



AFRICAN ACTIVISTS FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE

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ACRONYMS

ACCER	Africa Climate Change & Environmental Reporting
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and People's Rights
ACLI	African Climate Legislative Initiative
ACPC	Association pour le Développement et la Lutte contre le Changement Climatique
ACSEA	African Coalition for Sustainable Energy and Access
ADARS	Association for the Development of Rural Activities in Senegal and the Sahel
ADLCC	Association pour le Développement et la Lutte contre le Changement Climatique
AFMA	Association pour le Développement et la Lutte contre le Changement Climatique
AGN	African Group of Negotiators
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on Environment
ANGEL_SD	African Network on Gender Equality and Sustainable Development
APF	Association Paysan Sans Frontières
ATAD	Alliance Technique d'Assistance au Développement
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AYC	African Youth Commission
BPfA	Beijing Platform of Action
CAHOSCC	Conference of African Heads of State on Climate Change
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CBS	African Network on Gender Equality and Sustainable Development
CCCCF	Kenya County Climate Change Fund
CCDA	Climate Change and Development in Africa
CCJA	Community Climate Justice Activists/Volunteers
CCSAP	Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
CESE	Economic, Social and Environmental Council
CGLTE	Global Convergence of Struggles for Earth and Water in West Africa
UNCHR	UN Commission on Human Rights
CIMAC	Committee for the implementation of actions
CJFA	Climate Justice and Resilience Facility for Africa
CJRF	Climate Justice Resilience Fund
CPC	Climate Policy Centre
CSDDevNet	Climate & Sustainable Development Network of Nigeria
CSE	Ecological Monitoring Center
CSW	Commission on Status of Women
CVF	Climate Vulnerable Forum
DEFF	Department of Environmental Affairs, Forestry and Fisheries
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DMRE	Department of Natural Resources and Energy
ECEN	Eastern Cape Environmental Network
ESG Funds	Environmental, Social and Governance Funds
EVA	Education as a Vaccine
FPIC	Free and Prior Informed Consent
GAGGA	Global Alliance for Green and Gender Action
GAP	UNFCCC Gender Action Plan

GBV	gender-based violence
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
GLA	Green Livelihoods Alliance
HCCT	Haut Conseil des Collectivités Territoriales
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICPAC	IGAD Climate Prediction and Assessment Centre
INGC	Institute for Management of Risk and Disaster
JCA	Amplifying Voices for Just Climate Action
JESAC	Sahelian Youth for Climate Action
JUDEVD	Jeunesse Unies pour un développement Durable
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
NAP	National adaptation plans
NCCRS	Kenyan National Climate Change Response Strategy
NDC	Nationally determined contributions
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NJ	Natural Justice
NSC	National Steering Committee
OH	Outcome harvesting
OZA	Oxfam South Africa
PACJA	Pan African Climate Justice Alliance
PAMACC	Pan-African Media Alliance for Climate Change
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PGG	Programme Governance Group
RAPEN	Network of Associations for the Protection of the Environment
REC	Regional Economic Communities
SACAN	South African Climate Action Network
SACEF	South African Community Environmental Federation
SAFCEI	Southern African Faith Communities' Environment Institute
SCS	Strengthening Civil Society
SDCEA	South Durban Community Environmental Alliance
SEJN	Sisonke Environmental Justice Network
TAAFA	ACCER Awards Finalists Academy
UEWCA	Union of Ethiopian Women and Children Associations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	UN Environment Programme
UNEPMGCY	UN Environment Programme for Major Group of Children and Youth
YCJA	Young Climate Justice Activists

Figure 1. Climate Vulnerability index 2017. Combining climate change exposure, human sensitivity and adaptive capacity of countries (source: Maplesoft).





Figure 2. Impacts of climate change in 8 African countries.¹



¹ Impacts details of Global Warming (3°C) on the GDP (% Change/Year) provided per country are retrieved from: Kompas, T., Pham, V. H., & Che, T. N. (2018). The Effects of Climate Change on GDP by Country and the Global Economic Gains From Complying With the Paris Climate Accord. *Earth's Future*, 6(8), 1153–1173. <https://doi.org/10.1029/2018ef000922>



Alizeta (55), a farmer from Louda, Burkina Faso, has cultivated cereals all her life but yields have become ever lower. The seasons are gradually shifting, there is less and less rain and the dry season is longer and more intense. (Photo: Samuel Turpin)



Pastoralists in the **Somali region** have lost their animals and livelihoods due to four years of erratic rains and droughts. Crops have been decimated and people have been forced to rely on humanitarian aid for their survival. (Photo: Tommy Trenchard)



Climate change is causing lower and more unpredictable rainfall in Farfar, **Ethiopia**. Sama (9) is responsible for getting the cows home before dark. She says that the cows go further up the mountains every day in search of grass. She is afraid that one day she will not be able to find them anymore. (Photo: Petterik Wiggers)



In March 2019, during African Climate Week, climate change activists came together **across the African continent** to demand action from world leaders (Photo credit: Greener Impact)



DeCOALonize campaign joins climate strike in Kenya in 2019
Photo credit: Natural Justice

PART 1: THEORY OF CHANGE

1 BACKGROUND

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The journey of the lead applicant – the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) – started in 2008 when a group of African CSOs, concerned by the absence of African civil society voice in the international climate change dialogue processes, came together to mobilize, coordinate and put the continent’s unique stake in and contribution to a global climate strategy at the front and centre.

Today, PACJA is one of the largest, most vibrant coalitions of civil society organizations (CSOs) on the African continent that works on climate change and has gained recognition in African and international levels.

Climate change is having a growing impact on the African continent, contributing to food insecurity, land degradation, population displacement and stress on water resources. However, many African citizens do not yet connect the multiple challenges they face to the global causes of climate change.

Also for most governments, climate change is not yet a policy priority. Partly this is because other crises demand attention: corruption, debt, political instability, violence and unrest, gender inequality, unemployment, and more recently COVID-19². Climate change is seen as a topic that can be dealt with later. However, African governments also lack understanding of how climate change is disproportionately affecting citizens who already face many challenges and injustices: women, youth and local communities, such as indigenous communities and urban poor.³ Instead of involving these groups in policy making to ensure their fundamental rights are met, governments are approaching climate change primarily as a technical problem, prioritizing discussion with experts and scientists. Most governments also still prioritize economic growth over bold climate action and continue investment in fossil fuels and large scale agriculture leading to the violation of peoples’ rights and destruction of the environment.

The applicants of the proposed programme, African Activists for Climate Justice (AACJ), believe it is hugely unjust that people who have contributed least to the changing climate are most impacted. The AACJ consortium believes that the causes and effects of climate change must be related much more strongly to concepts of justice, in particular **environmental justice** and **social justice**.

² Despite relatively low numbers of COVID-19 cases which have been reported thus far, especially compared to other continents, COVID-19 is set to undo several years of development progress in Africa. Compared to the pre-COVID-19 forecast, Africa’s economy will be between US\$349 billion and US\$643 billion smaller in 2030. Efforts to roll out additional social grants in several African countries to mitigate the impact of the pandemic will marginally reduce extreme poverty and income inequality in the short term. Relative to the pre-COVID-19 forecast, 14 million additional Africans will be extremely poor in 2020. Source: Institute for Security Services. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from: ISSAfrica.org. (2020, July 23). *Updated forecasts quantify the impact of COVID-19 on Africa*. ISS Africa. <https://issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/updated-forecasts-quantify-the-impact-of-covid-19-on-africa>

³ Within the context of this proposal we define a local community as a group of people living in a particular area sharing beliefs, resources, preferences, needs, risks (among others) which form their identity. In this proposal local communities refer mostly to local communities that are disproportionately affected by climate change; indigenous communities, rural communities, pastoralists, IDPs and urban poor.

PACJA, FEMNET, Oxfam, Natural Justice and African Youth Commission have therefore come together to help strengthen an African movement for climate justice, amplifying the voice of Africans who are at the frontline of the climate crisis. We will work with women, youth and local communities – as well as other traditionally sidelined groups, such as people with disabilities – to call on governments and the private sector to act on the climate crisis and ensure the rights of all people to live a decent and dignified life in a healthy environment are met.

1.2 THE INJUSTICE

The climate crisis is the defining issue of our time and we are at a defining moment. The impacts are global in scope and unprecedented in scale: from shifting weather patterns that threaten food production, to rising sea levels that increase the risk of catastrophic flooding, to pollution in cities which increases health risks.

Science shows that as the impacts of climate change accelerate, extreme weather events are taking a major toll in developing countries. Africa has contributed the least of any continent to global warming; less than 3% of the world's total emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) emanates from the African continent.⁴ Yet, no continent will be struck as severely by the impacts of climate change⁵ (see also figure 1).

More than 52 million people in 18 countries across southern, eastern and central Africa are facing up to crisis levels of hunger as a result of weather extremes, compounded by poverty and conflict.⁶ COVID-19 is deepening the hunger crisis.⁷

Challenges include land degradation, desertification and loss of water retention⁸; affecting biodiversity, agricultural productivity and the food security, incomes and safety nets of millions. Droughts and floods in rural areas have forced many people to migrate to towns and cities, adding large new populations to existing slums.⁹ The long-term trend towards higher temperatures makes declining rainfall and greater aridity highly likely, with serious implications for development in Africa.¹⁰

Climate change is predicted to significantly decrease Africa's GDP through lowered crop yields, reduced agricultural and labour productivity, and damage to human health. Assuming no major changes to the world's social, economic and technological trends, climate change resulting in a temperature increase of 3 degrees Celsius will decrease

⁴ Hope, Sr, K. R. (2009). Climate change and urban development in Africa. *International Journal of Environmental Studies*, 66(5), 643–658. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207230903367955>

⁵ *Responding to climate change*. (n.d.). UNEP - UN Environment Programme. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.unep.org/regions/africa/regional-initiatives/responding-climate-change>

⁶ *More than 52 million people across Africa going hungry as weather extremes hit the continent*. (2020, April 7). Oxfam International. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/more-52-million-people-across-africa-going-hungry-weather-extremes-hit-continent>

⁷ Oxfam International. (2020, July 9). *The hunger virus: how COVID-19 is fuelling hunger in a hungry world*. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/hunger-virus-how-covid-19-fuelling-hunger-hungry-world>


⁸ IPBES (2018): The IPBES assessment report on land degradation and restoration. Montanarella, L., Scholes, R., and Brainich, A. (eds.). Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Bonn, Germany. 744 pages. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3237392>

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ *Special Report on Climate Change and Land*. (n.d.). Special Report on Climate Change and Land. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/>.

Africa's GDP by as much as 8.6% per year after 2100. If the rise is limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the decrease will be 3.8% per year after 2100.¹¹

Figure 1.1. The impact of climate change on sub-Saharan Africa's GDP (source: Africa's Growth Initiative)



GROUPS MOST AT RISK

There is a widespread consensus that **human rights to health, food, water and life** will be directly and indirectly affected by climate change. These effects will not be felt equally: more vulnerable segments of the global population will be hit hardest.

Climate change is a particular threat to the livelihoods of groups that are already excluded and oppressed, notably **women, youth and local communities**. Section 2.2 will further describe specific challenges these groups face because of climate change.

Most vulnerable are people with intersecting identities, such as IDP women and girls, black women and young people with disabilities. UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston, in a report on climate change and poverty, highlighted an 'increasing risk of climate apartheid'.¹²

NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A KEY STRATEGY TO TACKLE CLIMATE CHANGE

Land use change is the leading cause of climate change in Africa,¹³ and restoring and protecting nature are key strategies for tackling it. Forests,¹⁴ wetlands and other ecosystems not only help reduce carbon in the atmosphere, but also act as buffers against extreme weather, protecting houses, crops, water supplies and infrastructure.

¹¹ Okonjo-Iweala, N. (2020, January 30). *Africa can play a leading role in the fight against climate change*. Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/africa-can-play-a-leading-role-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/>.

¹² *World faces 'climate apartheid' risk, 120 more million in poverty: UN*. (2019b, June 28). UN News. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1041261>

¹³ *Land is a Critical Resource, report says*. (2019, August 8). IPCC. https://www.ipcc.ch/2019/08/08/land-is-a-critical-resource_srcc/

¹⁴ Forests in particular act as a carbon sink, and their storage potential could increase by as much as 3 to 5 gigatons of carbon per year if reforestation efforts were encouraged. Houghton, R. A. (2013). The emissions of carbon from deforestation and degradation in the tropics: past trends and future potential. *Carbon Management*, 4(5), 539–546. <https://doi.org/10.4155/cmt.13.41>

Rural women, indigenous communities and youth play a crucial role in protecting forests and ecosystem services, for example managing natural resources sustainably and by resisting land use change.¹⁵ Women and indigenous communities have knowledge and expertise that can be used in climate change mitigation, disaster reduction and adaptation strategies.¹⁶

Despite their valuable contribution, women, youth and indigenous communities are hardly heard or involved in land use planning processes. Instead, their (often customary) rights to manage forests and ecosystems are violated by extractives industries and infrastructural projects. Activists who mobilize people to oppose projects that affect communities' land and livelihoods are often harassed, criminalized and attacked.¹⁷

MORAL OBLIGATION TO PAY THEIR FAIR SHARE

Historically, the majority of GHG emissions have come from developed countries. Yet, the impacts of climate change have been greatest for low income countries. The table below shows the impacts of climate change on countries that have been selected to implement the AACJ programme, compared to a high income country, such as the Netherlands:

Table 1.1 Impact of climate change AACJ countries

	ND-gain index ¹⁸ scores for 2018			Emissions ¹⁹ 2019	
	Overall Rank (181 countries)	Vulnerability Rank (181 countries)	Readiness Rank (192 countries)	MtCO ₂ 2019 (% of Global)	tCO ₂ per capita
Burkina Faso	159	160	159	4.3 (0.012%)	0.2
Ethiopia	157	162	149	16 (0,044%)	0.1
Kenya	152	143	158	17 (0.047%)	0.3
Mozambique	154	137	169	8.7 (0.024%)	0.3
Nigeria	160	128	183	140 (0.384%)	0.7
Senegal	128	143	120	9.8 (0.027%)	0.6
Somalia	179	181	179	0.7 (0.002%)	0.0
South Africa	92	80	111	479 (1.314%)	8.2
Netherlands	16	31	14	155 (0.425%)	9.1
World total				36441	4.7

High-income countries may also experience disasters, but their economic power allows them to respond more quickly, adapt and support survivors.

¹⁵ Protection of ecosystem functions refer to e.g. preservation of biodiversity and maintenance of watershed functions.

¹⁶ *Women, Gender Equality and Climate Change*. (n.d.). WomenWatch. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from https://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/climate_change/

¹⁷ *Global Analysis 2019*. (2020, May 21). Front Line Defenders. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/resource-publication/global-analysis-2019>

¹⁸ University of Notre Dame. (n.d.). *Rankings // Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative // University of Notre Dame*. Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/>

¹⁹ *CO2 Emissions*. (n.d.). Global Carbon Atlas. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions>

BOX 1.1 CARBON INEQUALITY

From 1990 to 2015, annual emissions grew by 60% and cumulative emissions doubled. The richest 10% of the world's population (around 630 million people) were responsible for 52% of these additional emissions, while the poorest 50% (around 3.1 billion people) were responsible for just 7% of emissions. (*Oxfam report, Confronting Carbon Inequality, 2020*).

Reflecting the enormous variance in countries' contribution to climate change (see also Box 1.1) and their capacity to prevent and cope with its consequences, the Paris Agreement requires that (by 2020) rich countries commit USD 100 billion in climate finance per year for low- and middle-income countries to use for mitigation and adaptation. Yet there is a glaring lack of funding flowing from countries that are responsible for climate change.

Based on the reported numbers from 2017-2018, developed countries claim they are on track to meet the USD 100 billion goal. However, a closer look reveals that donor reports overstate climate finance by a huge margin. Most are loans, counted at their full face value, rather than the grant equivalent (the amount actually received once repayments, interest and other factors are accounted for). There are also significant inaccuracies in how the climate component of broader development projects is counted. Taking account of these issues, Oxfam estimates that public climate-specific net assistance is between USD 19 and 22.5 billion per year in 2017–18 – much lower than the reported figures.²⁰

1.3 THE CONSORTIUM

Consortium partners believe that all people have the right to live a decent and dignified life in a healthy environment. For people living on the African continent this right is increasingly compromised by climate change, especially for traditionally sidelined groups, such women, youth and local communities.

Consortium partners believe that a strong, broad-based Pan-African movement, with the people and communities most impacted by climate change at its heart, can help accelerate climate action and ensure that women, youth and local communities can enjoy their rights and thrive, instead of barely surviving. How a Pan-African movement for climate Justice can help shape more inclusive and sustainable societies will be presented in this programme proposal.

To contribute to an African movement for Climate Justice, the AACJ consortium has assembled partners and networks with broad constituencies and a diversity of tools, capacities, tactics and strategies to align and strengthen existing movements, organizations and initiatives advancing the (environmental) rights of women, youth and local communities. **Each consortium partner has presence and influence across Africa, with relevant and complementary expertise and experience:**

- **Climate Justice Activist Network PACJA** brings together over 1000 African organizations from 48 countries. PACJA has been at the forefront of advancing climate justice in Africa for over 10 years, using evidence-based advocacy to shape and improve policies and laws on natural resource management, and supporting local communities to develop climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies.

²⁰ *Climate Finance Shadow report 2020*, Oxfam (2020). Retrieved March 19, 2021 from: <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/climate-finance-shadow-report-2020>

- **Natural Justice (NJ)** works with 24 partners in 10 countries in Africa and uses legal empowerment, research, litigation and advocacy to stand with indigenous and local communities as they defend themselves and their ecosystems against environmental impacts caused by climate change and harmful extractive and infrastructure developments.
- **FEMNET** is a pan-African feminist network that brings together 800 members in 43 countries in Africa. It is strategically positioned as a convener and dialogue facilitator, enabling women and girls to claim, affirm and use their collective power to end all forms of exclusion, oppression, exploitation and injustices against them. FEMNET pushes for the implementation of commitments made by African governments to advance gender equality and realization of women's rights. Climate justice and natural resource governance are among FEMNET's key thematic focus areas.
- **Oxfam Novib** has 65 years of advocacy and campaign experience. Working in alliance with local allies and people's movements, it has advocated, and supported numerous actions and initiatives for climate accountability, funding for systemic climate solutions and support for communities least able to adapt. More recently it has built thought leadership on navigating restricted or changing civic space. Oxfam Novib is part of the Oxfam Confederation which works in 35 countries on the African continent.

The **African Youth Commission (AYC)** is an implementing partner, playing a key role in bringing more young people on board to raise awareness on climate change and influence national governments to implement climate-related projects in a transparent manner that benefits young people. The network also sees a vital role for youth in Africa to contribute to the development of practical solutions and efforts to enhance the livelihoods of vulnerable communities. The AYC has 228 members in 46 countries on the African continent.

1.4 SUPPORTING ACTIVISTS FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE: STARTING IN EIGHT COUNTRIES

The AACJ programme will be implemented in eight African countries: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia and South Africa. The AACJ consortium believes that building strong and inclusive movements for climate justice **in these countries** can be the engine for a powerful pan-African movement for climate justice. The selection of countries was based on a **combination of criteria**, including climate vulnerability. The consortium aimed for a combination of countries to allow for synergies, mutual learning, peer pressure among governments and knock-on effects, while contributing to a genuine African voice. The selection of countries was based on:

- **Opportunities for movement building.** In all AACJ countries our local partners have identified opportunities for inclusive movement building including the potential for strong partnership programmes and networks with relevant expertise and experience and availability of structures for movement building (such as existing movements, academies, climate change clubs, natural justice dialogues and youth platforms). Work in these countries will focus on supporting movements for climate justice to become more effective and inclusive, with youth, women and local and indigenous communities in leadership positions. The AACJ consortium has also taken into account geographical and linguistic balance, for representativeness and to facilitate multiplier effects between Anglophone, Francophone and Portuguese-speaking countries.
- **Needs for capacity strengthening and mutual learning.** In all eight countries local partners identified capacity gaps of CSOs and movements, for example to address shrinking space for CSOs, respond to conflicts and increased violence against human rights defenders, and engage with traditionally sidelined people. Consortium partners

will leverage their shared expertise and experience to support local organizations to build strong, effective and inclusive movements for change.

- **Climate change vulnerability:** Somalia, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso and Mozambique are among the countries most vulnerable to climate change, with women, youth and indigenous communities on the frontline (see also Figure 1). Our programme aims to work with and mobilize communities with **intersecting vulnerabilities**, including internally displaced people (IDPs). In countries including Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Burkina Faso, desertification, heat waves and floods are destroying the ecosystems on which the economies and cultures of nomadic pastoralist peoples are based. Pressure on natural resources is contributing to intercommunal conflicts over access to, and sharing of, remaining resources, such as fertile land and water.²¹ COVID-19 has further increased these communities' vulnerability and stress.
- **Emerging markets:** South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Senegal are resource-rich emerging economies where rapid growth has been accompanied by severe environmental degradation. Their challenge will be to support economic growth trajectories – key to fighting poverty – while curtailing environmental damage and GHG emissions and ensuing respect for human rights. Movements in these countries that are challenging their governments to align industrial policies with climate commitments can learn from each other, co-strategize, join forces when engaging with the African Union (AU) and push for policy frameworks with potential knock-on effects across the African continent.
- **Influence in (sub-)regional/global policy platforms:** Governments of South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal, leveraging their economic and/or political power, can lead efforts to improve Africa's influence in negotiations at regional and international levels and champion for effective and meaningful participation of women, youth and local communities in shaping policy frameworks. For example, in South Africa, CSOs will influence SADC²² through the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the Pan-African Parliament to ensure that voices of CSOs and local communities are heard at global level. Ethiopia has been showcasing strong regional, continental and international leadership for African-led climate change initiatives. Implementing the programme in Ethiopia, the AACJ consortium can also take advantage of proximity to the African Union (AU), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)²³ and its Climate Policy Centre (CPC).
- **Overlap with the Dutch Ministry's focus countries²⁴** to enhance opportunities for collaboration and shared strategizing between the AACJ consortium, embassies and the Dutch Ministry to advance climate justice in AACJ countries, and leveraging this progress for positive changes on the African continent.

²¹ Indigenous peoples and climate change, UN Economic and Social Council (12 January 2021). Retrieved March 19, 2021, from: <https://undocs.org/en/E/C.19/2021/5>

²² The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a Regional Economic Community comprising 16 Member States from Southern Africa.

²³ The Economic Commission for Africa was established by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations (UN) as one of the UN's five regional commissions. ECA's mandate is to promote the economic and social development of its member States and international cooperation for Africa's development.

²⁴ Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Somalia.

2 PROBLEM ANALYSIS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Inequality is at the heart of the climate crisis: while extreme events affect everyone, the magnitude of the impact depends on how far communities are from the centre of power. Their vulnerability is largely determined by their influence over the design, development and implementation of policies that could help them to adapt and cope.

Evidence indicates a vicious circle: the groups most likely to participate in policy-making processes are higher up the socio-economic scale and less vulnerable to climate impacts, whereas those who most need to articulate their interests and rights have least power, agency and opportunities to do so. This is partly because of a lack of formal processes which would enable their involvement, but equally important are less visible issues: lack of knowledge about or confidence in political processes; low education levels; norms and beliefs about roles of women and youth; and political capture (undue influence) by political and corporate elites that use their power protect their interests.

This chapter starts by describing three groups disproportionately hit by climate change, then details challenges that deepen existing vulnerabilities, injustices and inequalities in Africa and stand in the way of bold action on climate justice.

2.2 GROUPS DISPROPORTIONATELY HIT BY CLIMATE CHANGE

Women, young people and indigenous peoples are most **exposed** to climate hazards and less able to adapt and/or recover. They are more likely to be poor and illiterate, lack knowledge on climate change and access to shelter, food and sanitation. They are least positioned to **cope** with the effects of climate change due to their limited access to (natural and financial) resources, networks, decision-making power and legal systems. They are also least likely to be compensated for climate impacts, having to bear the loss and struggle to rebuild their livelihoods and properties.

- **Women** comprise a high percentage of people in poor communities who depend on local natural resources for their livelihood, particularly in rural areas. They are typically responsible for a household's cooking, heating and food security, making them particularly vulnerable to climate change.²⁵ In periods of prolonged drought it is particularly women and girls who make longer and more frequent journeys to obtain wood, food or water, which also makes them vulnerable to sexual assault.²⁶

²⁵ ²⁵ United Nations. (n.d.). *Women...In The Shadow of Climate Change*. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/women-in-shadow-climate-change>

²⁶ *Women at the Frontline of Climate Change. Gender Risks and Hope*. UNEP (2011). Retrieved, March 19, 2021 from: https://www.ipcc.ch/apps/njlite/ar5wg2/njlite_download2.php?id=9719

When men migrate to cities in search of better opportunities, women are often left vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, humiliation and violence, including rape.²⁷ Women, girls and sexual minorities in evacuation centres are more often subjected to sexual and gender-based violence and harassment, stigmatization and discrimination.²⁸

- Africa is home to some of the world's largest **youth populations**,²⁹ who will live longest with a changing climate and the resulting weather events, conflicts, violence and stress. Youth account for 60% of Africa's unemployed.³⁰ They are more likely to lose income from agricultural and other activities as a result of climate change, and make up the majority of the urban poor who live in unplanned, poorly constructed slums that are vulnerable to floods. A survey³¹ conducted for AACJ indicates that policy makers' neglect for youth pushes them to engage in activities detrimental to the environment, such as making charcoal. Youth climate movements, such as Fridays for the Future, have yet to gain as much traction in Africa as in the rest of the world.
- **Indigenous people and local communities** of fishers, pastoralists and small-scale farmers depend on natural resources for their economic, social, and cultural well-being. Land grabs for large-scale projects, pollution, biodiversity loss, desertification of arid and semi-arid regions and ocean acidification are among factors depriving local communities of these resources and threatening their livelihoods. Indigenous peoples, have a distinct social and cultural identity. Indigenous peoples constitute less than 5% of the world's population but safeguard 80% of the world's remaining biodiversity.³² Their contribution to combating climate change has been widely recognized, but governments still fail to systematically involve them in developing and implementing climate policies and in sustainable ecosystem management initiatives: only Ethiopia, Senegal and Nigeria among programme countries have included tenure security as part of their climate plans.³³ Communities that defend their land and natural resources risk harassment and violence because of their activism.
- **Most at risk** are groups where **identities** (such as race, gender, age and ability), **vulnerabilities and oppression intersect**. For example, people with disabilities are even less mobile and face higher health risks, while sexual minorities are more susceptible to human trafficking during climate crises.

Women, youth and local communities are also **powerful agents of change**. They possess knowledge and skills to contribute to climate change adaptation and mitigation and play a crucial role in opposing drivers of climate change (such as large scale agriculture and fossil fuels). However, they are often excluded from decision-making

²⁷ Mitra, Amit & Wajih, Shiraz & Singh, Bijay. (2015). Wheezing ecosystems, livelihood services and climate change resilience in Uttar Pradesh. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from: <https://pubs.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrate/10732IIED.pdf>

²⁸ *Environmental degradation driving gender-based violence – IUCN study*. (n.d.). IUCN. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.iucn.org/news/gender/202001/environmental-degradation-driving-gender-based-violence-iucn-study>

²⁹ *Climate Justice*. (n.d.). United Nations Sustainable Development. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/climate-justice/>

³⁰ *By 2050, More Than Half of Africa's Population Will be under 25 Years Old*. (n.d.). AFD - Agence Française de Développement. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.afd.fr/en/actualites/2050-more-half-africas-population-will-be-under-25-years-old>

³¹ Survey available upon request.

³² *Values of Indigenous Peoples Can Be a Key Component of Climate Resilience*. (2017, September 6). United Nations Climate Change. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://unfccc.int/news/values-of-indigenous-peoples-can-be-a-key-component-of-climate-resilience>

³³ Ibid.

processes that could help reduce their vulnerability, or their engagement is only tokenistic or pseudo-participatory.³⁴

2.3 GOVERNMENTS MUST DO MORE AND BETTER

Despite progressive global and regional policy frameworks – such as the SDGs, the Paris Agreement and Africa’s Agenda 2063³⁵ – urging governments to develop national and local adaptation strategies and limit global warming, people continue to face hunger, economic marginalization and conflicts as a direct result of climate change.³⁶

Central to implementing the Paris Agreement are **nationally determined contributions** (NDCs), which **communicate internationally** a country’s efforts to reduce national emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change, and **national adaptation plans** (NAP) which translate NDC goals into action and investment plans.

BOX 2.1 DELIVERING CLIMATE FINANCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

The Kenya County Climate Change Fund (CCCF) is a pioneering mechanism to facilitate the flow of climate finance to county governments. It also aims to empower local communities, through promoting their participation in the management and use of funds (e.g. for building resilience). The CCCF is a practical example of how climate finance can support climate-resilient development and effective adaptation as set out in the Paris Agreement. It has been piloted successfully in five counties in Kenya, and its expansion is one of the priorities in the National Climate Change Action Plan, 2018-2022. Retrieved from : <https://pubs.iied.org/G04415>

NAPs are meant to be ‘continuous, progressive and iterative processes which follow country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approaches’.³⁷

Even though NAPs play a central role in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, only five African countries (including Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Kenya) have submitted one.³⁸ Local adaptation planning processes **receive little attention**; the Kenyan Climate Change Act mandates local authorities to use 2% of their budgets for adaptation (see Box 2.1), but few other countries do the same. Countries that do have legal frameworks and public policies in place, such as Senegal and South Africa, still **fail to address** climate change in a **systemic and transversal way**.³⁹ National climate policies lack a focus on gender, inclusion and land rights, perpetuating the structural exclusion of women, youth and indigenous communities.

³⁴ *Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change: From Victims to Change Agents through Decent Work*. (2017, April 21). ILO. http://ilo.org/global/topics/indigenous-tribal/WCMS_551189/lang--en/index.htm

and Kosciulek, D. (2020, December 8). *Strengthening Youth Participation in Climate-related Policymaking*. Africa Portal. <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/strengthening-youth-participation-climate-related-policymaking/>

³⁵ Other frameworks include Lima Paris Action Agenda and the Lima Work Program on Gender, which specifically encourage involvement of climate-affected groups in policy making.

³⁶ *Global warming: severe consequences for Africa*. (2019, March 4). UN Africa Renewal. <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/global-warming-severe-consequences-africa>

³⁷ *National Adaptation Plans*. (n.d.). United Nations Climate Change. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/national-adaptation-plans>

³⁸ Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Togo. See also: *National Adaptation Plans*. (n.d.-a). United Nations Climate Change. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/national-adaptation-plans>

³⁹ More details and sources are presented in the country chapters.

Kenya, which was among the first African states to establish progressive climate legislation, continues to support investments in extractive industries that destroy local communities' livelihoods.⁴⁰ South Africa, heavily reliant on coal, is the world's 14th largest GHG emitter⁴¹ and among the low-ranking countries in the Climate Change Performance Index 2020.⁴²

The **large gap between climate commitments and effective implementation** is caused by factors including **lack of transparency** and governments and companies being at the forefront of policy debates, with groups most affected **excluded** from the drafting, approval, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of climate legislation, policies and programmes. Multiple implementation challenges also arise from **lack of knowledge** and **political will, uncertainty over policy direction, overstretched human and technical capacity, corruption** and **lack of financial resources** caused by the **slow pace of increase in climate finance**.⁴³

2.4 POSITIVE ROLE OF COMMUNITIES IGNORED AND HAMPERED

BOX 2.2 TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Community-based and collectively held knowledge of the land, sky and sea makes indigenous peoples excellent observers and interpreters of environmental change. Their valuable, landscape-specific insights can complement scientific data to help evaluate climate change scenarios. Indigenous knowledge can provide a foundation for community-based adaptation and mitigation actions to sustain resilience of interconnected social-ecological systems at local, regional and global scale.

Source: United Nations University. 2013. Why Traditional Knowledge Holds the Key to Climate Change to Climate Change.

The vast majority of Africans depend on land, forests and fishing grounds for their livelihoods. Climate impacts are contributing to the degradation of their land, freshwater, pasture, forests, fisheries and wildlife, leading to loss of incomes and food insecurity.

Ensuring the **sustainable management of these natural resources** is a **key aspect of climate adaptation** – for example, by restoring degraded land. While some adaptation actions require coordination and leadership at higher geographical levels, many need to be taken locally by communities and individual people and businesses.

However, local communities' crucial role in managing natural resources⁴⁴ (see also Box 2.2) is **barely acknowledged**.

Out of the 44 NDCs submitted by African States, only nine mention traditional or

⁴⁰ Kenya | *Climate Action Tracker*. (n.d.). Climate Action Tracker.Org. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://climate-actiontracker.org/countries/kenya/>

⁴¹ Prater, T. (2020, April 7). *The Carbon Brief Profile: South Africa*. Carbon Brief. <https://www.carbonbrief.org/the-carbon-brief-profile-south-africa>

⁴² *The Climate Change Performance Index 2020: Results*. (2019, December 10). Germanwatch.Org. <https://www.germanwatch.org/en/17281>

⁴³ *Climate Finance Shadow Report 2020*. (2020, October 20). Oxfam International. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/climate-finance-shadow-report-2020>

⁴⁴ *Principles for Locally Led Adaptation*. (2021, March 5). World Resources Institute. <https://www.wri.org/our-work/project/global-commission-adaptation/principles-locally-led-adaptation>

indigenous knowledge.⁴⁵ Challenges include the absence of enabling legal frameworks, lack of documentation of the relevant traditional knowledge and lack of interest from decision makers.

Local communities face **three main interlinking challenges**, in addition to climate change, which put their **livelihoods under increased pressure**

First, lack of **secure land tenure and natural resource rights**.⁴⁶ While many governments acknowledge customary land rights, few give them strong legal protection. When land rights are weak or insecure, indigenous peoples and local communities can lose access to critical resources, or lose their land entirely. This makes it harder for people to protect valuable ecosystems against land use changes, and also gives them no incentive to invest in their land. Local and indigenous populations see the use and protection of land as interrelated, unlike governments, scientists and others.⁴⁷

Second, local and indigenous communities often lack knowledge of and access to policy frameworks⁴⁸ that can **help them defend their environmental and land rights** and increase their **access to compensation for wrongdoing**. Communities that use these frameworks often get tied up in costly processes that last for years and create tensions and violence.

Third, drivers of environmental degradation beyond climate change impact communities' livelihoods, such as **infrastructure development, extractive industries** and the **expansion of crop and grazing lands into native vegetation such as forests**. The state-led development model of many African countries (including Mozambique, Ethiopia, Senegal and Nigeria) – which prioritizes economic growth and an exploitative type of industrial development – has dramatically increased the amount of land concessions. Transparent consultation processes with affected communities, such as free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and environmental impact assessments, are critical to avoid land grabs and degradation – but strong enforcement mechanisms are lacking.

2.5 CHALLENGES AFRICAN CLIMATE MOVEMENTS FACE

In 2015 the UNFCCC emphasized the key role of CSOs in effective implementation of the Paris Agreement at national and local level. However, CSOs have not been involved in designing and developing climate policies in most African countries – and even in the exceptions, such as Kenya, they have had little role in implementation and monitoring.

Groups with the highest stakes – in particular youth, women and local and indigenous communities – continue to be excluded. Most governments lack a clearly defined framework on what “participation” means, and how it should happen. A strong, pan-African movement for climate justice could demand more involvement. While a broad range of vibrant climate movements and initiatives exist in Africa, the AACJ consortium believes they will gain strength when they rally together and put most-affected communities front and centre.

⁴⁵ *Traditional Knowledge key in achieving Africa's climate goals*. (2019, January 22). IUCN. <https://www.iucn.org/news/commission-environmental-economic-and-social-policy/201901/traditional-knowledge-key-achieving-africas-climate-goals>

⁴⁶ Rights and Resources Initiative. (2020, March 16). *Indigenous Peoples & Local Community Tenure in the INDCs*. Rights + Resources. <https://rightsandresources.org/publication/indigenous-peoples-local-community-tenure-indcs/>

⁴⁷ Berkes, F. (2008). *Sacred Ecology*. Second edition. Routledge, New York.

⁴⁸ Such as due diligence; free, prior and informed consent; and environmental impact assessments.

The consortium believes that a strengthened movement for climate justice requires more cross-fertilization among organizations and local communities, connecting local movements that have emerged organically. It also requires addressing the **two key challenges** explained in the final three sections of this chapter.

2.5.1 HOW WE TALK ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE DEFINES WHO TAKES PART IN THE DEBATE

Most African citizens do not perceive climate change as the most important problem their governments should address.⁴⁹ Despite a near-universal sense that changing weather patterns are already affecting lives, the term 'climate' is rarely used.⁵⁰ About one in four Africans (28%) is considered "fully climate change literate".⁵¹

For centuries, indigenous and local communities in Africa have utilized their knowledge systems to respond to changing climatic conditions. However, this type of knowledge receives very little attention, including from African governments.⁵²

In all countries where AACJ will be implemented, the **debate on climate change is dominated by a small group in government, scientific experts and a few CSOs**. Less formal and community-based organizations are underrepresented.

How we talk about climate change has a big influence on who takes part in the debate. Language on climate change in African countries is dominated by Northern (and male) perspectives, and excludes groups which lack understanding of technical terms. The dominant discourse portrays local communities, youth and women as victims of climate change who need support, rather than holders of knowledge on conservation, restoration and management of land that can point to promising ways to adapt to climate change.

African media reports rarely link climate change to people's everyday lives, importing knowledge rather than developing it from an African perspective.⁵³ African opinion leaders consider the lack of clear and compelling narratives among the greatest barriers to public engagement with climate change in Africa.⁵⁴

2.5.2 SHRINKING CIVIC SPACE

Another challenge for activists, CSOs and movements on climate action is shrinkage of civic and democratic space. In countries where AACJ will be implemented, space for civil

⁴⁹ Welle 1, D., & Mwakideu, C. (2019, August 21). *Afrobarometer: Climate change literacy still low in Africa*. The Mail & Guardian. <https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-21-00-afrobarometer-climate-change-literacy-still-low-in-africa/>

⁵⁰ Godfrey, Anna & LeRoux-Rutledge, Emily & Cooke, Susan & Burton, Miriam. (2010). *Africa Talks Climate: The public understanding of climate change in ten countries*. Executive Summary. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319709766_Africa_Talks_Climate_The_public_understanding_of_climate_change_in_ten_countries_Executive_Summary

⁵¹ *Change ahead: Experience and awareness of climate change in Africa | Afrobarometer*. (2019, August). AfroBarometer. <https://afrobarometer.org/publications/pp60-change-ahead-experience-and-awareness-climate-change-africa>


⁵² *Traditional Knowledge key in achieving Africa's climate goals*. (2019, January 22). IUCN. <https://www.iucn.org/news/commission-environmental-economic-and-social-policy/201901/traditional-knowledge-key-achieving-africas-climate-goals>

⁵³ Lorez, C. (2020, July 2). *Communicating Climate Change in East Africa - ICPAC*. Medium. <https://icpac.medium.com/communicating-climate-change-in-east-africa-295e3bdce211>

⁵⁴ *Africa Talks Climate*. (2010). BBC Media Action. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/publications-and-resources/research/reports/africa/africa-talks-climate>

society is repressed (Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria), obstructed (Mozambique, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Kenya) or narrowed (South Africa) as shown in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1. Civic space in AACJ countries: repressed, obstructed and narrowed.⁵⁵



⁵⁵ See also: <https://monitor.civicus.org/>. Sources for country details are presented in country sections (see section 7.2-7.11).

Governments do not sufficiently uphold **freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression**. Non-violent actions such as marches and roadblocks are increasingly prohibited, including in Burkina Faso and Somalia. A recently passed bill in Nigeria prevents ordinary citizens from holding open discussion fora. Media houses and journalists in Somalia have been raided for publishing critical reports. Even in South Africa, where the constitution protects freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, civil society faces enormous challenges in engaging with the government.⁵⁶

Although social media offers great opportunities to connect and mobilize, freedom of expression is also being restricted on the internet. In countries such as in Kenya,⁵⁷ laws on hate speech and defamation are used to prosecute critical voices and dissidents. Fake news is spreading quickly in Burkina Faso through social media platforms.⁵⁸ Cyber bullying and harassment are also increasing, with online abuse specifically affecting women rights defenders and sexual minorities. Movements are hindered by long-term intentional internet shutdowns.

In six out of the eight programme countries – Somalia, Nigeria, Mozambique, Kenya, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso – civil society faces additional risks from **armed violence and violent Islamist extremism**. Activists, journalists and human rights defenders are not free to report openly on human rights abuses, advocate for political alternatives or campaign on sensitive topics due to high levels of impunity and the threat of force, such as abduction and torture. Safety fears mean they have to consider every step carefully.

Environmental and land rights activism has become especially dangerous over the last decade,⁵⁹ as growing criminalization, disinformation, stigmatization and smear campaigns seek to discredit the work of environmental rights defenders and also create an environment for impunity and violence, particularly targeting women. Indigenous peoples are more than three times as likely to be killed as defenders working in other fields.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ South Africa. (n.d.). Civicus. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.civicus.org/index.php/eena-country/south-africa>

⁵⁷ The 2018 Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act in Kenya.

⁵⁸ *Discussing fake news at the Night of Ideas in Ouagadougou*. (2021, February 8). CFI. <https://cfi.fr/en/news/discussing-fake-news-night-ideas-ouagadougou>

⁵⁹ Civicus. (2019, November 19). *New paper on the restrictions facing climate change activists*. <https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/reports-publications/4173-new-paper-on-the-restrictions-facing-climate-change-activists>

⁶⁰ *Global Analysis 2018*. (2020, January 7). Front Line Defenders. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/resource-publication/global-analysis-2018>.

3 TOWARDS CLIMATE JUSTICE

3.1 CLIMATE JUSTICE

For the AACJ consortium, **climate justice** means **all people have the right to live a decent and dignified life in a healthy environment**. We believe that curbing climate change and enabling all people to build resilience and recover from climate-related shocks is key to break the vicious cycle of inequality and vulnerability.

We believe all governments must develop and implement policies and practices that:

- Protect their **delicate ecosystems** – tropical forests, savannahs, montane grasslands, mangroves, deserts, wetlands – and ensure the sustainable management of **natural resources**, so both current and future generations can benefit from them.
- Reduce **GHG emissions** and support the **transition to more sustainable economies**.
- Ensure **people affected by climate change**, particularly those in vulnerable situations, have access to **effective remedies and means of adaptation** to enjoy human dignity.
- Enable **meaningful and effective participation** of citizens, in particular **women, youth, indigenous people and local communities**, in policy processes, ensuring democratic practice.
- Ensure the **protection of human rights and environmental defenders**
- Respond to **'loss and damage'** caused by climate change with compensation and safety nets at national level, and disaster preparedness, participatory governance and microfinance at local level.
- Increase **funding** for these climate actions.

Climate justice also means **developed nations and emerging economies take responsibility for their historic emissions. Developed nations must contribute funds and technologies** so developing countries can address climate change and transition to more sustainable economies. This historic responsibility has been recognized by heads of state at summits from Rio de Janeiro (1992) to Copenhagen (2009) to Paris (2015), but developed nations have still failed to deliver on their responsibilities.⁶¹

A strong movement, led by the groups most affected by climate change, can help to:

- Ensure that people who are most impacted and have most at stake are at the frontline of **designing, developing, implementing and monitoring climate action**.
- Apply a **human rights lens**⁶² to climate change.
- Increase **transparency and accountability** in developing and implementing climate policies.

⁶¹ Roberts, J. T., Weikmans, R., Robinson, S., Cipler, D., Khan, M., & Falzon, D. (2021). Rebooting a failed promise of climate finance. *Nature Climate Change*, 11(3), 180–182. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-00990-2>

⁶² The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) have addressed the relationship between human rights and climate change and called for a human rights-based approach to measures addressing climate change. See for more details: <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/COP21.pdf>.

- **Break silos** between movements and CSOs, **connect struggles** and **increase solidarity**.

3.2 GROUPS THE CONSORTIUM WILL WORK WITH

Women, young people and local and indigenous communities have been shown to be more exposed and less resilient to climate change risks than, for example, male adults. They also play crucial roles in climate change adaptation and mitigation:

- **Women** often show more concern for the environment, support pro-environmental policies and vote for pro-environmental leaders, so their greater involvement in politics and NGOs could result in environmental gains. **Women's** responsibilities in households and rural communities position them to contribute to adaptive livelihood strategies, but this requires more recognition and visibility and more women in leadership positions.
- **African youth** can create and drive solutions to climate change, as shown by a survey conducted by African Youth Commission. This requires young people to be taken seriously: under-25s comprise 60% of Africa's population, but have limited participation in decision making – including on climate-related issues.⁶³ Cultural norms often dictate that elders make decisions and bar youth from community leadership roles.
- **Indigenous and local communities** have traditional knowledge that gives them a unique role in climate mitigation and adaptation efforts and just transition policies.⁶⁴ They must be seen as powerful agents of change and enabled to participate in developing climate policies. Research shows that giving legal rights to community forests can reduce deforestation and carbon emissions.⁶⁵

3.3 OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE

We see many opportunities for a nascent African movement for climate justice:

- **Africa's engagement on climate change is evolving rapidly**.⁶⁶ A major UNDP survey found that 60% of respondents in Nigeria and 76% in South Africa believe climate change is a global emergency,⁶⁷ giving politicians a clear mandate for action.
- **Governments are increasingly being forced** to confront **climate change** by droughts and water shortages, flooding, extreme weather events and sea level rise. There is growing political will: more than half of sub-Saharan African countries have made economic reforms in recent years to become more resilient to climate change impacts.⁶⁸
- A **new generation** of savvy, sharp and **entrepreneurial leaders** is emerging across Africa. They are rising through government ranks, starting up businesses, working as local representatives of multinational corporations, and leading local NGOs and activist

⁶³ Yahya, M. (2017, August 30). *Africa's Defining Challenge*. Project Syndicate. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/africa-youth-opportunities-policies-by-mohamed-yahya-2017-08?barrier=accesspaylog>

⁶⁴ ILO. (2016, November 7). *Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change: From Victims to Change Agents through Decent Work [Summary]*. https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/indigenous-tribal/WCMS_534346/lang--en/index.htm

⁶⁵ Rights and Resources Initiative. (2020, March 16). *Indigenous Peoples & Local Community Tenure in the INDCs*. Rights + Resources. <https://rightsandresources.org/publication/indigenous-peoples-local-community-tenure-indcs/>

⁶⁶ Africa Talks Climate. (2010). BBC Media Action. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/publications-and-resources/research/reports/africa/africa-talks-climate>

⁶⁷ *The Peoples' Climate Vote*. (2021, January 26). UNDP. <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/climate-and-disaster-resilience/The-Peoples-Climate-Vote-Results.html>

⁶⁸ *Africa's new climate economy: economic transformation and social and environmental change*. (2016, November). ODI. <https://www.odi.org/publications/10593-africa-s-new-climate-economy-economic-transformation-and-social-and-environmental-change>

groups. They are tired of unaccountable governments and economic stagnation and bringing new ideas and vision, often fortified by travel abroad and a global outlook.⁶⁹

- There are **increased opportunities for women, indigenous communities and youth** to participate in political decision-making processes. Youth constituencies are demanding a seat at the decision-making table⁷⁰ and increasingly participate in formal climate change meetings such as the Youth Advisory Group to the COP Presidency.⁷¹
- CSOs increasingly understand **legal activism** (such as strategic litigation) and legal empowerment (for example increasing local communities' awareness of human rights frameworks) and their relevance to development outcomes.⁷² The legal community has also become more networked across Africa in recent years.
- **Cell phones are becoming ubiquitous** in Africa and internet access is growing quickly, even in remote areas, enabling the flow of information on which accountability and transparency depend. Social media has helped movements and CSOs to connect.⁷³
- There is growing recognition that **women and indigenous communities** can make a **unique contribution** to address climate change.⁷⁴ Indigenous and local communities are becoming more open to sharing their knowledge.

Key policy processes and (legal) frameworks that our programme can build on:

- Agenda 2030 (the SDGs) and Africa's 2063 Agenda both focus on '**Leaving No One Behind**'. We can leverage these frameworks for an inclusive climate justice movement.
- The **Climate for Development in Africa** (ClimDev-Africa) programme is an initiative of the African Union Commission (AUC), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and African Development Bank (AfDB). It was established to create a foundation for Africa's climate change response. PACJA represents civil society in its coordinating Committee and plays a crucial role in convening its flagship annual conferences.
- The **African Climate Legislative Initiative** (ACLI) is a joint PACJA and Pan African Parliament initiative to drive climate legislation in African countries.
- Implementation of the Paris Agreement and **Nationally Determined Contributions** (NDCs) started this year. Tracking implementation can help keep governments accountable for implementing climate policies, including at the local level.
- The SDGs have a dedicated goal to **advance gender equality**, and gender indicators are mainstreamed across the remaining 16 goals. The Beijing Platform of Action (BPfA) has 12 critical areas to advance gender equality. COP25 adopted a **Gender Action Plan** to advance gender equality in the UNFCCC. Generation Equality Forums is set to advance feminist actions on climate justice.
- Engagement with the annual **African Ministerial Conference on Environment** (AMCEN) can influence climate policies at regional level. Engagement with the African Group of Negotiators can influence the **UNFCCC COP**.
- Governments are investing in low-carbon, climate-resilient projects for the post-COVID recovery.⁷⁵ Financial institutions are starting to rethink their funding of fossil fuels.⁷⁶

⁶⁹ *Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way*. (2010, September). Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/archive/doc/full_text/EmergingAfrica/Radelet_EmergingAfrica.html

⁷⁰ *Shaking Up to Move Forward: Visions for stronger partnerships between youth movements and social organizations*. (2020, December 2). Oxfam. <https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/shaking-up-to-move-forward-visions-for-stronger-partnerships-between-youth-move-621039/>

⁷¹ *Why African youth matter in global environmental discourse*. (2020, August 12). UN Environment. <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/blogpost/why-african-youth-matter-global-environmental-discourse>

⁷² Using the law and justice mechanisms to reduce marginalization and inequality.

⁷³ *Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way*. (2010, September). Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/archive/doc/full_text/EmergingAfrica/Radelet_EmergingAfrica.html

⁷⁴ *Women, Gender Equality and Climate Change*. (n.d.). WomenWatch. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from https://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/climate_change/

⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶ Bergen, M., & Mountford, H. (2021, March 10). *6 Signs of Progress Since the Adoption of the Paris Agreement*. World Resources Institute. <https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/paris-agreement-progress-climate-action>

3.4 ACTOR ANALYSIS

Our programme will amplify the voice of people on the frontline of the climate crisis: women, youth and local and indigenous peoples who depend on natural resources.

We support communities, movements, formal and informal networks, CBOs and CSOs to claim rights, develop local adaptation approaches, engage in policy making and urge governments to deliver their mandate to protect citizens' rights to a decent life and healthy environment. As a consortium we will bring together a unique combination of movements and networks of environmental activists, smallholder producers, pastoralists, women, youth and CSOs. We enable them to connect, create new alliances and inspire more people to join. Organizations we will reach out to to join the movement include:

- **Partner platforms** such as AYC, Consortium for Climate Change (CCC-E) in Ethiopia, Climate & Sustainable Development Network (CSDevNET) in Nigeria, Farmers confederations in Burkina Faso (CPF) and Senegal (CNCR), Kenya Platform for Climate Governance and women's networks MULEIDE and Livaningo in Mozambique.
- **NGOs, local community's networks, think tanks** with their varied connections to local communities, like-minded organizations and wider society, are crucial to help bridge the gap between different sectors as African countries develop their national responses to climate change. The AACJ consortium has broad networks in all eight countries where the programme will be implemented, which include organizations of women, small-scale farmers, pastoralists, youth/ students, paralegals, etc.
- **Advocacy and research partners** such as Powershift Africa and Climate Prediction and Assessment Centre (ICPAC).
- **Complementary organizations we work with regionally and globally:** such as Pan-African Media Alliance for Climate Change (PAMACC), Consumer Unity Trust Africa, African Coalition for Sustainable Energy and Access/Big Shift campaign, CAADP Non-State Actors Coalition, ICCA consortium, Forest Peoples Program, Land Rights Now, International Land Coalition and Climate Action Network.

Figure 3.1 (page 30) presents a first overview of local, national and global partners and networks that the consortium will work with to implement the AACJ programme. More details about these partners are presented in sections 7.2-7.11.

We will also work with **allies and broker relationships** with those who can reach, influence and mobilize much wider constituencies for climate justice. Together we will **target (inter)governmental change makers** shaping climate policies:

- **Local authorities** and their platforms (such as United Cities and Local Governments of Africa) implement national programmes at local level. Through their proximity to local communities, they are well positioned to communicate on climate change and inspire citizens to respond, increase adaptive capacities and implement local adaptation strategies – yet they tend not to be well informed about climate change.^{zz}
- **Religious and customary leaders** can communicate on climate change with their constituencies, but need better understanding of climate change and climate justice.
- **National governments** have a legal and moral responsibility to protect the environment, natural resources, valuable ecosystems (including across boundaries) and meet the rights of citizens. They can accelerate climate policies and ensure no-one

^{zz} Godfrey, Anna & LeRoux-Rutledge, Emily & Cooke, Susan & Burton, Miriam. (2010). Africa Talks Climate: The public understanding of climate change in ten countries. Executive Summary. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319709766_Africa_Talks_Climate_The_public_understanding_of_climate_change_in_ten_countries_Executive_Summary

is left behind by implementing inclusive and progressive NDC partnerships and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and engaging with citizens on sustainable and inclusive development trajectories. Authorities tasked with **monitoring and compliance** (such as Kenya's National Environment Management Authority) also play a key role.

- **Developed-country governments** can be pressured to deliver on Paris commitments, in particular emission targets and climate funding. More progressive governments can be partners, pressuring others to turn promises into reality.
- **Progressive regional and continental platforms** can help accelerate African climate policies: the African Ministerial Conference on Environment, African Union (AU), Committee on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE), Pan African Parliament (PAP), Regional Economic Committees (RECs) - such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and South African Development Community (SADC), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Development Bank (AfDB), Climate for Development in Africa Programme (ClimDev-Africa) and African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.
- **Global bodies** including The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Green Climate Fund (GCF), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Commission on Status of Women (CSW) define frameworks and funding for action and can urge African states and bodies to accelerate climate action while 'leaving no one behind'.

We will highlight the role of the **private and financial sector**, supporting movements that campaign against (investment in) exploitative companies that affect ecosystems and abuse (environmental) rights of communities. We also challenge investors that finance large-scale projects without consulting local communities (FPIC) or acting on environmental impact assessments.


Finally, we will work with stakeholders that can help develop and spread new narratives:

- **Conventional and new media** can increase awareness of citizens, communities, local authorities and governments on climate change and enable civil society's watchdog role. Media require a better understanding of climate change concepts and processes.
- **Opinion leaders, academia, think tanks and researchers** can be essential (influencing) partners to provide evidence for activism and improving policies. PACJA's **Nairobi Summer School on Climate Justice** (see Box 3.1) and similar initiatives will offer excellent opportunities to bring together scholars and activists to cross-fertilize knowledge between communities and academia and offer opportunities to develop climate justice narratives.
- **Dutch embassies in AACJ countries** can help to access processes and information.
- **Dutch and global climate movements** can be strong partners to rally together on climate justice.

BOX 3.1: CLIMATE JUSTICE SUMMER SCHOOLS

Climate Justice Summer Schools, a PACJA initiative, bring together universities, research institutions, CSOs and grassroots champions for two weeks to share, learn and network on issues related to climate justice such as climate policies and legal frameworks, international processes, the role of climate movements, climate science and participatory research. Participants learn about climate justice through plenary sessions, breakout workshops, creative arts, case studies, exhibitions and experiential learning tours. Specific attention is paid to frontline communities: students learn about the concerns and adaptation strategies of indigenous communities, smallholder farmers, fisher folk, women and youth, among others.

Figure 3.1. Partners the AACJ consortium will reach out to/ work with.



4 THEORY OF CHANGE

4.1 ULTIMATE GOAL AND LONG TERM IMPACT

The impacts of climate change are not being borne equally or fairly, between rich and poor, women and men, and older and younger generations. The voices of frontline communities who both offer **solutions** to protect our climate **and** face the harshest **consequences** of the immediate impacts of climate change, are excluded from the policy debates shaping their futures. Their voices are often also isolated as opposed to aligned, and lack the capacity to come together in unified front calling for action.

The goal of our programme is to amplify and unite the voices in Africa demanding that **women, youth and local and indigenous communities in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia and South Africa can defend and realize their human rights and live a decent and dignified life in a healthy and sustainable environment, within the context of the climate emergency.**

The long term impact (strategic objective) of the proposed programme is:

LONG TERM IMPACT/ STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

A **strong and inclusive African movement** has mobilized citizens, companies and governments to advance climate justice, specifically contributing to:

1. Amplified voices of people who are disproportionately affected by the changing climate, and that offer solutions for a more sustainable future, such as women, youth and local and indigenous communities;
2. African narratives that highlight lived experiences of women, youth and local and indigenous communities impacted by climate change, and which can help change the terms of debate on climate change;
3. Empowered citizens/ communities that claim and defend their social and environmental rights;
4. Scoping and scaling of community- based best practice on adaptive capacities of climate frontline communities and;
5. Policy and practice change that prevent adverse impacts of climate change, support communities that are already affected and enable the transition to more sustainable, and low carbon economies, while leaving no one behind.

4.2 MEDIUM TERM IMPACT GOALS

Two medium-term impact goals will contribute to the overall objective:

- Strong, inclusive and effective **movements** promote climate justice and keep governments and companies accountable; and
- **Policies, practices and frameworks** that advance climate justice are adopted, funded and implemented.

Achieving climate justice calls for far reaching policy changes which require **political will**.

The mobilization of women, youth and local and indigenous communities in our programme will contribute to **better consideration** of their concerns, and recognition of their power and **innovative solutions** that can help mitigate the effects of the climate crisis.

Strong, legitimate movements, with sufficient space to engage with governments, play a crucial role in **promoting and claiming rights, monitoring the implementation** of policies, and **testing existing legislation and policy frameworks**.

Strong and legitimate movements also help **rebalance power relations** between groups that are often oppressed and excluded, such as indigenous communities, women and youth, and more powerful players such as governments, companies and (elderly) men.

Taking an educating, activating, mobilizing and participating role, a strong and legitimate movement can help **rebalance power asymmetries** and **advance climate justice** by:

- **Raising awareness on root causes of climate change**, and advocating for climate action from governments, companies and citizens.
- **Challenging African governments** that want to boost economic growth by investing in fossil fuels instead of supporting the green transition.
- **Showcasing community-driven solutions and alternatives** as evidence that alternatives are possible.
- **Challenging Northern countries** that fail to take responsibility for their historic emissions.
- **Creating space for communities to stage their own stories** about global warming and community-based solutions and frame climate change as an ethical and political issue.
- **Challenging patriarchy and racism** which perpetuate and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and exclude women, people of colour and youth from policy- and decision-making processes.
- **Empowering communities to oppose projects that degrade their natural resources** and limit their capability to be custodians of natural resources.
- **Mobilizing solidarity networks** that protect civic space and environmental rights defenders.
- **Activating and mobilizing citizens worldwide** to demand urgent climate action from the main contributors to climate change.

We will not only respond to power asymmetries within countries, but also challenge **asymmetries of power between countries**. We will connect with movements outside Africa, such as Climate Action Network Europe, jointly challenging unaccountable governments and unsustainable production and consumption patterns. Making these connections will help increase solidarity across communities and make the global climate movement more inclusive and legitimate.

Finally, **we will work from local to regional to global level, and vice versa**. We will amplify local voices – communicating both struggles and positive experiences – to advocate for strong climate policies and national laws, and demand and monitor their implementation. We will use progressive frameworks, such as the Paris Agreement, the Africa 2063 Agenda and the SDGs to influence national governments and companies for positive changes in people's lives.

4.3 PATHWAYS FOR CHANGE

4.3.1 INTRODUCTION

Five pathways for change will contribute to the strategic objective, as shown in Figure 3.1. Within each pathway, the focus is on **standing behind** local communities, women and (young) citizens to defend their rights in the face of the climate emergency and to join movements that urge governments, the private sector and citizens to take bolder action.

Two crucial themes are mainstreamed in our programme: **inclusion** – ensuring groups in vulnerable positions play a key role in all programme interventions; and **civic space** – empowering local groups and organizations to navigate shrinking space and protect rights defenders against harassment and attacks. More details on these cross-cutting themes can be found in Chapter 5.

Figure 4.1. Visualization of the theory of change



Within each pathway, each consortium partner will bring specific expertise and experience:

Pathways		Expertise
P1	Strengthening climate movements which are driven by women and youth, and connected with global movements.	FEMNET, Natural Justice and AYC: outreach, inclusion women and youth, intersectionality and SEAH. PACJA and Oxfam: strengthening and connecting networks and (global) alliances, and facilitating alignment with policy processes.
P2	Developing and spreading African climate justice narratives.	FEMNET and AYC: creating spaces for climate affected groups to develop their own narratives.

		PACJA and Oxfam: helping root community-based solutions to climate change in narratives; developing and implementing awareness campaigns
P3	Empowering communities and individuals to claim and defend their social and environmental rights.	Natural Justice: strategic litigation and legal empowerment of local communities. Protection of Human Rights Defenders.
P4	Scoping and scaling community-based best practice that strengthen adaptive capacities of climate frontline communities.	PACJA: developing and scoping community-based best practice, ensuring uptake by policy makers and companies
P5	Increasing political will of decision-makers (national and international) to support policies that advance climate justice.	Expertise shared by all consortium partners.

The next sub-sections explain how the pathways contribute to the programme’s medium-term impact and strategic objective.

4.3.2 PATHWAY 1: STRENGTHENING MOVEMENTS

Outcome 1: Strong, inclusive and connected climate movements in Africa.

Change we will work towards

Our aim is to help build a **broad-based African movement** that is aligned thematically and geographically, which brings together existing movements and struggles. Such a movement will create spaces for and harness the momentum of groups including youth, women, local communities and the more recent types of ‘leaderless movements’, and will integrate multiple sections of society – in order to rally around critical issues regarding climate justice. **This requires two distinct efforts.**

First, we will help strengthen organizations of traditionally sidelined groups – women, youth and local communities – contributing to an **inclusive, bottom-up movement for climate justice**. We will sensitize climate-affected communities on their rights and mobilize them to join existing organizations and movements or establish new ones, and ensure their interests are put front and centre. We will build on existing structures such as **Environmental Justice Fora** in Kenya and **Climate Change Clubs** in Senegal.

We will ensure that the **most-affected groups** are at **the forefront of the movement**, shaping its direction. We will promote leadership roles for women, youth and indigenous

BOX 4.1 MOVEMENT BUILDING – SOME LESSONS

There are lots of lessons on how social movements have been built and effectively achieved changes in policy and practice. According to Daniel Hunter, author of the Climate Resistance Handbook, movements are like waves: a bundle of energy made up of many parts that may appear to pop up suddenly but in fact emerge only after, in the early stages, citizens have built up and connected small networks, invested in skill-building and studied other movements. Movements do not win because of singular actions, however big these may be. Smaller actions, which might be less visible, and more experimental actions are equally important. A successful movement needs sustained pressure for change at many levels: local, national, regional and global. It should not be considered a problem if, in the middle of a movement, things look chaotic and disorderly: while working for unity is good, people will not always see things exactly the same way.

communities, for example through summer schools and activist labs which deepen their knowledge on climate justice and strengthen their negotiating capacities. We will facilitate their access to political processes at local and national level.

The consortium takes an **intersectional approach to movement building**, which means that planned activities will take into account intersecting vulnerabilities. The main groups that we will work with – women, youth and local and indigenous communities – may also belong to multiple other disadvantaged groups (e.g. IDPs, people with disabilities), worsening their experiences of oppression and leading to different interests and needs.

We will support **frontline activists** and through our regional networks and partnerships support activists in emerging movements to reach out to and mobilize climate-affected groups, facilitate connections between people

and develop effective strategies that advance climate justice. We will create spaces - virtual and physical, in communities, provincially, nationally, regionally and globally - for people to come together to learn, coordinate, collaborate and innovate.

Second, we will connect these movements with existing networks, advocacy organizations, research organizations, think tanks and universities to contribute to **broad-based alliances for climate justice**. We will seek opportunities to rally together with national and regional campaigns and advocacy organizations such as Greenpeace Africa, the International Land Coalition, the Climate Action Network, Earthlife Africa, the Decolonize campaign in Kenya and the Oceans Not Oil campaign in South Africa. We will break silos between feminist, environmental and human rights organizations and facilitate linkages with **global climate change movements**. We will help map existing networks and alliances, facilitating cooperation and coordination and encouraging joint engagement in discussions, advocacy and campaigns. .

ASSUMPTIONS

- Based on experience we assume that women, youth and local and indigenous communities (groups with high stakes) are eager to engage, convincing advocates for change and effective (peer) mobilizers.

Assumption on how Pathway 1 builds on/ interacts with the other pathways

- Movement building that aligns with (existing, local) struggles for environmental rights (P3) increases the movement's legitimacy and strength.
- Based on our advocacy experiences we assume stronger and more connected civil society leads to more political will and increased civic space for influencing policies and practices (P5).

INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES

- Women, young people and excluded communities have increased knowledge and awareness of their needs and rights around climate justice and are activated to engage.
- Women, young people and excluded communities are at the frontline of climate justice movements, CSOs and networks.
- Movements of women, youth and indigenous communities have stronger connections, and cooperate with likeminded organizations for climate justice.
- Movements have increased their influential and organizational capacities, including increased access to funds for climate justice activities.

ACTIVITIES INCLUDE

- Recruiting and mobilizing frontline activists and building their influencing capacities and understanding of key concepts (such as intersectionality and 'do no harm').
- Community outreach and community sensitizing activities.
- Creating (new) spaces and platforms ('labs') to connect people (online and offline) for learning and experimenting.
- Building networks and alliances, brokering common objectives and forging common agendas.
- Engaging in or facilitating shared (participatory) research activities to understand barriers to climate justice.

BOX 4.2 YOUTH DRIVING MOVEMENTS AND SUPPORTING A NETWORK

In 2013, youth representatives consulted on the Africa's Agenda 2063 realized that their voices would continue to be marginalized in continental decision-making processes unless they better organized themselves. This eventually led to **the formation of the African Youth Commission (AYC)**, a movement of youth leaders, youth-led and youth-serving organizations in Africa and the diaspora. Their ambition is to speak with a stronger, more coordinated and more legitimate voice across the continent to influence policy and decision-making processes at the AU and other intergovernmental organizations, national governments, regional economic committees and development partners, to accommodate the needs and interests of youth in Africa.

Today AYC operates in 46 AU member states. In each country AYC is supporting or establishing national consortia to coordinate country work and bring young people together to shape national agendas. As a continental movement AYC needs strong mechanisms to reach frontline communities, allowing it to be accountable to young people and responsive to their needs, and ensuring it represents different countries, ethnic groups, abilities and genders. New members are typically secured via word of mouth or social media. AYC also networks with youth constituencies of other national and continental organizations: for instance, linking up with young women leaders and gender champions in FEMNET's network.

Young people in Africa face several challenges in having their voices heard. AYC members report being denied access to formal policy processes, including those dealing with youth issues. Even when young people participate, they are not always listened to and lack decision-making power. Youth leaders often report being harassed or even criminalized for speaking out. For instance, in Nigeria many youth organizations have been labelled as terrorists and had their accounts frozen. AYC supports these activists and organizations to find legal recourse or other, less formal ways to challenge discrimination. Solidarity actions across the movement and continental escalation, such as open letters to the AU, are important tactics.

The network provides opportunities for youth groups and organizations to meet, exchange, connect, and learn, with over 500 participants coming together at the annual Pan African Youth Conference. It holds capacity building activities for members on issues such as civic education, leadership, fundraising and proposal development. Regular meetings and updates share information among members about opportunities and resources such as conferences, events, courses, funding calls, documents, blogs and vlogs. AYC communicates through email, a website in six languages, WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter.

AYC has helped its members to engage in a strategic and informed way in youth policy processes. In Nigeria, AYC members joined the electoral reform process with the 'not too young to run' bill, which became law in 2018. In Kenya, the national consortium participated in developing a youth policy adopted on International Youth Day in 2020.

4.3.3 PATHWAY 2: DEVELOPING AND SHARING AFRICAN NARRATIVES

Outcome 2:

African climate justice narratives have been developed and spread.

CHANGE WE WILL WORK TOWARDS

The AACJ consortium believes that **clear and compelling narratives** play a crucial role to increase the engagement of youth, women and local and indigenous communities in the debate and policy processes on climate justice. Taking people's lived experience as a starting point, these narratives will play a key role in raising awareness, unveiling prejudices and stereotypes, debunking lies and rebalancing relations of power.

The AACJ consortium will amplify African voices, encouraging environmental activists, indigenous leaders, women, youth, religious leaders, artists and opinion makers to share their personal experiences and contribution to addressing climate change. We will create safe spaces for traditionally sidelined groups to develop their own narratives which demonstrate their **strength, resilience, innovative capacities and contributions** to the climate crisis.

We will ensure that these new narratives are shared and spread through climate debates and policy processes, connecting policy makers with people on the frontline of the climate crisis. We will connect activists, movements and communities with popular media (TV talk shows, radio call-ins and other interactive platforms) to enable exchange of ideas and information, foster understanding and increase public awareness on how women, youth and local and indigenous communities are experiencing and coping with climate change.

The role of FEMNET will be indispensable to implementing Pathway 2. Box 4.3 and Figure 4.2 provide insights in how FEMNET created counter narratives to help shift the discourse on women's economic empowerment. This expertise and experience will play a crucial role in changing the discourse on climate change.

ASSUMPTIONS

- African narratives that are relevant and understandable for ordinary people will increase their awareness and understanding on climate change.

Assumption on how Pathway 2 interacts with and builds on other pathways

- New narratives can strengthen movements for climate justice by producing, regulating and spreading shared meaning within them (interaction with P1).
- African narratives will raise awareness on climate justice, increase public engagement (P1) and enable people to make more informed (long-term) choices (P4).
- Strong and relevant narratives which support the public debate will facilitate better cross-sector communication (between communities, NGOs, government, the private sector, media, local leaders and international actors), which will help increase political will to advance climate justice and to ensure policies reflect needs and interest of groups affected by climate change (P5).

INTERMEDIATE OUTCOME

- Climate movements, communities, media, academics, social influencers and policy makers develop and promote inclusive, feminist climate justice narratives.

ACTIVITIES INCLUDE

- Organize workshops and write-shops with communities, rights defenders, journalists, creatives, academics, PACJA's climate justice academies, and FEMNET's Feminist Macroeconomics Academy (see also Box 4.3 and Figure 4.2 below).
- Create forums and exchanges, physical and online, that bring together indigenous and local activists, policy makers and practitioners for storytelling, open dialogues, learnings and influence public perceptions and beliefs.
- Adopt innovative tools, strategies and techniques (e.g. participatory action research, gamification) to collect, collate and present local and present them in form of publications, films, recordings, etc.
- Develop and implement public awareness and sensitizing campaigns. Spread new messages through working with schools, social media influencers, media/journalists, artists, musicians, theatre and caravans.

BOX 4.3 LET AFRICAN WOMEN SPEAK! THE AUDACITY TO DISRUPT.

Those whose voices are heard loudest control our shared narratives. These dominant voices hold the power to shape societal norms which ultimately underpin our laws, policies and practices. Most African women find their voices systematically excluded from decision-making spaces, both formal and informal. Women are seldom invited to table their perspectives or needs, meaning that women lack power and control over shaping their own lives and livelihoods.

FEMNET's vision is that, to reclaim power and agency, African women must first reclaim their collective voice and shift debates through more inclusive (counter) narratives. This means supporting African women to come together to create, frame and share their stories. In policy making spaces this entails capacitating women to effectively engage in advocacy and speak to an agenda specific to women's needs. In wider society it is about promoting women's voices and working with women to shift popular narratives through communication and community outreach.

Through its **annual African Feminist Macroeconomics Academy (AFMA)**, FEMNET increases feminists' capacity to influence macroeconomic policies on the continent and globally. Governments typically approach women's economic development on the micro level, women are not seen as active participants in the real economy nor as thought leaders in the wider economic discussion.

'Shaming and framing' is an important tactic in reclaiming women's economic power. Without developing and adopting new discourses which can disrupt and displace dominant hegemonic narratives, women will struggle to reclaim political power. **Often political debates are framed as technical issues, without a rights-based discourse backed by women sharing their lived stories.**

To ensure a truly inclusive voice, women must work in representative movements that include frontline communities and those who have traditionally been most marginalized. Coordination and networking among representative organizations are important to build a movement in support of alternative narratives. FEMNET is strategically positioned as a convener, organizer and facilitator of dialogues and works with women and their communities to convene and organize African women's voices at regional and international levels.

Figure 4.2. Changing the term of debate by creating new narratives.

MODULE ONE
INTRODUCTION to MACROECONOMICS
 WITH Masego Madzwamuse

AFMA 2020

WHY ARE WE DOING THIS COURSE?
 WHY IS IT CRITICAL AT THE MOMENT?

Debunk:
 ECONOMICS IS NOT a TECHNICAL PROCESS. IT IS A POLITICAL PROCESS

TO ENGAGE ONE DOES NOT NEED TO BE AN ECONOMIST
 WE LEARN LANGUAGE so we BEGIN to HAVE SHAME & FRAME the DISPOSSESSION from 1945 & pre-DATING that.

1930's
 THE DEPRESSION
 NEO-LIBERALISM TOOK HOLD
 those with political power begin to SHAPE DISCOURSE

1940's
 BARTON WOODS
 GROWTH POLICIES
 LABOUR RIGHTS & WAGES SUPPRESSED

1950's

1960's
 EMERGING INDEPENDENCE of AFRICAN STATES

1970's
 1974 Joseph Stiglitz PAPERS
 GROWTH with culture CONTEXT of Resources

1980's
 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS

1990's
 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
 1992 Brantley Report

2000's
 MAJOR Banks Bailed out Using Citizens Money
 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS
 NEO-LIBERALISM BEGINS to be QUESTIONED

ECONOMIC POLICY is a VERY VERY VERY SEXIST FIELD!!
 • WRITE CURRICULUMS to CONVEY BLIND SPOT
 • INFILTRATE the SYSTEM ~ CHANGE it from WITHIN WOMEN in LEADERSHIP
 • BUY OUR OWN!
 • WE CAN HAVE A REVOLUTION WHERE MEMBERS HAVE POWER

ARE the BLIND SPOTS DELIBERATE? YES!
 PRESTIGE ASPECTS in ECONOMICS

NOT JUST LOOKING TO BE AT THE TABLE... LOOKING FOR FEMINIST REPRESENTATION
 • ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
 • DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
 • HISTORICAL REDRESS
 - Injustice DIDN'T start TODAY!!

UNDERSTANDING INTERSECTIONALITY MAKES IT EASIER TO UNDERSTAND MULTI-DISCIPLINARY AGENDAS
 Wellbeing IS NOT RADICAL ENOUGH!!
 ECONOMICS HAVE BEEN BUILT ON OUR BACKS FOR YEARS!
DE-COLONIZE!!

4.3.4 PATHWAY 3: STRENGTHENING HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORKS

Outcome 3: Strengthened human rights frameworks

CHANGE WE WILL WORK TOWARDS

As explained in chapter 2, the sustainable management of natural resources requires communities' **secure rights** over **their land** and **natural resources** and **strong policy frameworks** that enable local communities to oppose projects that damage the environment and violate their rights.

We will empower communities to **claim and defend their rights** by increasing their awareness of their legal rights, both under national law (including customary law) and under international human rights commitments.⁷⁸ We will support them to access information on nearby projects that might affect them, use legal instruments to oppose these projects and seek remedy when damage has been done. We will support women and youth to defend their rights at household and community level, ensuring they are not excluded from decision-making processes.

Engaging local and indigenous communities in **strategic litigation**⁷⁹ on exemplary cases – testing legal frameworks – can help strengthen human rights in legal and policy frameworks and set examples for other communities to claim their rights.

ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions on how Pathway 3 interacts with and builds on other pathways

- Communities with secure access to land, having been empowered to stop projects that degrade land and harm ecosystems, can help address climate change as custodians of nature and improve their livelihoods (P4).⁸⁰
- Strategic litigation directly supports communities and can also be leveraged to create broader public awareness (P1,2) and set legal precedents (P5).

INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES

- Communities and community members are capacitated and supported to claim rights
- Environmental and human rights frameworks have been strengthened through strategic litigation
- Journalists, activists, human rights defenders, and their organizations are better protected against harassment and physical, legal and social threats

ACTIVITIES INCLUDE

- Increasing awareness of communities on their rights and related policy frameworks (free, prior and informed consent, environmental impact assessments, due diligence, access to remedy and complaint mechanisms).
- Supporting communities to use compliance mechanisms through legal advice and litigation.
- Supporting communities to challenge projects and other corporate actions through court systems.

⁷⁸ We will use use strategies and methodologies developed by Natural Justice such as community-based legal empowerment and participatory action research.

⁷⁹ Strategic litigation is the use of legal action to bring about social, political or legal changes. Natural Justice often engages in strategic litigation: it is not just about winning the case, but bringing about wider systemic changes in defending the rights of indigenous communities with particular regard to their land, natural resources, ecosystems and knowledge.

⁸⁰ PACJA's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (see track record in concept note) underpins this assumption.

- Developing tools to collect evidence of rights abuses, and supporting human rights defenders and climate justice activists.

BOX 4.4 NATURAL JUSTICE WORKING WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES TO CLAIM JUSTICE AND RIGHTS

In June 2019 Kenyan judges halted plans to construct a coal-powered plant near the coastal town of Lamu. The court ruled that authorities had failed to do a thorough environmental assessment and that the plant would have had dire economic and health effects on indigenous peoples and local farming and fishing communities.

The case was brought by a broad coalition of impacted peoples, supported by Natural Justice as part of the Save Lamu coalition. The success of the litigation was due to community cohesion, unity of vision and extensive capacity building by paralegals. Save Lamu is umbrella organization of nearly 40 partners with a network of paralegals sensitizing and supporting communities to claim their human and environmental rights through both upstream and downstream interventions.

Upstream work is about facilitating access to information and building communities' cohesion and capacity to participate in negotiations and claim their legal rights.

Downstream work is about mitigating impacts when rights have already been infringed, through communities working with local regulators and stakeholders to demonstrate infringements, find pragmatic solutions and facilitate swift redress. In effectively claiming their rights over time, communities are able to shift dominant narratives about rural people's agency define their own developmental future.

4.3.5 PATHWAY 4: STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES' ADAPTIVE CAPACITIES

Outcome 4: Communities' adaptive capacities strengthened

CHANGE WE WILL WORK TOWARDS

Although local communities, youth and women are impacted disproportionately by climate change, their experience and knowledge on resilience, natural resource management and adaptation strategies also make them part of the solution. Pathway 4 will help us tap a precious pool of good practice and innovative approaches to tackle climate change.

The AACJ programme will – through the networks of the consortium partners – scope, document, spread and help to scale traditional knowledge and community-driven innovations that increase the resilience and adaptive capacities of climate-affected groups. We will prioritize strategies that also address root causes of exclusion and vulnerabilities (e.g. marginalization, patriarchy and discrimination). We will facilitate the piloting of promising climate solutions and capacitate communities to use new approaches. We will support and facilitate (and in some cases provide seed funds to) innovative, potentially ground-breaking climate solutions to serve as evidence in our campaigns and advocacy strategies. We will build confidence of communities to use their own approaches in combination with traditional knowledge on food production, land use and natural resource management.

ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions on how Pathway 4 interacts with and builds on other pathways

- Better understanding of local adaptation experiences will inform evidence-based advocacy strategies, helping improve the design of national and international adaptation and resilience-building policies and interventions (P5).
- Innovative solutions on adaptation and resilience will help create inspiring stories of change (P2) while preventing the loss of valuable knowledge.

INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES

- Enhanced capacity for communities on adaptation planning.
- Best practices on community-level adaptation interventions documented, shared and spread.
- Scaling of innovations in adaptation through bringing in other actors and facilitating cooperation, for instance partnerships between the private sector and governments.

ACTIVITIES INCLUDE

- Organize trainings and workshops that support community-based innovation and testing of best practice.
- Scope and document strong community-based and ecosystem-based adaptation examples.
- Systematize experiences and share knowledge on emerging good practice.
- Design and promote community-owned solutions in strategic partnerships with individual communities, governments and private sector, at regional and global level (e.g. to ensure funds for scaling innovation, to change terms of debate).

BOX 4.5 TAKING COMMUNITY DRIVEN ADAPTION AND INNOVATION TO SCALE.

In Meru County, Kenya, a partnership between BIDCO, a vegetable oil producer, the county government and farmers has transformed the sunflower oil value chain. Local producers were supported with access to information, technology, a more climate-appropriate crop variety, and a guaranteed market price, enabling a new business model with an increased scale of production. The communities have benefited tremendously, and the case will be used to advocate for governments and companies to support similar initiatives across Kenya and the region.

The project has been widely covered by local and national media as a model in climate resilience and adaptation. Climate-impacted communities are often cast as helpless victims, rather than powerful change agents on the frontline of innovation. Such practical examples of promoting community-led adaptation and agency can powerfully change perceptions and reshape narratives – opening new avenues to support communities to participate in politics, engage the private sector and effectively claim their rights.

The changing climate is leaving small-scale producers across Africa increasingly destitute, especially those who rely on rain-fed agriculture. Communities' resilience is eroding and their adaptive capacities are being undermined. The knock-on effects are disrupting local and national economies. To ensure that adequate (inter)national funding and support reach communities that need it most, advocates must go beyond presenting evidence of climate impacts and advocate based on evidence of viable solutions.

Frontline communities have incredible adaptive capacities based on their traditional knowledge and intimate understanding of their environments. But to influence policy makers and claim their rights, they need platforms to showcase their emerging successes, and resources to shift production practices at scale. PACJA supports communities and local partners to document and share successes like this, and take the lead in advocating for increased investment and support. They support communities to interface with local governments and companies, and profile community voices at national and international level in spaces such as the Global Commission on Adaptation.

4.3.6 PATHWAY 5: INCREASING POLITICAL WILL FOR CLIMATE JUST POLICIES

Outcome 5: Political will to support climate just policies

CHANGE WE WILL WORK TOWARDS

To address the **weak climate policies** and the **large gap between climate commitments and their effective implementation** the AACJ consortium will empower organizations and movements – in particular those that represent women, youth and indigenous communities – to co-strategize and engage with African policy makers and negotiators, contributing to policy and practice changes that advance climate justice.

NDC and NAP processes are helpful tools for movements and CSOs to monitor public policies on climate change and push for bolder climate action. Other relevant frameworks are the **2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Africa's Agenda 2063: The Africa we Want**⁸¹, the **Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)**⁸² and the **UNFCCC Gender Action Plan (GAP)**⁸³ which aims to advance gender-responsive climate action and women's full participation in the UNFCCC process.

In addition, the AACJ consortium will work with the **African Climate Legislation Initiative (ACLI)** to ensure global policies ratified by governments and those developed at national or sub-national levels are **translated into legal frameworks**.

In consultation with local partners, the AACJ Consortium has identified **six thematic areas** for national and local policy and practice change to achieve climate justice:

Thematic area	Examples of improved policies and practices
CIVIC PARTICIPATION	Policies and practices that increase the effective access and meaningful participation of citizens (women, youth and indigenous communities) in policy making , planning and budgeting processes that are important for their needs and interests.
ADAPTATION AND LOSS AND DAMAGE	<p>Policies and practices that support development and implementation of community-driven adaptation strategies, while using, honouring / rewarding women's and indigenous knowledge</p> <p>Gender-responsive policies and practices that support women, youth, local communities and countries to avert, minimize and respond to climate-related loss and damage, such as disaster risk reduction, social protection, safety nets and compensation.</p>

⁸¹ Africa's Agenda 2063 is an overarching strategic framework and vision for Africa over the next 50 years. See *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*. (n.d.). Africa Union. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview>

⁸² Parties to the CBD use a global framework for their national commitments towards biodiversity conservation, sustainable use and the equitable sharing of its benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. After the strategic goals and targets expired in 2020, discussions are underway on the post-2020 framework and agreement is due in May 2021.

⁸³ *Gender Action Plan*. (n.d.). United Nations Climate Change. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://unfccc.int/topics/gender/workstreams/the-gender-action-plan>

<p>JUST TRANSITION</p>	<p>Policies and practices that support a shift away from fossil fuel dependency towards low carbon alternatives, while attaining universal access to clean energy.</p> <p>Gender-transformative policies, practices and investments that help fast track transition to more sustainable economies. This may include investment policies and choices of financial institutions.</p>
<p>NATURAL RESOURCE RIGHTS AND PROTECTION</p>	<p>Policies and practices that help communities protect natural resources, biodiversity and vulnerable ecosystems and underpin communities' right to a healthy environment.</p> <p>This may include policies and practices that increase tenure security of communities, women and youth, enabling and encouraging communities to play their role as custodians of nature; and that support proper implementation of environmental impact assessments and that enable communities to exercise their right to give or withhold consent to a project that may affect them (FPIC).</p>
<p>CLIMATE FINANCE</p>	<p>Increased availability (including long-term commitments) of international public climate finance, for adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage with gendered outcomes. Improved transparency of climate finance reporting with gender disaggregated data. Improved access for African countries, civil society and communities to international funds.</p> <p>Enhanced accountability of national and local-level climate budgeting and spending</p>
<p>CIVIC SPACE</p>	<p>Policies that open and protect civic space and that specifically recognize and protect rights of marginalized groups, communities at the frontline of climate change and human and environmental rights defenders (specifically women).</p>

ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions on how Pathway 5 interacts with and builds on other pathways

- A strong civil society (P1) can hold governments accountable to uphold the rights of their citizens and implement climate policies, leaving no one behind.
- An enabling policy environment can help support the scoping and scaling of community-based solutions to advance climate justice (P4).

INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES

- Increased engagement of traditionally marginalized groups in policy processes.
- CSOs form effective alliances to advance specific policy propositions on climate justice.
- CSOs and movements have opened or protected civic space and/or increased access to accountability mechanisms.
- CSOs and movements have effectively engaged with governments for climate-just policies, their implementation and funding.

ACTIVITIES INCLUDE

- Working with frontline communities to develop evidence based advocacy strategies.

- Increase knowledge of women, youth and indigenous communities on policy processes.
- Create platforms and mechanisms for climate-affected groups to access and influence policy processes.
- Actively support the representation and inclusion of frontline voices in policy spaces.
- Coaching activists to develop joint policy agendas.
- Develop and use monitoring mechanisms, for example to track responsible use of and integration of climate change in state budgets.
- Supporting national platforms to work with ACLI representatives to introduce climate legislation into national parliaments.

BOX 4.6 SHIFTING CLIMATE POLICY AND DEMANDING GOOD GOVERNANCE

For nearly 40 years Oxfam has been calling on rich countries to do more to support frontline communities hardest hit by climate change. In 2007, Oxfam was one of the first organizations to calculate the minimum adaptation finance needed by developing countries per year. That call for USD 50 billion kickstarted a wave of global advocacy for concrete financial targets and funding allocations from rich countries. Today the figure stands at USD 100 billion – which should be supplementary to existing ODA and private investments.

Through tracking and analysing developed countries' financial reporting, civil society is monitoring if rich countries are delivering this money as promised. In recipient countries, civil society is advancing accountability movements to ensure that support actually reaches frontline communities. Key to this success is collaborating in broad-based global alliances, led by frontline communities and people's movements, with research institutes, international advocacy groups, climate-specialist organizations, NGOs and social movements in rich countries standing in solidarity.

Internationally, Oxfam worked successfully with partners and allies to influence the UN COP process. For instance, mobilizations such as the Caravan of Hope to the COP in Durban (2011) and decentralized People's Marches on the Road to Paris (2015) supported evidence-based advocacy, as does Oxfam's alliance with an increasingly broad and youthful climate movement on the road to Glasgow (2021). This resulted in a major milestone when rich countries committed to deliver the USD 100 billion climate finance target in the Paris Agreement, where developing countries also committed to National Adaptation Plans with local authorities and communities in the lead.

In advocating for climate finance, Oxfam works with others, such as PACJA, to link national and international advocacy through strong examples of community-driven climate solutions. Advocacy works best when complemented by the lived stories of impacted peoples and supported by evidence of viable alternatives such as concrete examples of scalable adaptation projects.

4.4 RESPONDING TO COVID-19 PANDEMIC

UN chief António Guterres has warned that the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are falling disproportionately on the most vulnerable. Consortium members are well aware that the pandemic will have a huge impact on the AACJ programme.

Governments have imposed national lockdowns and prohibited gatherings, impeding traditional civil society initiatives that rely on in-person interactions such as public meetings and face-to-face surveys. Some political leaders have also exploited the pandemic to advance objectives which have escalated conflicts and deepened gender inequalities.

The consortium has ensured that the programme's ToC reflects the context of the pandemic and developed preliminary arrangements to engage project stakeholders in seeking a just recovery:

- **Clear strategic communication and collaboration planning** among consortium members and other stakeholders through regular meetings using diverse means of communications to help project implementors and beneficiaries (including socially excluded groups) stay connected.
- **Project activities and strategies are tailor-made** to enable climate justice advocacy activities to continue despite the COVID-related regulations compromising civic space, and without exposing various actors to health risks, intimidation or attacks.
- **Centralization of information through innovative advocacy, campaigning and project management tools** to collectively track progress and ensure that key timelines (including weekly schedules) are met.
- **Continuous (participatory) monitoring of project activities** to gather real-time information for self-reflection, effective reporting, and timely application of corrective measures where necessary.

5 CROSS CUTTING THEMES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents our approaches, principles, mechanisms and tools to ensure a **safe, inclusive and effective movement**.

Our ambition is to help build and strengthen a pan-African movement for climate justice that is **effective**; capable of influencing policies and practices, facilitating mutual learning and innovative approaches, navigating shrinking and shifting civic space, mitigating unintended negative effects and sensitive to tensions that may exist or arise. The AACJ consortium also aims for movement that is **inclusive** and in which people feel **safe**. This requires dedicated approaches and principles to include traditionally sidelined groups and sounds mechanisms for safeguarding against misconduct.

5.2 GENDER, SOCIAL INCLUSION AND INTERSECTIONALITY

People who face the greatest risks – and require the most resilience – often also face the highest levels of inequality and barriers to accessing their rights in everyday life. The consortium aims not only to advance gender equality and social inclusion, but also to transform the **position** and **status** of women, youth and local and indigenous communities, so that **every African citizen leads a dignified life in a safe and sustainable environment**. This requires a thorough understanding of the diverse barriers to climate justice.

People affected by climate change are often put into categories – such as women, youth and indigenous communities – which conceals differences among them.

Intersectionality helps to identify multiple factors of advantage and disadvantage in a person's social and political identities – such as gender, caste, sex, race, class, sexuality, religion, disability, physical appearance and height – and understand how they combine to create different variations of discrimination and privilege.

Intersectional approaches are valuable for reducing vulnerability and building resilience as they take complex contextual realities into account. They recognize that people who experience exclusion and marginalization have different identities, needs and priorities. **An intersectional analysis illuminates how individuals and groups relate differently to climate change, depending on relations of power**, illustrating how power structures may be reinforced or challenged and renegotiated.

When implementing the programme, **FEMNET and AYC** will lead specific work on gender and social inclusion especially under **Pathway 1 and 2** where significant investment will be made to mobilize, support, and engage women, girls and youth in all their diversities, to be part of the movement in a meaningful and impactful way, shaping climate change narratives that are grounded in their lived experiences. Gender will also be mainstreamed in **Pathway 3** where women - especially from indigenous communities - will be legally empowered to know and stand up for their rights. In **Pathway 4**, women, girls and youth in all their diversities will be supported to plan and innovate (or scale innovations) through small grants. And on **Pathway 5**, gender inclusion has been framed as the prerequisite

for policy engagement where equitable participation will be advocated for (from governments and other actors) and practised (in the AACJ programme).

Specific gender indicators will help the AACJ consortium track and document engagement of different groups, with their intersecting identities. FEMNET will also lead the development of a **feminist climate justice analytical framework** to help assess whether public policies and legal frameworks are gender transformative, and inform climate justice narratives and advocacy strategies.

In addition, the AACJ consortium will embrace the following principles:

- **Call itself an 'inclusive movement'**, because this is a political and ideological stand we wish to be identified with. We understand that African women, men and youth have multiple intersecting identities which makes their experience, needs and aspirations unique. We recognize that, for climate justice to be attained, every African – regardless of their position or identities – needs to be informed, engaged and/or protected.
- **Challenge systems of oppression and exploitation.** We are mindful of systematic, structural marginalization of women, youth, local and indigenous communities and other groups. Our quest to be an inclusive movement centring on the rights, interests and needs of women, girls and youth, in all their diversities, means challenging structural oppression and patriarchy. We are aware that challenging patriarchy effectively also requires challenging other systems of oppression and exploitation which frequently mutually support each other: neo-liberalism and neo-colonialism. AACJ will work to alter power relations in communities and in the national, regional and global policy process.
- **Put gender at the heart of the AACJ programme.** We acknowledge the need to deploy multiple strategies to effectively advance gender rights. AACJ is designed to specifically advance and protect the rights, participation and engagement of women, girls and youth in all their diversities as a standalone work stream. AACJ commits to mainstream gender in all pathways and at all stages of project design, management and evaluation.
- **Embrace collective leadership.** We hold ourselves accountable for making sure the AACJ programme at all levels does not instrumentalize, use or co-opt women, girls and youth issues. We will ensure that communities, women, girls and youth in all their diversities are supported to participate fully and directly in programme decisions that impact them. We will relentlessly advocate and practice openness, transparency and equitable leadership.
- **Use power responsibly.** We will use our power and authority responsibly and manage institutional hierarchies with respect for all concerned. We believe that the AACJ programme is created to empower and uplift African climate activists in all their diversities. At no time should we allow the AACJ programme to degenerate into a space of oppression and undermining of women, girls and youth in all their diversities.
- **Prioritise safety.** We are mindful of continued and systematic suppression of voices of human rights defenders, especially women, youth and indigenous communities. Our quest to be inclusive and open up spaces will not come at the expense of their lives. AACJ will consistently assess risks of their engagement and make resources available to defend them (defenders fund). The programme will work to address shrinking civic space as a foundation for an inclusive movement and, by extension, inclusive societies.
- **Embrace feedback.** The AACJ consortium aims to critically assess its impact and ways of working with communities, women, girls and youth in all their diversities. Hence we will proactively institutionalize and activate feedback loops which inspire communities, women, girls and youth to provide checks on our role in the movement and the support we provide in a safe and timely manner.

5.3 SAFEGUARDING AGAINST SEXUAL EXPLOITATION

To implement a sustainable and successful programme, the consortium is committed to a policy of zero tolerance for inaction in relation to serious misconduct, especially safeguarding against sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH).

The consortium partners have adequate, survivor-centred policies in place to prevent misconduct, and procedures on how to deal with such behaviour when it occurs. These are in line with the ORIA and policies of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The following sections outline how we will embed safeguarding practices across the programme for all stakeholders, both internally and externally.

5.3.1 PRINCIPLES

The core principles at the heart of our safeguarding practice are:

- **Empowerment:** Supporting consortium members and other implementing partners to strengthen their own safeguarding policies, procedures and capacities;
- **Prevention:** Taking action to prevent any type of misconduct by embedding integrity, care and respect as the project's driving values;
- **Proportionality:** Ensuring the least intrusive response appropriate to the risk identified, and treating each case individually;
- **Protection:** a survivor-centred approach, putting the needs of survivors first throughout response and mitigation measures;
- **Confidentiality:** Protecting personal information so people feel safe to share concerns and ask for help, and requesting informed consent at all times;
- **Accountability and transparency:** Ensuring everyone plays their part and are held accountable for delivering on practices and commitments; and
- **Collaborative ethos and partnership:** Building a strong culture of collaboration and mutual learning in all matters relating to integrity and safeguarding, with ongoing conversations.

5.3.2 PREVENTION OF SEAH AND UNWANTED BEHAVIOUR

Prevention lies at the core of our strategy. It is the responsibility of all staff – of consortium members and implementing partners – to ensure a culture of dignity and respect and to challenge inappropriate behaviour when it is safe to do so. Prevention includes having basic safeguarding policies and procedures in place, screening and recruitment practices, awareness and training, and appointing focal points.

The consortium partners will:

- Assess programme activities on safeguarding risks, develop and implement mitigation measures and regularly reassess their impact.
- Ensure all staff have access to, are familiar with, and know their responsibilities concerning our safeguarding policy;
- Apply appropriate screening and training when recruiting, managing and deploying staff;
- Ensure everyone involved receives orientation on safeguarding at an appropriate level for their role;
- Appoint an individual staff member to be responsible for maintaining good safeguarding practices, providing resources and building capacities where needed;
- Inform communities, and people we work for and with, about their safeguarding rights and the behaviour they should expect from staff, volunteers and others involved in the project.

- Support any implementing partner that has no/ weak safeguarding mechanisms to develop their own policies and procedures to ensure safe project implementation.

BOX 5.1: CAPACITY STRENGTHENING ON INTEGRITY AND SAFEGUARDING

As the programme will reach youth, women and indigenous groups, consortium and local partners must have clear safeguarding policies and capable staff to prevent, detect and respond to safeguarding cases. Consortium partners will support any implementing partner to strengthen their safeguarding mechanisms by facilitating self-assessment, contributing to development of their integrity and safeguarding policies with a focus on SEAH, supporting community feedback design, training and monitoring, and helping to set up arrangements that fit each organization's size and type of work. Oxfam learning resources will be available for all organizations involved in this program, and tailor-made trajectories will be prioritized for partners that are exposed to higher safeguarding risks.

5.3.3 DETECTION AND RESPONSE

Throughout the project we aim to create an enabling environment where anybody can safely and confidentially raise a concern of misconduct as quickly as possible. Reporting channels will clearly outline the process to be followed and ensure confidentiality, anonymity (if requested) and a proper response without retaliation.

Effective **response** encompasses all actions from receiving a complaint to taking appropriate disciplinary action against perpetrators. Clear and accessible procedures will outline the response process, possible disciplinary actions and ongoing support to survivors.

All consortium partners have **various integrity and safeguarding mechanisms** in place, such as a code of conduct, speak up and complaint mechanisms, safeguarding policies and procedures. Each consortium member has appointed an integrity/safeguarding focal point. More details on the **Integrity and Safeguarding Management** are presented in **Annex 1**.

Risk management and mitigation measures are discussed in Chapter 9

5.4 CONFLICT SENSITIVITY

Violence and conflict continue to affect many countries on the African continent. Although there is no direct and linear relationship between climate crisis and conflict, there is evidence that climate-induced changes⁸⁴ can exacerbate conflict dynamics when:

- Climate change leads to a deterioration in people's livelihoods;
- Climate change influences tactical considerations of armed groups;
- Elites use climate change to exploit social vulnerabilities and resources; or
- Climate change displaces people and increases migration.

⁸⁴ ICRC. (2020, July 9). *ICRC report: Climate change and conflict are a cruel combo that stalk the world's most vulnerable*. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-report-climate-change-and-conflict-are-cruel-combo-stalk-worlds-most-vulnerable#:~:text=Countries%20affected%20by%20conflict%20are,in%20a%20new%20report%20today>.

Implementing our programme raises the risk that latent tensions may erupt into conflicts, as described in Box 5.2.

BOX 5.2: ACKNOWLEDGING THE CONTEXT WE WORK IN

Reasons for latent tensions in the countries where the programme will be implemented include:

- Natural resources in Burkina Faso, Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, Senegal, Somalia (including land and water), Nigeria, Mozambique (oil and gas) and South Africa (mining).
- Ethnic conflict in Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia and South Africa.
- Inter-communal rivalries, including pastoralist-farmer tensions, in Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Somalia.
- Violent extremism in Nigeria (Boko Haram), Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia (El Shabaab).
- State or police violence against citizens, including during the pandemic, in Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa.
- Social and economic inequalities creating exclusion and vulnerability in Burkina Faso, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique and South Africa.

To mitigate unintended negative effects and influence conflicts positively where possible, we will take a conflict-sensitive approach. **During the whole project cycle** (implementation, monitoring, evaluation) we will **assess the context in which we operate**, and **try to understand (potential) interactions between our interventions and the context**. We will use our analyses to inform our strategies to avoid negative impact ('do no harm') and maximise positive impact.

Key questions to be mindful of include:

- What are root causes of conflicts?
- Who are the main actors and what are their inter-relations and power dynamics?
- What are their positions, interests and needs?
- What are the main drivers of conflicts and peace?

Conflict affects men, women, boys and girls in different ways. Applying a youth and gender lens to conflict analysis will increase our understanding of the situation, and ensure we will not miss critical elements that could either resist or fuel conflicts.

In response to COVID-19, Oxfam developed a **new innovative way** to hold **creative and interactive online conflict analysis** workshops, which could facilitate collaboration, communication and information sharing among the country teams. This methodology could allow for **ongoing, joint conflict analysis that is adaptive and interactive** in an **inclusive and participatory conflict sensitivity approach**, while offering a **platform for joint learning** for AACJ country teams.

5.5 MUTUAL LEARNING

The AACJ programme aims to strengthen and amplify the voices of people at the frontline of the climate crisis: women, youth and local and indigenous communities. We will strengthen grassroots social movements by **supporting activism and leadership development, connecting movements** within and across countries, sectors and issues,

and creating safe spaces to deliver change. We envision strengthening civil society by combining strategies:

All partner organizations, formal and informal, networks and movements - bring separate knowledge, skills and relationships to the table. Global and regional partners facilitate access to funds, bring technical and thematic expertise, support safeguarding of civic space, and create linkages between national, regional and global initiatives for mutual learning. Local partners bring their own set of skills and expertise and their context-specific insights, connections, bridges to youth activists and movements, and knowledge about local power dynamics and challenges regarding the civic space in which they operate. All partners contribute to:

- Strengthening capacities, linkages and legitimacy of a **diversity of CSOs**, from informal to formal, grass-roots organizations, communities, activists and movements, especially those accessible for women, youth and indigenous people;
- **Synergy and cross-fertilization** through mutual strengthening and reinforcing (learning by doing) and creating spaces for mutual learning and innovation.
- Capacity strengthening efforts that **support the implementation** of the programme and are **sustainable beyond it**.

In addition, all partner organizations will be encouraged to apply a **tailor-made approach** through a flexible process, taking into account the diversity of actors we engage with, and their varying capacity.

We will facilitate the process of bringing together knowledge, skills and networks through **co-creation, co-implementation practices** and spaces for **joint learning** (digital and of-line) supplemented by trainings, sharing tools and providing financial resources (e.g. to involve external experts with new knowledge and skills). The AACJ programme aims to contribute to capacity strengthening in the following areas:

CAPACITY TO ACT	CAPACITY TO CONNECT	CAPACITY TO OPERATE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lobby and advocacy skills (to engage with governments and private sector), especially of young people, women and indigenous groups. • Skills and agency to claim rights, document rights abuses. • Capacity to scope and scale innovative community-driven approaches. • Digital skills and digital security awareness. • Facilitating youth, women and local communities to develop and spread climate justice narratives. • Protecting human rights defenders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building movements and alliances, broadening networks (including legal network), shifting power towards more inclusive partnerships with young people. • Protecting and opening civic space, including digital space. • Including the voices of informal organizations and community groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organizational development of CSOs including finance, MEL, leadership, HR, risk management and accountability. • Skills and awareness on integrity, intersectionality and safeguarding (SEAH). • Skills and awareness on conflict sensitivity. • Support emerging activists, communities and movements to improve their organizational capacities. • Skills on sustainability and fundraising. Fostering female, youth transformative leadership.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge on climate justice topics, relevant policy/ legal frameworks and civic space. 		
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Mutual learning efforts will lead partners to use their additional capacity not only to achieve impact, but to share knowledge and skills more widely in civil society, especially reaching grassroots communities and social movements. This will contribute to stronger, more inclusive and transformative CSOs and movements with the creativity, cohesion and advocacy power to achieve changes in policies and practices in the eight selected countries and across Africa.

5.6 PROTECTING AND OPENING CIVIC SPACE

As described in chapter 2, repression and restrictions on civic space are escalating in Africa, threatening space for civic engagement in policy development, freedom of expression and the right to organize. Within the AACJ programme, we want to strengthen capacities of organizations to open and defend civic space through exchange of expertise and co-creation of strategies. In previous programmes consortium members have shown it has the agility and experience to operate in severely restricted environments.

We will focus on:

- Understanding and acting on the context-specific challenges and opportunities of shifting civic space related to this programme, by using tools such as Oxfam’s civic space monitoring tool;⁸⁵
- Supporting activists and organizations at risk or under attack through a legal support and digital protection fund.
- Pre-empting attacks through risk mitigation planning and shifting the perception of governments and the public towards appreciation for civil society working on climate justice.

We will encourage mutual learning between consortium partners and local partners to opening and protecting civic space, self-care for activists at risk, digital security and information security. Strategies will be mainstreamed in four of the five pathways for change:

- **Pathway 1:** Working in alliances and increasing connections between informal and formal groups will i) leverage support from a broad base of constituencies (e.g. informal youth movements; indigenous groups; land rights organisations; lawyers; feminist organisations etc), ii) increase protection of activists against harassment and violence and iii) make best use of complementary insider/outsider tactics.
- **Pathway 2:** By facilitating, and working with youth, women and local communities to develop an African narrative on climate justice, we will work on the legitimacy of the AACJ partners, showing the wide support and a common African (non-European centred) voice. Increasing visible, home-grown support for climate activists is important to shift perceptions and improve appreciation for civil society working on climate justice.

⁸⁵ *Civic space monitoring tool*. Oxfam International. (2019). Retrieved 12 October 2020, from <https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620874/gd-civic-space-monitoring-tool-041019-en.pdf?sequence=1>.

- **Pathway 3:** We will strengthen the agency and resilience of local communities and climate activists to (self)organize and raise their individual and collective voice(s) safely through e.g i) risk mitigation strategies; ii) legal knowledge and support in case of arrests or defamation; iii) (digital) protection trainings and support for safe digital (youth) activism; and iv) an environmental defenders fund.
- **Pathway 5:** We will influence policies and frameworks to increase state accountability, transparency, protection of human rights/ and environmental defenders and space for local CSOs and communities to defend their rights and hold states and companies accountable.

5.7 APPROACH TO INNOVATION AND DIGITALIZATION

Supporting and nurturing innovation is crucial to be effective. We see it as our duty to recognize and support innovations that underpin our objectives and activities, and to facilitate sharing or scaling them.

New solutions and approaches are at the heart of the AACJ programme: **strongly rooted in the ToC** (in particular pathways 1, 2 and 4), **inherent in our organizations and our local partners and their constituencies** and supported through a **small grants facility** (see section 6.1).

The AACJ consortium sees innovation as a product of a creative, collaborative, problem-focused approach that leads to new solutions. The process of innovation is one of fast learning cycles in which the consortium and partners test and adapt solutions. Partners will be encouraged to take intelligent risks by experimenting and measuring.

5.7.1 DIGITALIZATION

In the past year, COVID-19 has transformed our ways of working and collaboration. Face-to-face meetings and workshops have been replaced by online meetings and workshops using various platforms. While this has been a challenge in many ways, it also has been an inclusive experience for all involved and we expect to **continue to explore new approaches to connect, communicate and co-create** throughout the programme.

We will use blended programming, combining digital tools with face-to-face contact, to develop strategies and interventions. We are aware of the risks brought by the digital era and will take steps to mitigate them, notably through **digital security** such as two-factor authentication, firewalls, penetration tests, security protocols and training as necessary. We will adhere to standards and regulations to ensure (digital) data is kept safe and secure.

While digitalization and blended programming allow us to respond to COVID-19 restrictions, reduce travel time and mitigate climate change, we also understand that online tools are not always fit for purpose. Traditionally sidelined groups are significantly less likely to use the internet. **To address the digital and gender divide**, the consortium will invest in appropriate technologies for communities with limited or patchy online access and blend online with offline communications. We will design and optimize our platforms for low-tech phones and ensure they load quickly, to reduce data costs. We will also use non-digital strategies to reach remote communities, such as local radio stations that broadcast in local languages. We will involve local communities, women and youth in the design of digital technologies to ensure their usefulness and adequacy.

We will encourage users to engage with each other respectfully, regardless of gender or socio-cultural affiliation. We will build our digital platforms to be safe and sustainable, using industry-standard open source technologies that adhere to our data policies. We will develop inclusive and intersectional digital strategies to help create safe online environments.

5.7.2 INNOVATION INTEGRATED IN PATHWAYS FOR CHANGE

In particular, the AACJ consortium will nurture and support innovation in Pathways 1 (strengthening movements), 2 (developing and sharing climate justice narratives) and 4 (strengthening communities' adaptive capacities).

We will connect with and contribute to (existing) **spaces for learning and nurturing innovation** such as FEMNET's African Feminist Macroeconomic Academy; PACJA's network of Climate Change Clubs, Climate Justice Summer School and annual award encouraging journalists to develop new narratives on climate justice; and Oxfam's EMOTIVE programme,⁸⁶ Climate Initiative programme,⁸⁷ and alliances and communities of practice such as the Pan African Media Alliance for Climate Change (PAMACC).⁸⁸

The expertise of consortium partners will enable mutual capacity development trajectories, and allow the AACJ consortium **to tap into a wealth of innovative skills, tools and methods across the programme** to, for example, develop new narratives (based on learnings from African Feminist Macroeconomic Academy and exchanges in summer schools on climate justice), involve traditionally sidelined groups in movement building (based on experience in Mozambique), use ICT-based methodologies for community-driven climate action (based on experience in Ethiopia) and legally empower climate-affected groups (based on tools and protocols developed by Natural Justice).

To facilitate exchange and learning the AACJ consortium will build a **regional portal**, to **connect frontline activists** across countries. It will host events, dialogues, webinars and content on climate justice topics and policy processes, including training videos, tutorials, interactive activities and downloadable content for partner communities and CSOs.

We will support co-creation of community-driven climate solutions and facilitate collaboration and co-creation across civil society. Where possible we will facilitate private sector involvement in the development, scaling and funding of new approaches and solutions.

⁸⁶ Emotive is an international exchange programme that enables peer-to-peer learning between professionals who have the power to generate impact as role models and change makers. See: <https://www.emotiveprogram.org/>

⁸⁷ A shared space for everyone working on climate justice – campaigners, fundraisers, communication experts, people in the private sector, public policy experts and programme leads – to share and exchange plans, ideas and materials.

⁸⁸ The Pan-African Media Alliance for Climate Change (PAMACC) is one of Africa's associations of environment journalists. It was created in June 2013 at a workshop the Pan-African Climate Justice Alliance organized for African journalists. See also <https://www.pamacc.org/>

6 SUSTAINED IMPACT & KNOCK ON EFFECTS

6.1 CLIMATE JUSTICE AND RESILIENCE FACILITY FOR AFRICA (CJFA)

6.1.1 INTRODUCTION

A **Small Grants Facility**, *Climate Justice Facility for Africa* (CJFA), will be established to support the achievement of the AACJ consortium's objectives. It is designed to support innovative, rapid-response alternatives and 'start-up' initiatives. The CJFA will target more or less formal (community) groups and initiatives and informal groups and movements, many of which may not have legal personality due to various reasons including government restrictions, resource constraints and the choice of activists.

The CJFA will consist of five funds, each one managed by a consortium member that will provide technical support to beneficiaries, assess proposals and determine amounts. PACJA will provide overall coordination and ensure communication about the different funds. Calls for proposals will be made through a portal. Selection criteria will need to be determined per fund and per organization managing that fund.

MOVEMENT BUILDING FUND

The Movement Building Fund will be led by Oxfam Novib, supporting grassroots and independent movements and organizations that are mostly not registered. These typically have many 'leaders', are based on individual connections and networks rather than a formal structure, and have decentralized fundraising and spending for autonomously determined purposes. The fund will make EUR 212,500 available to **support around five influencing activities and capacity strengthening initiatives per year**.

Activities to be supported are often ad hoc, short-term, based on voluntarism, and require relatively small amounts of money. Such movements, individuals or informal groups do not usually look for 'calls for proposals' but make activities happen by collecting online and offline donations. Ensuring financial accountability when funding loosely coordinated, decentralized activities by people who independently drive their own agenda requires a level of risk taking and innovation in systems to comply with rules and regulations. We will implement our flexible administrative procedures for movements with the utmost care.

Given the local nature of movements and how they operate, funds will be transferred in ways that best suit each group, such as mobile money, cash, wire transfer, Western Union or other types of cash transfer, or crowdfunding linked to mobile money. Accountability will take into account that expenses will mainly be activity-based, accepting records such as photos of outputs and asking for 'receipts when realistically available'.

The Movement Building Fund is innovative for the consortium, and we anticipate a phased implementation. In Year 1 the framework and criteria will be defined, with an

accountability mechanism and clarity on acceptable financial risk. In Year 2 we anticipate testing the fund by creating dedicated periods for evaluating various funding mechanisms. From Year 3 the fund will be fully operational.

ALLIANCE FUND

Activists and organizations can amplify their influence by working together. The Alliance Fund, of EUR 425,000, will enable flexible responses to **sudden opportunities to accelerate action** and achieve a quick win or pave the way for bigger gains in the future. This fund will also be led by Oxfam Novib. It aims to further stimulate and facilitate collaboration among allies in networks beyond AACJ.

On average we will support about four alliances per year to improve their ability to influence. The fund will support bringing different organizations or their constituencies together, online or offline, to strengthen linkages and complementarities; it will support joint offline and online campaigns and gatherings; and it will provide seed money for innovative approaches, new alliances or work on new and emerging issues.

The Alliance Fund will be an online and open fund, marketed through the consortium and partners' networks. Applications will be assessed as they are submitted, according to standards of quality, accountability, reporting and the potential for impact.

PROTECTION FUND FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

The Protection for Climate Human Rights Defenders Fund will be led by Natural Justice. States have a human rights obligation to prevent the foreseeable adverse effects of climate change and ensure that those affected can access effective remedies and means of adaptation to enjoy lives of human dignity. However, activists defending their human rights or those of their communities – as individuals, groups or organizations – often run serious risks, particularly in a context of shrinking civic space.

Frontline climate-related human rights defenders challenge abuses by state, business and political interests at great personal risk and under threats of intimidation, violence, criminalization and death. Indigenous peoples, local communities and women human rights defenders are often perceived as weak targets.⁸⁹ The COVID-19 period has been especially deadly, with cases of gross human rights violations, criminalization, attacks and threats to environmental and land defenders being reported in many countries.

When facing threats, immediate action is paramount. This fund will provide human rights defenders with a **rapid-response small grant** of up to EUR 5,000 to **cover immediate and short-term transitional costs arising from the emergency situation** and allow the defender to identify a more stable source of support, which often requires more time-consuming approval processes. It can be used for digital and physical security, travel expenses, legal fees and psycho-social support.

EMERGENCY LITIGATION FUND

The Emergency Litigation Fund will be led by Natural Justice. It will **support communities facing imminent threats of climate injustices**, including environmental destruction through extractives and large-scale infrastructure projects and illegal acquisition of their lands. Timely injunctive intervention by the courts is often critical to stop irreparable harm to communities' local environments. The **legal costs** of filing these injunctive processes is, however, often a **barrier**. We will reserve EUR 285,000 for this component.

⁸⁹ *Holistic Protection for Women Human Rights Defenders*. (2018, October 23). AWID. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from: <https://www.awid.org/resources/holistic-protection-women-human-rights-defenders>

Communities facing imminent threats will be able to apply to access the fund, and applications will be considered by a small committee. It will be critical to make indigenous and local communities and environmental justice lawyers aware of the fund's existence, communicating through Africa's growing network of lawyers and community movements.

LOCAL ACTION FUND

We will reserve EUR 900,000 for this component, which will be led by PACJA. It will drive **locally-led, evidence-based advocacy**, by supporting **innovative community response initiatives** that struggle to attract funding in the traditional donor landscape but are potentially transformative. It will promote co-creation and cross-sectoral learning with the private sector, acknowledging that communities need to be involved in the process of finding their own solutions to challenges based on their own contexts, and that the private sector cannot be ignored in the transition to low-carbon, climate-resilient development pathways defining individual countries' NDCs.

This component will support robust engagement of communities at the frontline of the climate crisis in collectively developing and - together with governmental and private sector partners - scaling-up solutions that enable them to overcome shocks, rebound and continue pursuing goals set by their sub-national governments, national development blueprints, the Paris Agreement or SDGs.

PACJA will apply its extensive outreach and convening power to catalyse strategic dialogues between communities, CSOs and the private sector, cultivating relationships over time in order to influence private sector actors to play an active role in promoting communities' climate resilience. One example of how they can play such a role, is through joint pilot initiatives (social enterprises) on viable community solutions in adaptation, mitigation and financial mobilization.

6.2 OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION WITH THE DUTCH MINISTRY AND ALIGNMENT WITH DUTCH POLICIES

The AACJ consortium has held several meetings with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specifically with representatives from the Inclusive Green Growth Department (IGG), to explore areas of alignment, coordination and cooperation at global level. One meeting explored areas of alignment on climate relevance in particular. Meetings between the Dutch embassies and the consortium took place in five of eight countries in January and February 2021 (alignment still to be explored in Senegal and Nigeria).

ALIGNMENT BETWEEN MINISTRY AND AACJ CONSORTIUM

The consortium and the Ministry agree that inadequate climate policies at national level mean those who have least power in societies are most affected. The consortium will build movements up from the existing national policies. The consortium and the Ministry recognize that narrative building and strategic litigation can influence key decisions in international fora such as the Climate Adaptation Summit (CAS). The consortium will seek through such engagement sustainable knock-on-effects and connections with movements in other countries.

The Ministry expressed the importance of considering how local-level action can achieve change. The consortium considers the programme to be primarily on lobby and advocacy and CSO strengthening, in line with the policy framework – but the partnership with the

Ministry is an ongoing process in which dialogue will continue, including on adjusting the approach to local-level action. It is also agreed that the consortium will seek dialogue with organizations working on climate within the Power of Voices policy framework, such as Both Ends and SNV, for mutual learning especially on the role of women (see also section 6.3).

ALIGNMENT BETWEEN THE AACJ ALLIANCE WITH DUTCH EMBASSIES

The consortium partners agreed that the lead member of the consortium in a country would lead on embassy engagement on behalf of the consortium and its local partners. Opportunities for collaboration and synergies have been identified, and meetings planned between consortium partners and Dutch embassies to further explore areas of alignment and opportunities to operationalize partnerships with the embassies through:

- Connecting with partners on local, national and international level for alignment and improvement of programming;
- Engaging with embassies on key areas of AACJ's work; and
- Brokering and facilitating access to decision-makers.

More details per country are presented in chapter 7.

6.3 ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER CONSORTIA UNDER PVP PROGRAMME

The AACJ consortium partners have explored opportunities for cooperation with other Power of Voices partnerships, particularly with the **Green Livelihoods Alliance (GLA)**⁹⁰, with **Amplifying Voices for Just Climate Action (JCA)**⁹¹, with the **Global Alliance for Green and Gender Action (GAGGA)**⁹², and with **BENKADI**⁹³. In addition, Oxfam Novib is also part of the **Fair for All consortium**⁹⁴ and FEMNET of the **She Leads alliance**⁹⁵, which also offer opportunities for cooperation. With each of them we have agreed to discuss collaboration as soon as the programs are underway, in Q2 or Q3.

Several other consortiums (GLA, JCA, GAGGA, She Leads, BENKADI) are interested in **co-creating African narratives on climate justice**, or on specific aspects of climate justice stimulating debate (e.g. GLA is specifically interested to cooperate on a just transition out of fossil fuel dependency), as well as in co-creating / participating in joint public campaigns.

Cooperation with She Leads may offer opportunities to AACJ for reaching out to new groups of young women and girls (potentially) interested to engage with **climate justice movements**. Similarly, AACJ may offer young women and girls active in She Leads avenues to engage and lead on climate justice. Also, AACJ and She Leads are both

⁹⁰ GLA is an alliance of Gaia Amazonas, IUCN NL, Milieudefensie, NTFP-EP, SDI and Tropenbos International, with WECF and FERN as technical partners.

⁹¹ JCA is an alliance of World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Netherlands, SouthSouthNorth, Akina Mama wa Afrika, Slum Dwellers International, Fundación Avina, Hivos.

⁹² GAGGA brings together the Fondo Centroamericano de Mujeres (FCAM), Both ENDS and Mama Cash, with the World Resource Institute (WRI) as strategic partner.

⁹³ BENKADI brings together Woord en Daad, Secrétariat Permanent des ONG (SPONG), Convention de la Société Civile Ivoirienne (CSCI), Secrétariat de Concertation des Organisations Non Gouvernementale Maliennes (SECO-ONG/Mali) and Plateforme des Acteurs de la Société Civile au Bénin (PASCiB)

⁹⁴ FAIR for ALL is an alliance of Oxfam Novib, Third World Network-Africa, Huairou Commission and SOMO.

⁹⁵ She Leads Alliance brings together Plan International, Defence for Children Nederland/ ECPAT, Terre des Hommes Nederland and FEMNET.

interested in changing attitudes towards and creating space for activism, and may find each other in joint initiatives.

AACJ, GAGGA and Fair for All will manage (or cooperate with) **small grants funds** aiming to support community and activist groups fighting for climate justice. Consortia will exchange information (calls for proposals, guidelines, procedures, deadlines) about the different small grants funds we manage. In cases when applications to one of those funds/calls do not match with the fund's criteria or timelines, there may occasionally be scope for referring those applicants to other funds/calls.

AACJ, GAGGA, JCA, She Leads and Fair for All are all interested in promoting African civil society and community **engagement with regional and global level climate processes**, including e.g. in UNFCCC (promoting ambition in NDCs, climate finance, gender action plan), African Union (African cooperation) and in multilateral funds and banks (GCF, AfDB, World Bank). We will regularly discuss advocacy agendas and opportunities for collaboration. By virtue of our engagement with these processes, and with related civil society networking, it will generally not be difficult to coordinate.

With GLA, GAGGA, JCA and Fair for All we share an interest in strengthening **natural resource rights**, as a precondition for communities and households depending on those natural resources, to plan for and invest in adaptation measures; as well as in strengthening the capacities of local groups to defend (community) natural resource rights, and in protecting the lives, rights and wellbeing of defenders. We will explore opportunities for collaboration both at regional level and at country level, particularly in Mozambique and Nigeria.

With BENKADI we will look both at opportunities for cooperation or **complementarities in Burkina Faso and at regional, global or Dutch level**. Complementarities may be found in AACJ taking forward challenges, and experiences from country level to influencing opportunities at regional or global level, since BENKADI expects to do limited work at those levels.

6.4 SUSTAINABILITY

Building an inclusive movement for climate justice is a long-term assignment. Sustainability is a core element of our work, underpinning programme design, implementation and ways of working across all five pathways. It is a function of four elements: i) civil society sustainability; ii) organizational sustainability; iii) social sustainability; and iv) environmental sustainability.

CIVIL SOCIETY SUSTAINABILITY

Our consortium will connect partners, strengthen alliances, networks, movements and constituencies, building complementary relationships and fostering alliances that will last well beyond the programme's life. We will invest in mutual learning, leveraging the expertise, knowledge, skills and relationships of consortium and local partners. We will recognize and address power asymmetries within and between formal and less formal groups and organizations to assure the movement's legitimacy. Ensuring strong leadership roles for groups that have traditionally been sidelined requires dedicated attention and resources to build confidence and create safe spaces to speak out, along with do-no-harm approaches and risk mitigation plans.

Influencing work is designed and implemented by right holders, in collaboration with relevant movements and CSOs. In addition to local and national change, our programme

will influence regionally and globally (multilateral institutions and regional bodies) to institutionalize positive changes and ensure accountability mechanisms.

The consortium will explicitly address civic space as part of our influencing agenda to ensure sustainability. This means fostering mutual learning between CSOs on how to navigate shrinking civic space, while helping increase and defend their legitimacy.

Changing the discourse on climate change is a key element in the AACJ programme. The consortium will support the development of a climate justice narrative which emphasizes the lived experience of African women, youth and local communities. We assume that working with movements, media, opinion and thought leaders and universities to spread new and alternative narratives to a broad range of stakeholders, beyond civil society, will lead to changes continuing beyond our immediate interventions.

ORGANIZATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY

The programme will allocate a substantial share of its financial resources to the Global South and local civil society actors. This could challenge their financial sustainability when the programme ends, given the context of diminishing core funding in the aid sector. We will support the financial sustainability of partners through mutual capacity development: as elaborated in section 5.5, we believe it is important to offer organizational development based on needs assessments in issues including fundraising and MEL.

Consortium members intend to engage in joint fundraising during programme implementation, to contribute to the institutional sustainability of the consortium and enable partners and members to continue and expand their work beyond the programme.

SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY

Strengthening the agency and voice of women, youth and local communities is a pre-condition for climate justice. Our programme will be part of the journey towards more locally owned climate polices and empowered women, youth and local and indigenous communities. For example, the legal empowerment work (pathway 3) will contribute to ensure that communities are in a position to raise issues and complaints with government and companies without support. Intervention strategies will be checked for unintended (negative) effects on women, youth and local communities.

All pathways should contribute to increased awareness and understanding of barriers and forms of exclusion faced by women, youth and local communities – whether visible or invisible, formal or informal – in adapting to and coping with climate change. Increased understanding will empower women, youth and local and indigenous communities to advocate for measures that address these barriers and for policies and practices that advance climate justice.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

The consortium will advocate for policies and practices that help reduce GHG emissions and increase communities' resilience and capacities to adapt to climate change, through community-driven and ecosystem-based adaptation plans. We will support partnerships within and across countries to allow learning and exchanges and scaling of good practice.

We are aware of the environmental impact of our interventions, including international and national travel, and will limit this as much as possible. The consortium and local partners will assess on a case-by-case basis the necessity to travel or use products or materials that might be environmental unfriendly. In this assessment environmental sustainability, not cost, will be the decisive factor.



PART 2: IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAMME

7 NATIONAL, REGIONAL & GLOBAL PLANS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The AACJ programme will be implemented in eight countries – **Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia and South Africa** – selected through rigorous context and problem analyses and in consultation with local partners and their constituencies. A key consideration was potential for inclusive movement building: the availability of strong local partners and existing structures, and opportunities for mutual learning and regional knock-on effects (connecting movements across countries).

DESIGN OF AACJ PROGRAMME: BOTTOM UP CO-CREATION

The AACJ programme is built bottom-up: in all eight countries, local partners and constituencies identified opportunities for change at local, national and global level. These opportunities – which are context specific, and may relate to local, national and/or processes – have informed countries' strategies and interventions.

This chapter provides a detailed overview of how the programme will be implemented at local, national and regional levels. The next eight sections (co-created by local partners of PACJA, FEMNET, Oxfam, Natural Justice and AYC) provide **country**-specific details on the problem analysis, opportunities for change and the AACJ programme (strategic objective, impact outcomes, intermediate outcomes).

More details on how the five pathways will be carried out in each country and on regional and global level is described in Annex 2 (alternatively the reader may click on hyperlinks provided in sections 7.2-7.11). The last two sections – developed by the consortium partners, with the support of local partners – present how we will leverage opportunities on the **regional** level, and work with **Dutch stakeholders** to advance climate justice.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Local partners are enthusiastic about working together, and have already identified many complementarities and opportunities for shared work. However, in most of the eight countries they met for the first time only recently (virtually due to COVID-19): co-creation at national and local level has only just started, and will continue in the coming months. In some countries one or two consortium partners still need to identify local partners to support implementation.

The pandemic has had a huge impact on the programme's development. All consortium and local partners experienced high levels of stress caused by COVID-19. Several members fell sick and could not be replaced easily, with high impact on the work. Colleagues lost people close to them. Local partners' efforts to co-create the programme were compromised by restrictions on meetings, public transport and cross-border travel. It was not always easy to shift to virtual working as some constituencies of local organizations that will implement the programme, still have no access to the internet.

The country chapters therefore provide a first glance of what a co-created programme on the national and local level will look like. This applies also to opportunities for collaboration between the consortium, partners and Dutch embassies in the countries.

7.2 BURKINA FASO: TRADITIONALLY EXCLUDED GROUPS ACCELERATING CLIMATE ACTION

STRATEGIC COUNTRY OBJECTIVE:

Organizations of young and female farmers, pastoralists, people with disabilities, refugees in the Centre, Nord, Sahel, Sud-Ouest and Centre-Nord regions, and local and national authorities become aware of the challenges posed by climate change, and decide to work in synergy towards climate justice.

CONTEXT

Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in the Sahel, with a total population estimated at 20.9 million. The UN classifies it as a least developed country. Its GDP per capita, USD 786.9,⁹⁶ is less than half of the sub-Saharan African average (USD 1,566.3). The richest 20% of the population earned seven times more than the poorest 20% in 2014, resulting in a GINI coefficient of 35.3%.⁹⁷

Over 40% of the population are considered poor, with higher rates in regions such as Nord (70.4%), Boucle du Mouhoun (59.7%) and Centre (51.7%). Poverty is higher in rural areas (47.5%) than urban areas (13.7%).⁹⁸ Poverty has been compounded by COVID-19's impact on access to markets and unpaid care work.

The country is heavily affected by violent conflict and Islamist insurgency. Jihadist armed groups, including Al Qaeda and Islamic State for the Greater Sahara, have overrun large portions of the country's north and east. More than 2,000 people were killed in 2020. Violence and widespread insecurity have led to an estimated 1.1 million people being internally displaced, with children (61%) and women (23%) the most affected.⁹⁹

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

CLIMATE IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIES

Burkina Faso is getting hotter and drier, with longer dry seasons and high variability year-on-year. Rainfall comes less frequently and with shorter duration, but greater intensity, occasionally causing flooding. The impacts include lower agricultural yields, and loss of pastureland.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ GDP per capita (current US\$) - Burkina Faso, World | Data. (n.d.). World Bank. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=BF-1W&year_high_desc=false

⁹⁷ Gini index (World Bank estimate) - Burkina Faso, World | Data. (n.d.). World Bank. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=BF-1W&year_high_desc=false

⁹⁸ Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie. (2020, January 30). *Burkina Faso - Enquête Multisectorielle Continue 2014*. World Bank. <https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2538/get-microdata>

⁹⁹ Conseil National de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation. (2021). *Situation des PDI par communes d'accueil au 28 février 2021*. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Li-yrvK_RuSaWofl9yRoav9Bu3BDIEKqn/view.

¹⁰⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. (2019, February 5) *Climate Change Profile West African Sahel*. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/publications/2019/02/05/climate-change-profiles/West+African+Sahel.pdf>

Most of the population (86%) works in the agricultural sector,¹⁰¹ which lacks adaptation and resilience to climate change. Women represent 65% of agricultural producers¹⁰², and women and youth are most affected by extreme weather, land degradation, loss of biodiversity and reduced agricultural output. In this patriarchal society, gender inequality is deeply entrenched in customary norms, leading to discrimination against women in access to and ownership of land, and participation in decision-making roles in local communities.

Groups disproportionately affected by climate change – in particular young and female farmers, pastoralists, people with disabilities and IDPs – lack the capacities to participate in policy-making processes. Their organizations are often not officially recognized by authorities and lack the structure and technical know-how to influence policies on issues that threaten their livelihoods, such as climate change and social inclusion.

Policies mostly focus on immediate, operational needs, and overlook issues related to climate change, leading to problems of access to water and land. Indigenous knowledge systems, based on thousands of years of land management, sustainability and climate adaptation have remained largely undocumented and are not taken into account by policy makers.

CLIMATE ACTION IS LAGGING, POLICY FRAMEWORKS NOT PROTECTING RIGHTS

Despite the government's ratification of various international conventions, progressive climate policies remain undelivered due to administrative challenges and lack of political will. Climate change policies, strategies, plans, frameworks and discussions have done very little to mainstream adaptation and community resilience. They have limited impact on the lives of the most climate-affected communities, often due to lack of local ownership in agricultural communities and among the poorest population.

Environmental laws, such as to stop mining companies degrading natural resources, are fairly new in Burkina Faso and rarely enforced. Affected communities struggle to defend their rights to food and a healthy environment due to lack of awareness about existing laws, high illiteracy rates, poor recognition of customary laws, lack of state accountability and high costs for legal procedures.

LACK OF A STRONG CSO MOVEMENT CONNECTED TO COMMUNITY NEEDS

Despite the presence of a dynamic civil society and the recent emergence of social movements and activists engaged in climate justice, CSOs continue to work in isolation. There is a clear need to engage CSOs in a broader dialogue, alliances and coalitions, and link them to potential constituents by addressing community struggles and resiliency needs. Civil society remains largely unrepresented in decision-making processes for public policies and commitments, including climate policy and the budget cycle.

While local populations perceive the effects of climate change through irregular rainfall and droughts, there remains an overall lack of awareness of the negative impacts of environmental degradation among those most affected. CSOs have a clear opportunity to engage with local communities and develop a broader movement based on climate justice as a path towards increased participation and influence over public policies.

¹⁰¹ Burkina Faso | *Global Partnership Initiative for Plant Breeding Capacity Building*. (n.d.). FAO. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <http://www.fao.org/in-action/plant-breeding/our-partners/africa/burkina-faso/en/>.

¹⁰² *Agriculture : Les femmes rurales plaident pour un "Burkina sans faim" - leFaso.net*. (2020, October 12). LeFaso.Net. <https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article99918>

SHRINKING CIVIC SPACE

While the country's adoption of a new constitution and international charters on human rights in the 1990s were important advances, civic space in Burkina Faso remains limited, with the banning of demonstrations, repression of human rights activists, and interruption of internet services to prevent citizens from mobilizing and sharing information. Currently, most limitations are linked to security concerns and COVID-19 measures. Despite this, activists are broadly willing to engage on national and sectoral climate change policies.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

- Despite the lack of effective implementation so far, Burkina Faso has committed to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocols, ratified the Paris Agreement and targeted its NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution) on renewable energy and agriculture.
- Burkina Faso has legislative frameworks and strategies in place, such as the National Strategy for the implementation of the Climate Change Convention (2001); National Adaptation Plan (PNA, 2014); National Council for the Environment and Sustainable Development; and an Inter-Ministerial Committee for the implementation of actions (CIMAC). Together they form an existing roadmap for officials to act on.
- Burkina Faso has strong civil society groups and emerging movements that advocate for human rights and climate justice. Internet coverage reaches 60% of the population and 90% have mobile phones. With capacity development and alliance building, CSOs have the potential to inspire a nation-wide grassroots movement.

PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

IMPACT OUTCOME 1:

Organizations of young and female farmers, pastoralists, people with disabilities and IDPs in the Centre, Nord, Sahel, Sud-Ouest and Centre-Nord regions of Burkina Faso rally together to promote climate justice.

The AACJ consortium in Burkina Faso will **promote and facilitate a broad movement** of impacted communities, IDPs and minorities (including women and youth) from multiple regions (Pathway 1). The programme will allow for existing groups, organizations and movements to join forces, to develop a **shared narrative and to rally together** on climate justice topics (Pathway 2). Varied civil society actors will be connected with the appropriate communication channels, delivering an inclusive and effective platform.

The consortium will also address the reduction in **civic space** and limits to freedom of expression faced by climate movements, including women and youth groups, supporting official recognition of civil society structures and building capacity on mobilization.

IMPACT OUTCOME 2:

Public policies and frameworks have been developed that advance climate justice for the groups that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, through the inclusion of young and female farmers, pastoralists, people with disability and refugees in policy-making process.

The programme will raise awareness of vulnerable and impacted groups – including indigenous people, women, youth, and IDPs – on environmental laws and climate policies and work with local communities to **claim and defend their rights to a decent livelihood and healthy environment** (Pathway 3). It will support local and indigenous communities to document, share and spread traditional knowledge and best practice

regarding climate adaptation and resilience (Pathway 4) while ensuring this knowledge is acknowledged as a major resource for climate adaptation by policy makers.

The AACJ consortium in Burkina Faso will advocate for public policies and practices for protecting the **livelihoods of vulnerable groups**, improving their **resilience** and promoting **inclusive climate financing**, and strengthen capacities of CSOs to **participate in political processes** (pathway 5).

For more details on how the programme will be implemented in Burkina Faso see Annex 2 or click [here](#).

ADDRESSING LOCAL CAPACITY NEEDS

CSOs in Burkina Faso need capacity strengthening on management issues such as financial and human resources, alliance building, and cooperation with local stakeholders to build grassroots movements. Training activists in using digital media to promote stories on climate justice has the potential to increase awareness about climate issues. CSOs also need more capacity to better understand international and national processes that affect climate policies, and share this knowledge with more local organizations.

We will support vulnerable communities to increase their resilience to climate change by scoping and documenting local initiatives, facilitating cross-community learning, and encouraging private sector investment in community-driven resilience initiatives.

LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

Consortium members will work with around 15 Burkinabe organizations.

- **PACJA partners** include: African Network on Gender Equality and Sustainable Development (ANGEL_SD); Ecologie pour le Développement (EcoDev); Association pour l'Education et l'Environnement (A-2E); Association pour le Développement et la Lutte contre le Changement Climatique (ADLCC); Jeunesse Unies pour un développement Durable (JUDEV); and Association Paysan Sans Frontières (APF).
- **Oxfam partners** which will particularly work on Pathways 2 and 5, include: Confédération Paysanne du Faso (CPF); Secrétariat Permanent des Organisations Non Gouvernementales (SPONG); Alliance Technique d'Assistance au Développement (ATAD); and SEVE-Africa.
- **AYC partners** will build capacity of youth organizations, increase awareness of legal and institutional frameworks, develop youth **leadership** in climate justice, and facilitate sharing of successful experiences in resilience with other countries. Local partners include: Junior Chamber International Burkina Faso; Iwili Association; and National Youth Coordination for Environment and Climate, and its regional branches.
- Voix des Femmes is a local partner of **FEMNET** and will particularly advance Pathways 1 and 3.
- **Natural Justice** will scope partners that can help advance environmental justice.

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

PACJA and its local partners have been supporting locally led actions and initiatives in Burkina Faso including:

- Building rural communities' resilience to climate change and COVID-19 through community-based investment in sunflower farming for improvement of livelihoods.
- Supporting community-based structures for participatory forest management.

OXFAM BURKINA FASO

- Global Convergence of Struggles for Earth and Water in West Africa (CGLTE-AO) comprises nearly 30 organizations (including peasants, women and civil society) focused on climate resilience and public policies.

- Sahelian Youth for Climate Action (JESAC): implemented in Burkina Faso and Niger, this project (ongoing until 2022) raises awareness and strengthens women and youth leadership on climate issues, seeking better climate governance at community, national and regional level. It is scheduled to train over 2000 young activists.
- Zero Desert Surface: this ten-day annual project is focused on sharing knowledge on environmental resilience with youth in Burkina Faso, including through social media.
- Climate Extreme Resilience and Adaptation Programme: this project established 75 Early Warning Committees in Centre-Nord, building the resilience of agricultural communities, and developed alliances with numerous local stakeholders.
- Belgium DGD Agro-Ecological Financing: this project raised awareness on climate change, resilience and gender in agriculture among over 1,000 women rural workers.

ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

- **National government officials** develop and implement budgets and public policies. They can be considered an ally of the programme, based on the wide adoption of policies on sustainable development and improving quality of life for the poorest people. The programme will target senior positions in ministries in charge of agriculture, finance, development, environment, climate change, women, humanitarian action, and animal resources. The National Assembly will be targeted through individual parliamentarians and specialized committees on development, climate change and finance.
- **Local and regional government officials including mayors of affected municipalities, governors, high commissioners and presidents of regional councils** will be engaged through advocacy to integrate resilience and funding in municipal and regional development plans. Local authorities are open to working with civil society, interested in community-based adaptation strategies, and responsive to messages from CSOs.¹⁰³
- **Private sector actors, mainly in the extractives and cement sectors**, have a significant environmental impact and influence in policy discussions. The programme seeks to hold them accountable for environmental damage and engage them in climate change work.
- **Media outlets including traditional media (public and private), digital media and local radio stations** play an important role in disseminating knowledge on policy discussions and resilience efforts. Collaboration with engaged artists will also take place through such outlets, to diffuse advocacy messages and increase public awareness.

ALIGNMENT WITH DUTCH MINISTRY AND EMBASSY

The proposal aligns with the Embassy's priority theme of energy. AACJ will be the Embassy's only climate programme, and the Embassy has expressed interest in the results of litigation and in programme sustainability. The ambition is to further align and collaborate with current initiatives in the country and national priorities on climate change.

¹⁰³ For example, part of the Kua forest in the Hauts-Bassins region was to be destroyed to build a modern hospital. Thanks to action taken by an extensive civil society network, the government relocated the construction to another site.

7.3 ETHIOPIA: FAST TRACKING CLIMATE ACTION THAT IS BOLD, FAIR AND INCLUSIVE

STRATEGIC COUNTRY OBJECTIVE:

A strong, all-inclusive and gender sensitive climate justice movement advocates for fair, accessible and equitable climate policies, including community-driven adaptation strategies, which specifically benefit disadvantaged groups (in particular women, youth and indigenous communities).

CONTEXT

Ethiopia's impressive economic growth is driven by the (primarily rain-fed) agricultural sector,¹⁰⁴ which accounts for 80% of the country's workforce. It has resulted in a reduction in poverty levels, but less so among the rural population.¹⁰⁵ Inequality is on the rise, and conflicts over land and natural resources are rife. Women have equal legal rights under the constitution, but lack of awareness and local social norms perpetuate discrimination. Ethiopia ranked 121 out of 160 countries in the 2017 Gender Inequality Index.

Ethiopia faces significant internal displacement, largely related to ethnic and border-based disputes.¹⁰⁶ Political instability could remain high in 2021, given ongoing conflicts and rivalry including the Tigray-federal feud, and the long-delayed general election. COVID-19 has slowed growth and reduced employment opportunities for youth and IDPs.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

CLIMATE IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIES

Ethiopia is one of the most drought-prone countries in the world, with increasingly unpredictable rains. In some years seasonal rains fail completely, causing crop failure and loss of livestock. In the highlands, heavy rains sometimes cause flooding and soil degradation.

Climate change and related loss of agricultural land, coupled with aggressive economic and infrastructure development, is causing conflicts and human rights violations and degrading the environment.¹⁰⁷ Communities have been displaced by conflicts (1.2 million people) and extreme weather events including droughts and flooding (more than half a million people).¹⁰⁸ Despite positive trends in linking national development plans with climate initiatives, current efforts tend to be focused more on mitigation than community-driven adaptation.

¹⁰⁴ Ethiopia's economy averaged 9.7% growth from 2009-2019. *GDP growth (annual %) - Ethiopia | Data*. World Bank. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ET>

¹⁰⁵ The poverty rate decreased from 26% in 2011 to 15% in 2016 in urban areas and from 30% in 2011 to 26% in 2016 in rural areas. *Ethiopia Overview*. (2021, March 18). World Bank. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>

¹⁰⁶ *Ethiopia National Displacement Report 6, Round 23: August - September 2020*. IOM. Retrieved March 2021 from <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-national-displacement-report-6-round-23-august-september-2020>

¹⁰⁷ Ethiopia ranks 157 out of 181 countries in the ND-GAIN index (2018) for climate vulnerability and is the 20th most vulnerable country in the world. University of Notre Dame. (n.d.). *Country Index*. Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/>

¹⁰⁸ The 2020 IOM report revealed that primary causes of displacement in Ethiopia are conflict and climate/weather. *Ethiopia — National Displacement Report 5 (June — July 2020) | DTM*. (2020, September 10). Displacement Tracking Matrix IOM. <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-%E2%80%94-national-displacement-report-5-june-%E2%80%94-july-2020>

Women, youth and indigenous peoples are extremely vulnerable to climate change as they rely on small-scale agriculture and natural resources. They often lack agency to insist on their environmental and land rights, in part because of patriarchal norms. They are unheard in public discourses and decisions and policies on climate change.

LAND AND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT

Ethiopia's rapid economic growth has been driven by foreign investment and large government infrastructure projects.¹⁰⁹ Land acquisitions for agribusiness projects, industrial zones, and urban expansion is causing environmental and tenure insecurity for indigenous people, local communities and women, violating their rights and eroding any notion of community environmental, social and land rights. Expropriation of land forces individuals and communities to migrate without reasonable compensation or full consent. Affected communities lack awareness of their rights¹¹⁰ and legal recourse, as laws are flawed. Land scarcity is resulting in more natural resource-based conflicts.¹¹¹

LEGACY OF RESTRICTED CIVIC SPACE – AN EMERGING CIVIC SOCIETY

Ethiopia's civic space is recovering after a decade marked by shrinking space to engage on human rights issues, conduct rights-based advocacy or use media to express dissent against the government.¹¹² Despite more progressive civil society legislation in 2019, organizations, networks and media still have limited capacity to influence and mobilize citizens at scale to claim their rights. Legal avenues remain largely underutilized.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

- After a decade of restrictions, citizens, civil society and media are increasingly claiming more space to defend vulnerable communities' environmental, social and land rights.
- The Environment Policy of 1997 and other environmental regulations provide legal hooks to promote environmental, social and land rights, while the Pollution Control Proclamation of 2002 allows individuals and environmental rights advocacy groups to bring cases before courts in the public interest.
- The Government of Ethiopia has set out an ambitious new sustainable development agenda (2021-2030) which identifies empowering women and youth and building a climate-resilient green economy as key strategic pillars. This framework recognizes the need to strengthen climate adaptation and invest in citizens' and communities' adaptive capacity by improving the water, natural resources, health and agricultural sectors.
- Ethiopia is a signatory to international agreements and conventions (UNFCCC, Paris Agreement) that enshrine vulnerable communities' rights to climate mitigation measures and avenues of redress. It developed a National Adaptation Plan in 2017.

PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

IMPACT OUTCOME 1:

Empowered indigenous and local communities and CSOs will provide a strong grassroots foundation to build national movements promoting and advocating for climate justice and community driven climate narratives.

¹⁰⁹ *Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US\$) - Ethiopia | Data*. World Bank. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=ET>

¹¹⁰ See for example Amsalu, D. (2018). Environmental rights in Ethiopia: Shifting from theory to practical realization. *Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy (The)*, 9(2), 48. <https://doi.org/10.4314/jsdlp.v9i2.4>

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Legal aid and advocacy programmes were not allowed, while 1,741 NGOs were closed down. Many remaining CSOs have experienced significantly reduced capacity especially in the areas of advocacy for gender, ethnic and minority rights.

The AACJ consortium in Ethiopia will work with broad networks of local organizations to conduct regular **outreach activities aimed at disadvantaged communities** and empower community members, especially youth, to take up leadership roles (pathway 1). The consortium will create common understanding on influencing goals amongst more than 100 CSOs, and create new platforms for **existing and new women-led alliances** to jointly run popular **campaigns to advocate for climate justice** on national, regional and international level.

The consortium will create awareness and space for disadvantaged communities to voice their views on climate change solutions and support community groups to create **new climate justice narratives** (pathway 2). Such narratives will be taken up by activists, journalists and influencers (including athletes and artists) and inform public campaigns, mobilizing support for **gender-sensitive and inclusive adaptation solutions** and **realizing the NAP**.

IMPACT OUTCOME 2:

Improved mechanisms for the participation of vulnerable groups, allow indigenous and local communities and CSOs to engage effectively with climate decision-makers at national and sub-national level to develop policies and adaptation plans and claim environmental and social rights. Local and national policies and frameworks for climate justice are developed and implemented.

The consortium will support community members, especially women, in **understanding their rights** under national and **international legal frameworks** (Pathway 3). Affected communities and individuals will be supported to securing land tenure and use of traditional lands. **Strategic litigation** will be used to challenge unjust policies and practices. The AACJ consortium will develop a **monitoring framework** to increase scrutiny over enforcement of environmental and land rights in Ethiopia.

The consortium will establish **new platforms and spaces** and empower communities to engage in policy and legal reforms, engaging traditionally excluded communities (women, youth, indigenous communities). The consortium will facilitate joint CSO strategy and advocacy plans and build CSO and community capacity to engage with national and regional authorities to influence Ethiopia's **NAP and NDC**- increasing inclusion, climate finance and aligning climate and development plans (Pathway 5). Recognizing the legacy of restricted **civic space** in Ethiopia, the consortium will create mechanisms to report and engage key stakeholders on civil, political and economic rights.

The consortium will also increase capacity of frontline communities to use new ICT-based methodologies for community-driven climate action, facilitate community exchanges on innovative **community-driven adaptation plans and models**, and support multi-stakeholder dialogues with public and private sector to scale up **emerging best practices** and inform advocacy strategies (pathway 4).

Lessons from national policy engagement and legal advocacy will further equip Ethiopian CSOs and representatives of youth, women and indigenous communities to take part in **regional bodies** (ICAD, AU) and **global policy platforms** around the Paris Agreement.

For more details on how the programme will be implemented in Ethiopia, see Annex 2 or click [here](#).

ADDRESSING LOCAL CAPACITY NEEDS

- The recent history of restricted civic space is reflected in the need to support grass-roots civil society to mobilize citizens for climate justice, empower women, youth and local communities and increase women and youth leadership.
- Newly formed and existing CBOs/CSOs need to strengthen their capacity to form alliances and joint advocacy and influencing strategies. Breaking the silos between organizations working on different rights, the partners will facilitate the creation of a climate justice movement in Ethiopia that can foster new climate-just policies.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL KNOCK-ON EFFECTS

- Since 2009 Ethiopia has shown regional, continental and international leadership on climate change, leading the Conference of African Heads of State on Climate Change for two terms and championing the Conference of African Heads of State on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), an African Union body counterpart to the Paris Agreement.
- The programme will build on Ethiopia's increased responsiveness to UN bodies in reporting on progress under the UNFCCC, domestication of international agreements (Cancun Adaptation Framework) and its recent leadership while chairing the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) and Least Developed Countries Negotiating Groups.
- The programme will leverage proximity to the AU, ECA (ACPC) and Africa Commission Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights Violations.
- The climate justice movement will bring the voices of the country's disadvantaged groups to sub-regional, regional and international decision-making platforms, including the Conference of Parties, UNFCCC, and African Union climate events.

LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

- **Consortium for Climate Change-Ethiopia (CCC-E)**, local partner of PACJA, is a legally registered network of over 30 organizations working on environment, climate change and natural resources.
- **Union of Ethiopian Women and Children Associations (UEWCA)**, local partner of FEMNET, is a non-governmental, nonpartisan consortium of 80 women- and children-focused CSOs.
- African Youth Commission partners with five local organizations in Ethiopia, including **Talent Youth Association, Haramaya University, GME Africa and The Yellow Youth Movement AAU Addis Ababa Ethiopia**
- **Natural Justice (NJ)** will offer technical support to the AACJ consortium in Ethiopia.

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

CONSORTIUM FOR CLIMATE CHANGE-ETHIOPIA (CCC-E)

Has a track record in capacity and movement building with vulnerable groups and in popular campaigns, research and advocacy on climate change. It recently collected 2 million signatures on an online petition supporting the Paris Agreement.

UNION OF ETHIOPIAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN ASSOCIATIONS (UEWCA)

Has a track record promoting the participation of women, youth and indigenous people in planning, decision making and implementation of climate-resilient projects, and supporting creation of shared agendas bringing feminist expertise to climate policies.

ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

- **Government offices:** can be influential allies given their mandates to promote women, youth and pastoralists' empowerment and a climate-resilient green economy.
- **Key public decision-making bodies** (Forest, Environment Climate Change Commission; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Water and Electricity; Ministry of Women Children and Youth): open to supporting communities, but experience high turnover of staff and require continuous engagement.

- **Parliamentarians and local council members:** have decision-making power but are sometimes hesitant to support climate justice initiatives due to lack of knowledge.
- **Community elders:** Gadas (male) or Sinke (female) elders are respected and influential at community and national level, with strong links to environmental justice.
- **Recognized figures** (athletes, artists): influential at community and national levels, they can be critical allies in raising public awareness on climate justice.
- **Media:** increasingly attuned to climate issues and can raise public awareness.
- **Private sector** (e.g. Dutch horticulture companies): can be allies, with the chamber of commerce having good intentions on CSR, but more profit-driven parts of the private sector are often blockers and require further engagement.

ALIGNMENT WITH THE DUTCH MINISTRY/ EMBASSY

It is agreed that possible alignments with the priority themes of the Embassy and ongoing interventions will be further explored by the consortium in the future.

The Embassy expressed its interest in the alignment with the mainstreaming of climate change into its priority areas and in ongoing interventions, such as that in Lake Tana and its watershed areas.

The Embassy will facilitate and link up the consortium with its regional climate change advisor and with the following organizations: Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA), Ethiopian Environment Forest and Climate Change Commission, Land and Water Resource Center, AAU, NDC Partnership – Washington DC and Netherlands Enterprise Agency.

7.4 KENYA: ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

STRATEGIC COUNTRY OBJECTIVE:

To promote climate justice through inclusive human-rights and gender-responsive approaches that strengthen civil society and communities' ability to claim their rights and influence climate relevant policies and decision-making processes.

CONTEXT

Poverty rates in Kenya remain high relative to other lower middle-income countries.¹¹³ The 2020 Comprehensive Poverty Report by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics indicates that 15.9 million out of 44.2 million Kenyans are poor despite a decline in poverty over the last decade line.¹¹⁴ The COVID-19 pandemic caused an average drop in business income of 67%, and greatly increased the number of people living in poor conditions.¹¹⁵ Rural regions have more than double the poverty rate (67%) of urban areas, leading to inequalities in access to services.¹¹⁶ Poor populations lack access to basic needs including nutrition, health, education, child protection services, information, water, sanitation and housing.¹¹⁷

Kenya's main economic drivers (agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishery) are **particularly vulnerable to climate change**.¹¹⁸ Four-fifths of Kenya's land is arid or semi-arid, home to 16 million often-marginalized people who earn their living mainly through pastoralism and small-scale agriculture.¹¹⁹ Crop and livestock production in the country's north and east are expected to suffer particularly due to droughts.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

CLIMATE IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIES

Indigenous people and local communities depend on their deep knowledge of nature for their livelihoods,¹²⁰ and are under threat from lack of respect for their rights. This greatly affects their resilience and capacity to respond to climate change. It also aggravates traditional conflicts over natural resources.

Discrimination based on gender, age, education and disability are further marginalizing some groups. Communities in the coastal and northern regions of Kenya are particularly vulnerable to losing large tracts of their unregistered lands to dispossession by private investors for mega projects.

¹¹³ *Poverty Incidence in Kenya Declined Significantly, but Unlikely to be Eradicated by 2030*. (n.d.). World Bank. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/publication/kenya-economic-update-poverty-incidence-in-kenya-declined-significantly-but-unlikely-to-be-eradicated-by-2030>

¹¹⁴ *UNICEF Kenya*. (n.d.). UNICEF. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.unicef.org/kenya/>

¹¹⁵ *Research: poverty rate doubles as coronavirus grips Kenya | Hand in Hand International*. (2020, October 21). Hand in Hand International | Fight Poverty With Jobs. <http://www.handinhandinternational.org/research-poverty-rate-doubles-as-coronavirus-grips-kenya/#>

¹¹⁶ The Borgen Project. (2020, December 20). *3 Ways Kenya Has Worked to Drop Its Poverty Rates*. <https://borgenproject.org/tag/poverty-in-kenya/>

¹¹⁷ *UNICEF Kenya*. (n.d.). UNICEF. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.unicef.org/kenya/>

¹¹⁸ *Climate risks, vulnerability and governance in Kenya: a review*. (2012, November). Eldis. <https://www.eldis.org/document/A64511>

¹¹⁹ *Kenya - Arid and semi-arid lands*. (2021, January 13). IUCN. <https://www.iucn.org/restoration-initiative/projects/kenya-arid-and-semi-arid-lands>

¹²⁰ Koissaba (2020). *The Challenge of Climate Change and Conflict among Indigenous People in Kenya*. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335338041_KESSA_The_Challenge_of_Climate_Change_and_Insecurity_among_Indigenous_People_in_Kenyaasd

The full **detrimental impact of climate change** and the concept of climate justice remain **unknown for most of the population in Kenya**. Part of this is due to the lack of active and meaningful engagement of local communities: participation in policy discussions and knowledge sharing is rare. There is a clear need for a grassroots movement.

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

Kenya has an advanced legal framework around climate and environmental topics. It is one of the first African countries to enact a comprehensive legal framework and public policies on climate change, notably the Kenyan National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS).¹²¹ However, implementation challenges¹²² impact marginalized groups especially around land tenure security, environment impact assessment and climate change (see also Box 7.1 below).

BOX 7.1: COMMUNITY LAND ACT IMPLEMENTATION

Land ownership remains the most notable source of conflict, particularly in the north of Kenya where mega-projects proliferate on unregistered communal lands. In 2016, the Community Land Act enabled local communities to legally register and jointly own their communal lands, but an estimated 3.5 million people have not done so. The law is not widely publicized, and the government is yet to deploy the necessary personnel or infrastructure. Only a few cases of registration of community land have been completed. A combination of improper land use planning, marginalization and historical injustices regarding land ownership continue to leave marginalized communities vulnerable.

DEVELOPMENT PLANS BUILT ON LARGE-SCALE LAND DEMANDING PROJECTS

Although Kenya's government has set out ambitious developments plans through the Vision 2030 blueprint with commitments that seek to directly support climate risk management, and NDCs mitigation targets, the country remains in schedule to develop new coal plants, prioritizing a potential transformational economic growth in exchange for further environmental degradation, hence climate change impacts.¹²³

Recent increased investment in large-scale projects that demand a high quantity of land (including extractive industries, energy, horticulture, and transport infrastructure megaprojects) is placing additional pressure on the country's already fragile ecosystem and weakening communities' strategies to cope with climate change.

FACTORS COMPROMISING A STRONG MOVEMENT FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE

Unfamiliarity with climate change prevents most Kenyans from having an active voice in decisions that directly impact their lives.

Climate justice efforts are frustrated by shrinkage of civic space, with more climate activists, human rights and environmental defenders facing various threats and attacks. Tactics used by the state to shrink civic space include burdensome registration requirements, restrictions on financing from foreign sources, harassment of staff and

¹²¹ Government of Kenya. (2010). *National Climate Change Response Strategy*. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from <http://www.environment.go.ke/wp-content/documents/complete%20nccrs%20executive%20brief.pdf>

¹²² Implementation challenges can be traced back to inadequate expertise on mainstreaming climate change.

¹²³ Kenya | *Climate Action Tracker*. (n.d.). Climate Action Tracker.Org. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://climate-actiontracker.org/countries/kenya>

partners, arrests and intimidation during outreach activities, disproportionate penalties for non-compliance with regulations and banning of protests.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

- Kenya's legal framework is conducive to enhanced climate action and active citizen engagement, despite significant gaps in implementation.
- Marginalized groups are slowly but surely gaining a voice in Kenyan decision-making. The Climate Change Act (2016) has provisions that, if well implemented, would ensure that contributions from women and other socially excluded groups are adhered to.
- Compared to elsewhere in Africa, civil society in Kenya is relatively vibrant and actively involved in public policy discussions. Many counties have women's organizations.
- Kenya's youth have strong social, technological and environmental awareness. Their activism has potential to transform societies.
- Existing climate change campaigns can be built on. Community Environmental Legal Officers work alongside communities at the forefront of climate crisis.
- Target communities have local governance systems that can be supported.
- Strategic litigation presents an opportunity to draw attention for community participation and the lack of implementation of the Climate Change Act, such as the requirement for environmental assessments. This strategy spurs corporate action to accelerate the transition to low carbon and can be used to hold companies and governments accountable for their actions (and inactions) hence improving climate governance in Kenya. More importantly, litigation seeks to fill the gaps left by legislative and regulatory inaction related to climate change mitigation and adaptation.
- Legal and administrative procedures can also be utilized to hold business, government officials and the financial sector to account on environmental issues.

PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

IMPACT OUTCOME 1:

Kenyan CSOs and movements working on climate justice are mobilized to **build a strong alliance** that seeks to **strengthen and disseminate the climate justice narrative** and **support indigenous people and local communities** to access and defend their environmental rights. The movements will include grassroots organizations, thought leaders, media platforms, women and youth.

The consortium will work with local organizations to develop a **broad movement for climate justice**, with specific focus on supporting indigenous people, local communities, women and youth (Pathway 1). It will work with established movements, such as DeCOALonize Campaign, to **break silos** between environmental, human rights, and feminist organizations, **connecting movements and facilitating collaboration** through common agendas.

To support a **shared narrative for change**, the consortium will host narrative development workshops on climate justice, bringing together indigenous and local activists, policy makers and practitioners for storytelling, dialogue and learning (Pathway 2). The consortium will also promote transversal **forums and dialogue opportunities** to enshrine the role of **indigenous peoples and local communities as custodians of nature**.

IMPACT OUTCOME 2:

Strengthening systems of accountability on climate justice at the county and national levels and supporting the development and enhancement of policies, laws and programs that strengthen the rights of communities and increase their meaningful participation in climate related decisions.

Through its second impact outcome, the consortium will seek to enforce implementation of public policies that support affected communities to cope with climate change. The consortium will push for **implementation of policies** to protect the **(land and environmental) rights of local and indigenous communities** and to **halt further construction of coal plants**. To address shrinking civic space, the consortium will invest in rallying societal and political support and **advocate for policies that create and protect civic space** (Pathway 5).

The programme will train local communities and their networks to work with regulators and to use the law to **hold various institutions accountable**. The AACJ consortium will also support local and indigenous communities to **launch strategic litigations** and **file complaints** to challenge violations to community and climate rights (Pathway 3).

Finally, the programme will work with communities, CSOs and policy makers to research, document and promote **community-led and gender responsive climate adaptations solutions** (Pathway 4) and use these approaches for evidence-based advocacy.

For more details on how the programme will be implemented in Kenya, see Annex 2 or click [here](#).

ADDRESSING LOCAL CAPACITY NEEDS

Local CSOs and activists lack awareness of climate justice. Only through capacity development will CSOs be able to mobilize the public and improve their participation in the development of policies. A national space for dialogue is necessary, involving CSOs, activists, national/sub-national governments, specialized institutions and private actors. CSOs need capacity in alliance building and impacting political will.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL KNOCK-ON EFFECTS

Kenya has potential to play a prominent continental role if it addresses implementation issues with its legal framework. Relative to the African context, Kenya has a strong role for CSOs; the formulation of, and eventual enactment of Kenya's (progressive) climate policies were **largely driven by the civil society in partnership with members of parliament**. This experience can be shared with movements and CSOs in other countries.¹²⁴ Climate litigation can also be a strategic tool for concerted efforts across the continent.

LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

Grassroots organizations: The consortium will work with networks of indigenous people and local communities including women and youth to increase awareness of their rights and strengthen their capacities to engage with public institutions. Local partners include:

- **Kenya Platform for Climate Governance** (hosted by PACJA) which has over 100 members, such as women groups, faith based groups and pastoralists, and works on (among others) NDC implementation, just transition, climate finance.

¹²⁴ Poverty Eradication Network. (2014). *State of civil society in Kenya*. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from <http://penkenya.org/upgrade/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/csos-leaders-dialogue-report2015.pdf>

- Natural Justice has a Sub-regional office in Nairobi with a strong partner network which includes NGO partners such as the **Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas**, which seeks to achieve equitable and sustainable oil and gas sector, and the **Katiba Institute**, which works on human rights issues in relation to indigenous people and local communities. Natural Justice also works with local peoples communities' networks, such as **Save Lamu**¹²⁵, **Friends of Lake Turkana (FoLT)**¹²⁶, **Endorois Welfare Council (EWC)**¹²⁷, **Malindi Rights Forum**¹²⁸ and **Community Land Action Now (CLAN)**.¹²⁹
- AYC works with **15 member organization in Kenya** including think tanks and university associations, **such as National Youth Council of Kenya, Youth Senate Kenya, Nyandarua County Teartary Students Association and youth think tank Daima Trust.**
- **Womenkind Kenya (WOKIKE)**, an indigenous national NGO based in Garissa in North Eastern Kenya, is a local partner of FEMNET.

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

- **The Climate Justice Resilience Fund (CJRF).** The CJRF project works with climate-vulnerable indigenous and local people affected by exploration and infrastructural activities in northern and coastal Kenya.
- **Enhancing Policy Change on Climate Change and Natural Resource Management** project. The project supported the drafting of climate change and finance bills in alliance with local communities, working through local government to address climate impacts.
- **The Voice for Change partnership project.** The project supported the inclusion of pastoral and marginal communities in local policy discussions and developed the capacity of CSOs in Marsabit and Isiolo counties to hold the county governments accountable on administering the climate change fund.
- **Shock-Responsive Safety nets.** Supported communities to leverage social protection mechanisms such as cash transfers to ameliorate climate change impacts, improving nutrition and strengthening resilience.
- **DeCOALonize Campaign.** Seeks to stop coal-related industries through community engagement, public activism, litigation and legal advocacy.
- **Commenting and Tracking of Climate/Environmental-related Laws.** Consortium members have appealed to the National Environmental Tribunal and Kenyan High Court, supporting local communities to proactively pursue climate justice.
- **Building Community Climate Resilience through Land Use Planning.** The project mobilizes communities in regions characterized by land injustices to advocate for proper land use planning that supports coastal regions' resilience to climate change.
- **Kenya Platform for Climate Governance.** The project supported CSOs' engagement in dialogue on the implementation of the Paris Agreement and SDGs aligned to environmental conservation and climate change.

ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

- **Media personalities:** Engaging a diverse network of media actors to share climate justice narratives, reaching specific constituencies and policy makers.

¹²⁵ See for more information: <https://www.savelamu.org/>

¹²⁶ See for more information: <https://www.friendsoflaketurkana.org/index.php/en/>

¹²⁷ See for more information: <https://endorois.org/>

¹²⁸ See for more information: <http://malindirightsforum.co.ke/>

¹²⁹ A community-based movement advocating for secure tenure for Indigenous People and Local Communities.

- **Lawyers:** Growing the interest of legal experts in climate justice issues and using legal frameworks to protect activists, communities and movements on climate justice.
- **Private sector:** The consortium will target private sector actors and financial institutions to support climate-smart development, technology transfer and capacity building.
- **Government actors:** The consortium will engage the State Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the focal point for climate change activities and UNFCCC, in policy discussions and implementation. Other key targeted institutions include the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), responsible for approving climate change mitigation projects, State Department of Agriculture, Kenya Forest Service, State Department of Mining, State Department of Roads and Infrastructure. Climate roles cut across these institutions, yet they are not effectively coordinated.
- **Academic and scientific community:** The consortium will engage academics and scientists to ensure climate justice literature is informed by local experiences.
- **International actors:** The consortium will engage the international community and participate in processes and negotiations including the CoP and UNFCCC, bringing the voices (and narratives) of the country's indigenous people, women and youth.

ALIGNMENT WITH DUTCH MINISTRY/ EMBASSY

It is agreed that possible alignments with the priority themes of the Embassy and ongoing interventions will be further explored by the consortium in the future.

The proposal is aligned with the priority theme Food Security & Water. The Embassy weighs a great deal to ensuring priorities of communities are included in the programme. The Embassy can facilitate a connecting role with Private Sector partners and Human Rights organizations.

It is agreed that the Embassy will be invited to events of the programme and the Embassy will help as much as possible in advocacy when necessary.

7.5 MOZAMBIQUE: STRENGTHENING CLIMATE RESILIENCE AND JUSTICE FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES

STRATEGIC COUNTRY OBJECTIVE:

Key climate actors working with marginalized groups and local communities, particularly women and youth, who are at the frontline of the climate crisis, are strengthened to claim their rights for climate justice and climate resilience.

CONTEXT

Mozambique has experienced economic growth rates between 7% and 8% for a decade,¹³⁰ but remains largely dependent on natural resource exploitation and the agricultural sector. Approximately 70% of Mozambique's population live in rural areas, of which about 80% work in agriculture.¹³¹

The country is currently facing **four major political and economic challenges**: peace-building with the political opposition, impunity for large-scale and high-level corruption including severe human rights abuses (murder and repression of dissident voices), a public debt crisis and terrorism-related insecurity in the northern region.

Over the last five years, there was an increase in poverty rates, especially in rural areas,¹³² due to a combination of decreasing foreign direct investment, natural disasters, and military attacks in various part of the country. Approximately 17-18 million Mozambicans live in extreme poverty, with women and girls being among the poorest.¹³³ A recent survey found that poverty is associated with rainfall trends and temperatures.¹³⁴ COVID-19 has seen a 87% decline in tourism, 20% in industry and 19.1% in trade.¹³⁵

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

CLIMATE IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIES

Mozambique is extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Much of the population lives in low-lying coastal areas with weak, non-resilient infrastructure and relies on local natural resources (e.g., agriculture and fisheries) for their livelihoods. Alternating flood and drought events affect the ability of farmers and fishermen to consistently grow crops and fish, which impacts food security, malnutrition and sustainable incomes. Droughts, flooding and higher temperatures impact human health and forest ecosystems. Extreme weather events such as tropical cyclones are affecting already weak infrastructure and damaging or destroying coastal ecosystems and livelihoods.

¹³⁰ *About Mozambique*. (n.d.). UNDP in Mozambique. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/countryinfo.html>

¹³¹ World Bank. (2019). *Republic of Mozambique: Agriculture Public Expenditure Review: Assessment and Result-Focused Expenditure Management*. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ar/101351562620820193/pdf/Mozambique-Agriculture-Public-Expenditure-Review-Assessment-and-Result-Focused-Expenditure-Management.pdf>

¹³² World Bank. (2018). *Who Wins and Who Loses from Staple Food Price Spikes?* Retrieved March 19, 2021 from documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/323001539354782668/pdf/WPS8612.pdf

¹³³ Sharma, N. (2020, October 16). *Poverty eradication in Mozambique: Progress and challenges amid COVID-19*. IGC. <https://www.theigc.org/blog/poverty-eradication-in-mozambique-progress-and-challenges-amid-covid-19/>

¹³⁴ Baez, Javier E.; Caruso, German; Niu, Chiyu. 2018. *Extreme Weather and Poverty Risk : Evidence from Multiple Shocks in Mozambique. Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8667. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30989> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.*

¹³⁵ See footnote 133.

Data from the National Institute of Disaster Management indicate that more than 8 million Mozambicans have been affected by natural disasters.¹³⁶ Competition for land from local and foreign investors has pushed farmers into more marginal areas: only 10% of the country's rural population has secured community land tenure,¹³⁷ with land grabbing continuing to be a problem.

Despite legal frameworks that promote gender equality, Mozambique ranks 181st out of 189 globally in the UNDP's 2020 Gender Inequality Index.¹³⁸ Inequality in land ownership is particularly problematic. Women often do not have a say in decisions about harvested crops, or access to agricultural technologies or markets.

Extractive industries, such as gas, also have significant impacts on communities that depend on their local environment for their livelihoods.

POLITICAL EXCLUSION OF CSOS IN THE FRONT-LINE CLIMATE CRISIS

Civil society¹³⁹ has recently become more vocal on climate change. Organizations that have been critical of government have faced intimidation, as have members of the public, resulting in a climate of intimidation and fear.

CSOs have had limited participation in climate policy making and in monitoring of climate commitments (such as NDCs). There is limited CSO capacity to drive a bottom-up advocacy agenda on climate justice, partly due to CSOs limited capacities.

A CENTRALIZED POLICY APPROACH

The Government of Mozambique currently has neither the ability nor the financial resources for organized and consistent implementation of an integrated climate adaptation strategy. The government has put forward a new national strategy on adaptation and mitigation, but the benefits do not trickle down to communities. In part this is due to a centralized approach, weak participation of CSOs in design and implementation, and vulnerable communities not being included in decision-making.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

- The Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Strategy for 2013-2025, National Adaptation Plans, the effort to mainstream NDCs and the existence of a national platform on climate change provide opportunities to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable populations, although implementation of these policies is inadequate. Civil society has an important role in ensuring government accountability.
- There are a significant number of local and national CSOs involved in climate activism and advocacy, including Associação para a Preservação do Meio Ambiente (Livaningo), ADEL-Sofala, the National Peasant Union, Women's Forum, Environmental Justice and Mozambican Human Rights League. Private sector entities

¹³⁶ F.A.O. (n.d.). *The role of local institutions in reducing vulnerability to recurring natural disasters and in sustainable livelihoods development: Mozambique Case Study*. FAO. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <http://www.fao.org/3/ae079e/ae079e04.htm>

¹³⁷ Schreiber, L. (2017, February 10). *Putting Rural Communities on the Map: Land Registration in Mozambique, 2007–2016 | Innovations for Successful Societies*. Successful Societies. <https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/putting-rural-communities-map-land-registration-mozambique>

¹³⁸ U.N.D.P. (n.d.-b). *Gender Inequality Index (GII) | Human Development Reports*. UNDP. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii>

¹³⁹ In Mozambique, there are three main civil society groups. Community-based organizations, which in general have weak organizational capacities and lack funding but provide essential services in places where state structures are absent or inadequate. Issue-based CSOs (e.g. health, climate change, poverty reduction) also provide services. In the capital, Maputo, more academically oriented CSOs are interlocutors for international donors on accountability and rights.

operating in the country can also be engaged to support climate activism and policy implementation.

- Youth in Mozambique have widespread access to social media, offering opportunities for online training, tutorials, interactive activities, and downloadable content, as well as to spread advocacy messages calling for government accountability on climate justice.

PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

IMPACT OUTCOME 1:

Strong, inclusive, and effective civil society promotes climate justice and climate movements, driven by women and youth, are connected with global movements.

Movement building will prioritize amplifying the **voices of women and girls** on climate justice through sensitization and lobby and advocacy with local and national CSOs, international non-governmental organizations and international institutions (Pathway 1).

The programme will map and document **traditional knowledge of indigenous communities** on resilience to climate-related challenges, also supporting women and youth, tell their stories through social and mainstream media and awareness campaigns (Pathway 2).

IMPACT OUTCOME 2:

Public policies and frameworks advancing climate justice are adopted, funded, and implemented.

The consortium will work with local organizations and indigenous communities towards **community-driven solutions** that particularly strengthen resilience and adaptation capacities of women and youth, and use them for evidence-based advocacy (Pathway 4).

The programme will provide legal support to local communities to know, claim and defend their environmental and social rights which are at risk due to extractive industries (Pathway 3).

Recognizing the value of **bottom-up policy development** for climate justice, the consortium will promote the leadership and participation of women, youth and indigenous communities in submitting proposals for national, regional and international reform.

As Mozambique already has progressive legislation on climate change, the focus will also be on **effective implementation**. AACJ will promote the participation of women, youth and indigenous communities in climate change fora to ensure that government is held accountable for the funding and implementation of climate change-related legislation (Pathway 5).

For more details on how the programme will be implemented in Mozambique, see Annex 2 or click [here](#).

ADDRESSING LOCAL CAPACITY NEEDS

There is a need in Mozambique to build the voice and agency of those most impacted by climate change in national climate justice debates. CSOs need strengthened capacity to engage with partners, members and constituencies for better advocacy and influencing.

This requires resources (financial, technical, and human) to mobilize community groups and raise awareness on climate justice issues. Women and youth require particular support to strengthen their skills to advocate, negotiate and address legal violations.

Using legal mechanisms to protect and enforce human and environmental rights will be important for long term change. This requires strengthening the legal capacity of local communities, which have remained limited.

LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

- FEMNET is represented in Mozambique by **MULEIDE and Livaningo** which bring together several women's rights associations, activists on climate justice and individual members with expertise in climate advocacy. They focus on the gender dimension of climate justice.
- **ITC-F/PACJA** has supported over a thousand rural communities in the last 15 years to influence decisions on land and share benefits from exploration of natural resources.
- African Youth Commission (AYC) is an independent pan-African youth network that provides space and voice for youth to set their own agenda. The AYC will be represented by Focal Point for Mozambique.
- Oxfam Mozambique works with **SOCIEDADE ABERTA and SEKELEKANI** with immense influencing experience and **AJOAGO**, a local humanitarian partner that has already championed a Climate Justice campaign in context of Cyclones Idai and Kenneth response.
- Natural Justice will elect partners to work with on the AACJ programme in year 1.

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

- **FEMNET/ MULEIDE** works with women's rights organizations, CBOs, CSOs and FBOs on women's rights, land access, environmental rights, adaptation measures, research and training. MULEIDE will make available its expertise in mobilization, communication, legal support to vulnerable and marginalized groups, and lobby and advocacy on climate justice, adaptation and resilience. Legal and environmental experts train, facilitate dialogues, improve information flow between communities and decision-makers, share experience and best practices on resilience to climate change, and empower communities to raise their voices for their human rights and climate justice.
- **ITC-F/PACJA** has over 10 years' experience amplifying the African voice on climate justice and will bring its expertise in movement building, resilience building and policy advocacy.
- **AYC** and its local members have promoted young people's engagement in implementation of the Africa 2063 Agenda, UN Agenda 2030 and the African Youth Chapter.
- **Natural Justice** is strongly connected to organisations in Mozambique through its wider African environmental justice networks, however, has not undertaken projects in the country as yet.
- **Oxfam Mozambique and SOCIEDADE ABERTA** have a long-standing commitment on climate change. They launched a climate campaign in 2020 calling for effective implementation of planning tools for resilience and disaster preparedness.

ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

- **Government entities**, such as the Ministry of Land and Environment, Ministry of Agriculture, Provincial Directorate of Land and Environment and Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy, can incorporate community climate justice issues in their economic and development plans.
- **The Ministry of Justice** (Department of Human Rights) and Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Action have primary responsibilities for social protection of vulnerable groups.
- **The National Assembly** discusses and approves new laws and policies.

- **National Institute for Management of Risk and Disaster (INGC)** is responsible for implementing government strategies on preventing and managing natural disasters.
- **A wide range of CSOs and faith-based organizations** working on climate justice or climate-related issues across the country will be engaged, as will community-based organizations and gender organizations in the target areas.
- **Research institutions**, such as Eduardo Mondlane University, will influence decision makers through their publications.
- **The private sector** will be influenced through lobby approaches to innovate to reduce impact of climate change and take responsibility to protect people affected by their operations.

ALIGNMENT WITH THE DUTCH MINISTRY/EMBASSY

- AACJ programme interventions tie in with Dutch Ministry-funded activities at country level that aim to increase resilience to climate change, and synergies will be sought.
- The programme will strongly support existing initiatives to mainstream climate in the Dutch Ministry-funded programmes implemented in Sofala (district of Nhamatanda), Zambezia (district of Mocuba) and Cabo Delgado (district of Macomia and Balama).
- The programme will continuously advocate to the Mozambican government for scaling up activities related to SDG 13.
- The programme will support and advocate for CSOs, CBOs, FBOs, journalists, activists and human rights defenders to strengthen knowledge and capacity on climate justice and human rights-related issues.
- The programme will pursue collaboration opportunities with the Dutch Ministry on environmental sustainability.

7.6 NIGERIA: CLIMATE ACTION FOR SUSTAINABLE, RESILIENT AND INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH

STRATEGIC COUNTRY OBJECTIVE:

A grassroots driven movement – bringing together local organizations and broad constituencies – drives the implementation of climate policies that enable all Nigerians to thrive and live in a healthy environment.

CONTEXT

Nigeria is heavily reliant on carbon-intensive natural resources – particularly oil – for economic growth and revenues. Despite its vast potential, Nigeria suffers from extreme economic inequality: 40% of the population is considered poor,¹⁴⁰ 13% suffer from acute malnourishment and 32% of children under five experience impaired growth.¹⁴¹ Agriculture employs 35% of the country's population and contributes approximately 22% of GDP.¹⁴² Households relying on rain-fed agriculture are among the country's poorest.¹⁴³ Lack of irrigation makes the agricultural sector extremely vulnerable to climate change.

This precarious situation is compounded by multiple security challenges, notably the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency in the north-east, long-running discontent in the Niger Delta, Igbo separatism, and disputes between local communities and international oil companies, and herders and farming communities. Violence, particularly by Boko Haram, has displaced more than two million people and created a humanitarian crisis.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

CLIMATE IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIES

The **impacts of climate change are highly variable in Nigeria**. Northern Nigeria is part of the Sahel, and experiencing a decline in rainfall leading to regular droughts, desertification, loss of wetlands, and declining surface water. In Southern Nigeria, coastal areas are facing sea-level rise and related coastal erosion and saline intrusion.¹⁴⁴

Women and young small-scale farmers and their (rural) communities are particularly vulnerable to climate change. They lack knowledge and tools to enhance their adaptation capacity, leading to lower productivity and increased poverty. Damage from climate change or environmental degradation are not compensated.

Rural communities are affected disproportionately by oil and gas extraction. Mining leads to violent conflicts over land, water and natural resources. Dumping of chemical by-products into rivers destroys mangroves, fishing industries and soil quality. Environmental impact assessments are often not done or acted upon, especially in Kogi, Rivers, Delta and Niger states. Women and young people are marginalized from less-polluted land.

¹⁴⁰ National Bureau of Statistics. (2020, May). *2019 Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria: Executive Summary*. <https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/>

¹⁴¹ National Bureau of Statistics. (2018, June) *National Nutrition And Health Survey (NNHS) 2018*. <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/media/2181/file/Nigeria-NNHS-2018.pdf>

¹⁴² Statista. (2020, November 18). *Distribution of gross domestic product (GDP) across economic sectors Nigeria 2019*. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/382311/nigeria-gdp-distribution-across-economic-sectors/#:%7E:text=In%202019%2C%20agriculture%20contributed%20around,percent%20from%20the%20services%20sector.>

¹⁴³ Government of Nigeria. (2019). *Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria*. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from <http://nigerian-stat.gov.ng/download/1092>

¹⁴⁴ Haider, H. (2019, November 1). *Climate Change in Nigeria: Impacts and Responses*. Institute of Development Studies. <https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14761>

COVID-19 lockdowns rolled back many gains on gender equality, with a sharp increase in gender-based violence.¹⁴⁵ The economic impact has been felt disproportionately by women and girls, who are taking on more unpaid domestic work.

LACK OF POLITICAL WILL, RESPONSIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Despite Nigeria's participation in international fora and commitments by government officials, there is a lack of **political will** to implement climate policies and action plans – particularly in holding **multinationals in oil, gas and mining** to account. Policymaking procedures remain **non-transparent** and **closed to citizen participation** or CSO influencing, in particular women and youth. There are no non-partisan spaces for citizens to engage with government officials on issues that affect their communities, or formal avenues for non-state actors to influence policy or budget decisions. This is compounded by the fact that the political structure means that laws need to be passed at both national and state levels to ensure their implementation. There is no effective monitoring of commitments such as the Paris Agreement NDCs, meaning that governments and the private sector, including oil and mining companies, are not held to account.

MOVEMENTS FACING LACK OF TRUST AND SHRINKING CIVIC SPACE

Civil society in Nigeria is highly fragmented. Local grassroots organizations are not linked to national CSOs or regional networks. Civic space is shrinking, with increasing threats to activists and journalists as well as illegal arrests. Recently the government attempted to pass bills on 'hate speech' and 'internet falsehoods and manipulation', which were widely seen as giving officials more power to target political criticism on social media.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE AT NATIONAL LEVEL

Digital activism has emerged as a powerful means for young people to mobilize: for example, **the 2020 EndSars movement was mainly driven by youth through smartphones and social media**, resulting in nationwide protests. Digital activism can be fostered to push for accountability and transparency in use of public revenues at national and subnational levels, and for improved environmental sustainability in private sector activities.

Nigeria has good legislation on climate change at national level, and in some states, but it is not always acted on.¹⁴⁶ Communities and youth movements can push for climate action through innovative, scalable community-based approaches. There is an opportunity to create platforms at the national level to bring rural and urban youth together.

PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

IMPACT OUTCOME 1:

A strong, inclusive and effective civil society movement is connected and empowered to amplify communities' voices in the fight for climate justice

The AACJ consortium in Nigeria will work with local organizations on **outreach** and **build alliances** between organizations of women, youth and (climate/oil)- affected rural

¹⁴⁵ *Amidst COVID-19 Lockdown, Nigeria Sees Increased Sexual and Gender Violence*. (2020, June 5). Pulitzer Center. <https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/amidst-covid-19-lockdown-nigeria-sees-increased-sexual-and-gender-violence>

¹⁴⁶ Legislation includes: Nigerian Agricultural Resilience Framework (NARF), Economic Growth and Response Plan (EGRP); National Strategic Plan of Action Against Climate Change in Nigeria (NASPA-CCN); NDC's Sectoral Action Plan; Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+); National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change.

communities to **jointly run campaigns** and **advocate for community-driven solutions** (Pathway 1).

Climate-just narratives will raise awareness on climate change and bring in more constituencies such as youth, journalists, local policy makers (Pathway 2). A network of nano-influencers in communities, media content creators, journalists, artists and social media influencers will mobilize support for a just energy transition and realization of NDC commitments. Plans include a **#ClimateJusticeTour** and an **art-based campaign** to showcase local narratives around climate justice, highlighting the leadership of women and young people.

To increase **support for community-driven climate action**, the consortium will initiate national-level forums (inviting legislators at national and subnational levels, state, civil society and private sector actors), events and media engagements to showcase workable innovations that boost climate resilience and information sharing in communities (Pathway 4).

IMPACT OUTCOME 2:

Systems of accountability at national and subnational levels are strengthened to help ensure the protection of communities and resilience of livelihoods against the worst of climate change impact and environmental degradation.

To increase public accountability the consortium will establish formal platforms that enable government officials to listen to and engage with citizens on policy issues. For example, **Climate Governance Dialogues** will involve local, national and state executives, legislature, local communities and excluded groups in knowledge transfer with government agencies on e.g. access to cleaner, decentralized and community-controlled energy, improved climate finance and budgeting, environmental impact assessments, climate finance, adaptation plans and reporting (Pathway 5).

The consortium will support working groups of journalists, community leaders and CSOs to access climate negotiations¹⁴⁷ and co-create policy positions. The programme will develop an NDC implementation index and compliance scorecard.

The consortium will also invest in **working with oil-affected communities** to increase their knowledge and understanding of their rights and how to claim them, for example through FPIC. The consortium will directly support environmental defenders, strengthening their security and protection capabilities (Pathway 3).

The programme focuses on **women and youth** due to their challenges in accessing resources and decision-making, and on the northern part of the country as it is especially affected by climate change and poverty.

For more details on how the programme will be implemented in Nigeria, see Annex 2 or click [here](#).

ADDRESSING LOCAL CAPACITY NEEDS

- There is a need to improve local CSOs' **knowledge** of issues including environmental sustainability, Nigeria's climate commitments and the subnational actions required to achieve them. This will involve trainings on constituency building and civic participation.

¹⁴⁷ Participation in e.g. UNFCCC and UNEP, regional AMCEN and ECOWAS meetings, regional SDGs and HLPF, and organizing CSO side-events in collaboration with the regional REC (ECOWAS) and Nigeria Government at COPs.

- Local CSOs need to improve their capacities on **budget development**, using accountability and good governance as entry points on climate justice-related issues.
- Communities need legal support to defend their environmental rights against large corporations, and support on using successful litigation cases for advocacy.
- Climate justice movements need to adopt an **intersectional approach**, ensuring the inclusion and participation of individuals from across society, especially women and young people with effective **participatory platforms** for local communities.
- CSOs need stronger capacities on finance, MEL, fundraising, leadership, HR, integrity and resilience.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL KNOCK ON EFFECTS

- Nigeria has the **largest economy on the African continent**, with a GDP of USD 410 billion in 2019.¹⁴⁸ Nigeria's climate movement can lead efforts to improve Africa's influence in negotiations at the UNFCCC, legitimizing the climate movement on the continent and boosting current efforts to prioritize climate change at the AU and AfDB.
- Nigeria has a **leading role in the extractive sector in Africa**, and a strong national movement to set higher environmental and social standards and establish models for sustainable community development which could reverberate across the continent.
- Nollywood, Nigeria's vibrant film industry, is appreciated across Africa, and can be engaged through messaging campaigns on climate change in their productions.

LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

The opportunity exists to create a broad network of local organizations to engage with pan-African CSOs, building a continental movement. We can build on local networks:

- **PACJA** and **Oxfam Nigeria** work with **Climate & Sustainable Development Network of Nigeria (CSDevNET)** that has 300 member organisations cutting across the six geopolitical zones. CSDevNet brings together community associations, pastoralists, youth and women groups, media organisations, faith-based and CSOs to commonly promote and advocate climate-friendly and equity-based responses to climate change.
- **FEMNET - Education as a Vaccine (EVA)** is a youth advocacy organization with six local offices in Nigeria which strengthens the capacities of young people to facilitate and sustain social change.
- **African Youth Commission** has 43 members in Nigeria, including youth organizations, youth groups, university students organizations and youth parliaments, such as Youth for Change Initiative, Youth Initiative for Sustainable Human Development in Africa, New Century Initiative, Entrepreneurs Network Nigeria, Muazu Abdulrahman Raji, National Youth Assembly of Nigeria.
- **Natural Justice** will scope partners in year 1.

The consortium will identify more (new) CSOs to partner with. Not all local organizations are structured formally: many youth and women's groups that hold a lot of sway in their rural communities are not registered, and will need to be identified when we begin work.

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

- **Networks.** Oxfam Nigeria has implemented livelihood projects on climate resilience and agricultural incomes in Kebbi, Adamawa and Bauchi. Village savings and loans groups were established in Nasarawa and Plateau, helping mostly women and young people to access non-traditional finance for their businesses. Work under Pathways 1, 2, 4 and 5 will build on this experience.

¹⁴⁸ Statista. (2021, February 18). *GDP of African countries 2020, by country*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1120999/gdp-of-african-countries-by-country/>

- **Agricultural budget influencing and open governance.** Previous sustainability projects on food security and climate resilience trained local government officials and community-based organizations from 16 areas on community development planning – a methodology for including citizens in state and local government budget processes. We will build on this previous work and expand its reach, in particular relevant for work under Pathways 4 and 5.
- **Climate information.** In 2020, consortium partners linked the National Meteorological Agency (NiMET) to ministries in 16 northern Nigerian states to provide farmers with climate information ahead of the dry planting season. Enhancing the reach to more communities is part of the work we will be doing in Pathways 4 and 5.
- **Engagement on Paris Agreement.** Following the implementation of the NDCs through SIDA/PACJA funding in 2018-2020, there is an opportunity to deepen engagement of Nigerian civil society in climate change dialogue and response strategies. Work under Pathway 5 will build on this.
- **Establishment of CSO coalitions.** Previous campaigns and networks empowered Nigerian civil society to hold government officials accountable on implementing the Paris Agreement and the SDGs through the establishment of a national CSO framework. This work paved the way for a deepened engagement under Pathway 5.

ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

Government officials: Multiple officials at national, state and local levels in the executive and legislative arms of the governments are involved in developing and implementing budgets and public policies. At national level, senior positions on budget and finance, agriculture, water resources and environment are particularly relevant for engagement.

Frontrunning private sector entities can also be instrumental in advancing climate action. Political will is fundamental to increase the **participation of CSOs' and citizens** in the design and implementation of climate policies.

ALIGNMENT WITH DUTCH MINISTRY/ EMBASSY

The Embassy and the alliance agreed that the Embassy will connect the alliance with the incoming Climate Change and Agric Development person who will be appointed in the near future. There are no objections to the proposed program.

7.7 SENEGAL: DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE CLIMATE DEBATE

STRATEGIC COUNTRY OBJECTIVE:

A better-informed population plays an active role in the debate and decisions on climate change and contributes to improved recognition of the concerns and rights of climate-affected communities and vulnerable groups and their contribution to addressing climate change.

CONTEXT

Senegal has a population of about 13 million,¹⁴⁹ nearly half of whom live in poverty. Even though Senegal's economy has been growing, at 6.8% in 2018, its poverty rate was estimated at 46.7% in 2011 using the national poverty line, and 38% using the international line. There are wide disparities in poverty, with a high concentration in rural areas and in the southern and south-eastern regions of the country.

The unemployment rate in Senegal is 6.68%,¹⁵⁰ with thousands of youths migrating to urban areas and overseas in search of jobs. The COVID-19 crisis resulted in major job losses and further slowed economic growth to an estimated 1.3% in 2020. The Senegalese population is relatively young, with almost half under 18 years of age (48.6%). Gender inequality ranks 125th out of 162 countries.¹⁵¹

Around 30% of the population remains engaged in the agricultural sector.¹⁵² Artisanal fishing also contributes significantly to food security and livelihoods of local communities. The agriculture and fisheries sectors are both sensitive to climate change.

Though Senegal is considered one of the most stable countries in Africa, the recent imprisonment of opposition figures and the continued criminalization and intimidation of journalists and human rights defenders has reduced space for civil society and contributed to political tensions.¹⁵³

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

CLIMATE IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIES

Rural and coastal communities are affected by reduced rainfall, land salinization, erosion, destruction of mangrove forests and reduced agricultural productivity. Climate change is also impacting on water resources and biodiversity, affecting people's livelihoods. Coastal communities are being crowded out by infrastructure and industry projects with negative climate impacts, such as coal plants and offshore oil and gas exploitation.

Local communities in rural areas and peri-urban coastal areas are especially vulnerable to climate change. Gender inequality means women lack rights over land and resources and participation in decision making and benefit sharing, limiting their capacity for

¹⁴⁹ World Bank. (n.d.). Poverty & Equity Data Portal. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from <https://poverty-data.worldbank.org/poverty/country/SEN>

¹⁵⁰ Statista. (2020, October 28). *Unemployment rate in Senegal 2019*. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/451805/unemployment-rate-in-senegal/>.

¹⁵¹ *Human Development Reports*. (2019). UNDP. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2019-report>

¹⁵² World Bank. (n.d.-a). *Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate) - Senegal | Data*. World Bank. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=SN>

¹⁵³ Ohchr. (2019) *Human Rights Committee reviews the report of Senegal, raises concerns about limits on press freedoms and on civic space*. <https://ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25147&LangID=E>

adaptation. Lack of access to land and lack of voice in decision-making also affects young people. Land and environment defenders risk prosecution and harassment.

GAPS IN POLICIES AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

At the state level, structures have been put in place to address climate change: e.g. the National Committee on Climate Change, as well as the Ecological Monitoring Center (CSE). But climate change is **not taken into account in a systematic and transversal way in programs and policies**, and a **specific legal framework on climate change is missing**. The environmental code is being revised, and a new biodiversity code is being considered, but civil society especially women, youth and indigenous communities are not sufficiently involved in these legal reform processes and climate discourse in general. Senegal has had a National Climate Change Adaptation Plan since 2006, but this plan is largely outdated. Fisheries is so far the only sector to have a sectoral NAP for 2035¹⁵⁴, others are in development.

There are **gaps in existing policy frameworks regarding the protection of human rights, land rights and gender equality**. Communities have limited access to information on environmental issues and on projects impacting them, and there is a lack of transparency in the allocation of climate financial resources. A framework protecting the rights of human rights defenders is also missing.

NATURAL RESOURCES BASED CONFLICTS.

Senegal has a growing extractives industry. There are efforts towards renewable energy, but other policies increase dependency on oil and gas. Offshore oil and gas exploitation will also exacerbate the existing conflict between artisanal fishers and industrial fishing. The violation of local communities' environmental rights in extractives and infrastructure projects can create conflicts and social unrest: in the region of Casamance, control over natural resources is one issue underlying a low-level internal conflict since the 1980s.

EXCLUSION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The debate on climate change is dominated by a small group within the government, scientific experts and a few CSOs. Local communities, women, youth, farmers and fisherfolk are excluded from debates and policy processes. The customary solutions of local communities, especially those of women, are not taken into account. Local communities and vulnerable groups have little say in industry and infrastructure projects that affect them and struggle to access information and the justice system.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

- Existence of local and national CSOs and networks involved in climate activism and advocacy, and local movements opposing projects violating environmental and social rights – such as the coal plant in Bargny, which attracted international attention – make it possible to mobilize a bigger movement of CSOs to rally behind climate justice.
- There are opportunities for strategic litigation that can create valuable precedents in Senegal and the region, as there is little jurisprudence on environmental justice issues.
- Established legislative frameworks and ratified international instruments promote gender equality, the environment code is being revised, and a new code on biodiversity presents opportunity to engage with policy makers with direct inputs from women, youth, indigenous people and local communities at the frontline of climate change.
- There are efforts to mainstream NDC in national policies; Centre de Suivi Écologique is one of the first agencies in the region accredited for the Green Climate Fund.
- The young population embrace technology for social mobilization and campaigns.

¹⁵⁴ <http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/Sen186289.pdf>

PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

IMPACT OUTCOME 1:

More effective involvement of communities affected by climate change and environmental injustice, including young people and women, and a better informed and stronger civil society contribute to democratization of the climate change debate and recognition for local groups as providers of solutions.

Consortium partners in Senegal will focus on building transversal movements by **bringing different organizations and constituencies together** to share experiences and knowledge (Pathway 1). This will also involve **establishing and strengthening links between community-based organizations and national platforms**, facilitating their involvement to promote inclusive policies.

The consortium will strive to **raise awareness and build the capacity** of youth groups, women's groups and community organizations on climate change and climate justice, through **public awareness and advocacy campaigns**, and through **trainings and dialogues that promote civic actions** by young people (Pathway 2).

In addition, the AACJ programme in Senegal will support the valorisation, sharing and dissemination of existing community good practices for climate adaptation and mitigation through **publications, video, events and fairs** (Pathway 4).

IMPACT OUTCOME 2:

Relevant policies, programmes and institutions at all levels (national to local) integrate the concerns of local communities including women and youth, protect their rights, allow for meaningful participation, and support the increased resilience and adaptation of climate affected communities, and a just transition to more sustainable production.

Addressing **gaps in policies and legal frameworks** are the focus of the second impact outcome, mainly related to **environmental rights, climate resilience and biodiversity**

The consortium strengthens capacities of impacted communities to **denounce violations, initiate strategic climate justice litigation and challenge actions** that violate their environmental and social rights (Pathway 3).

The Programme will promote **corporate accountability** and policy changes for just transition policies on **renewable energies** and a **reduction of fossil fuel dependence** (Pathway 5). The programme will also promote and support the representation and **inclusion** of community voices in policy spaces at national, regional and global level, and lobbying and advocating.

For more details on how the programme will be implemented in Senegal, see Annex 2 or click [here](#).

ADDRESSING LOCAL CAPACITY NEEDS

Although there are strong local community-based organizations, including women's and youth organizations, they often lack capacity to insert themselves in national debates and are poorly represented by the civic movements and networks. Environmental, women's and youth organizations face challenges in mobilizing their members effectively, due among other things to a lack of capacities and reliance on volunteers. Local communities,

particularly women, have knowledge on solutions for adaptation and mitigation (e.g. regarding conservation of ecosystems), but these are not visible or taken into account.

LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

- **Natural Justice** will involve local associations such as the Network of Associations for the Protection of the Environment (RAPEN), which opposes the coal plant in Bargny, and SOS Mboro, which mobilizes communities affected by the phosphate industry, and national networks such as KABEKA, which works on community conserved areas.
- **OXFAM SENEGAL** will involve local partners with expertise in climate activism and advocacy such as ENDA Energie, JVE Senegal, Alternatiba Senegal and Teranga Lab.
- **FEMNET** is represented by the Development and Communication Network for Senegalese Women, and will involve others such as UFDEK, WILPF Senegal Groupe, UNAFRES, Nénuphar, the Women's Network of Taiba Ndiaye, Kabonkétoor and AFAO.
- **African Youth Commission** will collaborate with Senegalese youth networks such as the National Youth Council, the Senegal AYC Consortium, Jeune Chambre Internationale Sénégal, Nebeday and Give Back to Senegal.
- **PACJA** is represented by Action Solidaire International, a national NGO, which will work with the National Platform of Climate Change Clubs, a platform of young activists; the Association Conscience Environnementale, which works on training and awareness raising; and the Association for the Development of Rural Activities in Senegal and the Sahel (ADARS), which provides technical and financial support to poor populations.

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

- **Natural Justice** will play the strongest role in Pathway 3, using its experience with community legal empowerment, legal advice, strategic litigation, and the existing emergency fund for defenders. NJ will also bring the voices of partner communities into movements (Pathway 1), narratives (Pathway 2) and policy debates (Pathway 5), and support local climate solutions (Pathway 4).
- **Oxfam Senegal** brings a track record in developing women and youth leadership, networking (Pathway 1), and supporting professionalization of civil society, and strong experience with the Green Climate Fund. The Oxfam network brings campaigning, advocacy and negotiation experience, while local partners have long experience in climate activism. Oxfam will disseminate good practice from local adaptation pilots (Pathway 4).
- **FEMNET** works with women's groups across Senegal, including on adaptation, access to land, and training on rights, and has expertise on climate justice and advocacy for the environmental rights of women and youth (Pathway 1,2,5).
- **Action Solidaire / PACJA**: brings experience in strengthening local movements and partners, such as the National Platform of Climate Change Clubs. ASI is a member of international and pan-African networks such as PACJA, AFCOMNET and Women Gender Climate. Several local partners have piloted community-based approaches to adaptation (Pathway 4).
- **AYC** has experience in youth mobilization and capacity building across all five pathways. Its local partners will create a platform for exchange of experiences. The National Youth Council of Senegal is a flagship partner and experienced in advocacy.

ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

- **Government**: The Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDD) is responsible for international environmental conventions and the designated national authority of several climate funds; the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment, Ministry of Territorial Communities, Development and Land Use Planning, and Ministry of Higher Education have relevant responsibilities.
- **Parliament**: for its role in approving legislation.
- **State advisory bodies**: the most relevant are the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) and Haut Conseil des Collectivités Territoriales (HCCT).

- **Courts and tribunals:** deal with civil, criminal and administrative disputes.
- **Local authorities:** their competence includes the environment and natural resources.
- **The private sector:** the extractive industries are the most polluting sectors in Senegal.
- **Financial institutions:** can be pushed to stop or reduce their investment in fossil fuels.
- **CSOs:** Senegal has a dynamic civil society movement.
- **Women's groups:** rural women affected by climate change often develop resilience strategies in partnership with NGOs and donors.
- **Youth platforms,** including school climate change clubs, can help share information.

ALIGNMENT WITH DUTCH MINISTRY/ EMBASSY

Discussions on potential discussions did not yet take place between the consortium and the Embassy. The consortium aims to have a meeting before the submission of the proposal. In case this is not possible, alignment will be explored at later stage.

7.8 SOMALIA: BUILDING A CLIMATE JUSTICE MOVEMENT IN SOMALIA

STRATEGIC COUNTRY OBJECTIVE:

Groups that are most affected by the climate crisis – including rural pastoralists and farmers, young unemployed, and disadvantaged women – understand its effect on their situation and rally together to demand investments and policy changes from governments, companies and the aid system. The Somali government is able to pass environmental protection laws, make strong climate action plans and access global finance to fund them.

CONTEXT

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with nearly 7 out of 10 Somalis living in poverty.¹⁵⁵ Somalia's economy depends heavily on the livestock sector, which has proved to be very vulnerable to climate change.¹⁵⁶

Somalia faces multiple conflicts and security challenges, including armed insurgency by Islamist groups and inter- and intra-clan violence, which occurs mostly over access to land and resources, and the local cultural order. Conflicts are exacerbated by recurrent climate-related shocks such as desert locusts, droughts and flooding.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

CLIMATE IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIES

Somalia is affected by long droughts, erratic and unpredictable rains, cyclones and floods. Average temperatures in Somalia have increased by 1 degree Celsius over the past 30 years, from an average daily maximum of 32.8 degrees Celsius to 33.8 degrees Celsius. After a drought in 2019, Somalia experienced heavy rainfall, flooding¹⁵⁷ and a tropical storm¹⁵⁸ in 2020. 2021 is predicted to be another year of drought.¹⁵⁹

Climate variations are causing deterioration of pasture lands, destroying the livelihoods of pastoralist families: massive livestock deaths due to drought - 60% of herds in some areas - have severely **damaged pastoralists' livelihoods**.¹⁶⁰ The livestock losses threaten to exacerbate the country's **food security situation**, which remains critical in the central and northern pastoral areas. Food insecurity and lack of access to assistance has led to humanitarian crises and large-scale displacement as people go in search for

¹⁵⁵ Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie. (2019, August 28). *Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey*. World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32323>

¹⁵⁶ UNDP. (2018). *Somalia Drought Impact and Needs Assessment*. <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/climate-and-disaster-resilience-/somalia-drought-impact-and-needs-assessment.html>

¹⁵⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2020, August 7). *Floods drive over 650,000 Somalis from their homes in 2020*. UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/8/5f2cf86c4/floods-drive-650000-somalis-homes-2020.html>

¹⁵⁸ Davies, R. (2020, November 24). *Somalia – Floods After Tropical Storm Gati Dumps Year's Worth of Rain*. FloodList. <http://floodlist.com/africa/somalia-floods-storm-gati-november-2020>

¹⁵⁹ *Somalia | Famine Early Warning Systems Network*. (n.d.). FEWS NET. Retrieved March 20, 2021, from <https://fewsn.net/east-africa/somalia>; Funk, C. (2020, October 15). *Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya face devastating drought*. Nature. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02698-3?error=cookies_not_supported&code=dea738e0-8ddf-4fbf-b342-a009266475c0

¹⁶⁰ FAO. (2018, March 21). *In Somalia massive livestock losses have severely impacted livelihoods and food security: FAO in Emergencies*. <http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/stories/stories-detail/en/c/1110285/>

water and pasture lands. An estimated 2.6 million people are internally displaced.¹⁶¹ Communities and institutions have **limited capacity** to deal with risks and shocks.

BOX 7.2: BELIEFS PERPETUATING PATRIARCHY

The parliament in Somaliland passed a sexual offences bill after advocacy by women's rights organizations, but a backlash from the public and religious leaders prompted the government to put the bill on hold. Public opinion and religious leaders need to be engaged to change social norms and attitudes.

Somalia is steeped in **cultural practices and religious beliefs** that perpetuate patriarchy at the expense of women's empowerment (see Box 7.1). The climate crisis has exacerbated certain pre-existing inequalities and increased the risks of gender-based violence and sexual exploitation of women and children. Women are marginalized in formal decision-making roles in the government and the workplace.

Somalia is one of the **youngest countries in the world**. Young people have no role in formal decision-making at any level. Lack of

economic opportunities is a big concern: as traditional livelihood options are becoming unviable, many young men and women are moving to the cities, either because they are displaced or to seek jobs or education. Youth unemployment is 68%; it affects educated and uneducated youth across Somalia.

LIMITED UNDERSTANDING OF THE CLIMATE CRISIS

Many people are aware of changing weather patterns. Pastoralists, for example, know that while droughts have happened for hundreds of years, they are now more frequent and severe. These changes are not, however, clearly connected to the climate crisis. Indeed, some beliefs hinder climate justice actions – for example, that human suffering is God's will and punishment for sinful behaviour.

AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE BY THE GOVERNMENT

Government institutions, already confronted by multiple crises, lack resources and long-term vision to mitigate climate shocks and address the needs of the most vulnerable. Climate change adaptation and climate justice are not high on the agenda. The government has a relatively new climate action plan, but few Somalis know its contents. A more comprehensive plan, tackling impacts on employment, food security and conflict, could enable the government and civil society to access international grants and loans.

With offshore oil and gas exploration licenses now being issued for projects that will potentially affect the livelihoods of local communities, there is a need to build the knowledge of local communities on legal frameworks that protect their rights, engage the government on environmental policies (such as environmental impact assessments and FPIC) and to ensure the transparency and accountability of the extractive industry.

Attacks on freedom of expression are targeting journalists. Activists are demanding a stronger judicial system to protect human rights defenders. The status of human rights defenders reflects Somalia's shrinking civic space.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE AT NATIONAL LEVEL

Local partners see a lot of potential to mobilize Somalia's young population for climate justice and building a more green and human economy. Many youth organizations and networks exist, and there is moderate access to mobile phones for digital activism. A

¹⁶¹ UNHCR. (2020, July 31). *Situation Horn of Africa Somalia Situation*. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/horn/location/192>

number of youth volunteer groups are engaged in environmental or climate change projects, such as tree planting and awareness raising. They could be connected to more structural efforts to influence policies and practices for climate justice.¹⁶² Women's rights organizations and networks have a good track record on advocacy and collaboration.

Some public institutions have started working on climate responses, such as the Ministry of Environment, but others have not, and the responses need to be further strengthened.

PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

IMPACT OUTCOME 1:

Existing civil society actors, such as women's rights organizations, youth movements, environmental organizations, humanitarian actors and communities, work together in a climate justice movement, co-creating Somali narratives on climate justice, to be better able to defend the interests of people most affected by the climate crisis: (agro) pastoralists, urban unemployed youth and disadvantaged women.

The AACJ consortium in Somalia will work from a movement building perspective and focus on **increasing the knowledge** of existing CSOs around climate change and the prospect of climate justice policies. **Broadening the partner base** and effectively linking local organizations in Somaliland is fundamental to movement building (Pathway 1). Activities related to this objective include developing online and offline platforms to share knowledge between humanitarian organizations, women, youth and minority groups.

Another priority is to **raise awareness** of CSOs and citizens on climate justice rights, including facilitating the participation of climate activists in media discussions and policy debates about climate justice in the regional and national context (Pathway 2).

IMPACT OUTCOME 2:

Somalia implements climate justice policies with a focus on: 1) strong climate action plans that increase resilience and adaptive capacities of women and youth and can be used to seek global climate finance and 2) environmental protection laws.

For CSOs and grassroots movements to influence public policy around climate change effectively, the consortium recognizes the need to **establish permanent and active engagement** with the **Somali government and public officials**. As grassroots organizations need to be recognized as credible actors before they can be included in policy discussions, the project's activities include publishing policy papers on climate change, supporting the inclusion of local voices in policy spaces, and engagement with key ministries and parliamentarians (Pathway 5).

With the support of Natural Justice, the consortium will look for opportunities to develop legal empowerment approaches for communities (for example a paralegal programme and community audits) to defend their rights (Pathway 3).

For more details on how the programme will be implemented in Somalia, see Annex 2 or click [here](#).

¹⁶² Oxfam in Somalia consulted representatives of youth organizations in Hargeisa on 14/1/2020.

ADDRESSING LOCAL CAPACITY NEEDS

- As the focus in Somalia/Somaliland has so far been on responding to urgent humanitarian needs, there is not a large climate justice movement in the country. The environmental movement is limited and dispersed. Local organizations currently do not have the capacity to mobilize and advocate for national and global policy changes on climate. There are many youth organizations and networks, but most lack resources and they are not very well connected.
- Women are still constrained by deeply entrenched social norms that affect their education and public confidence and the kind of jobs they can obtain. Lack of women's meaningful participation in policy making undermines the effectiveness of climate change programmes.
- CSOs and human rights defenders face shrinking civic space. Attacks on freedom of expression target journalists and activists, and the judicial system is unable to protect human rights defenders.

LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

PACJA and Somali Greenpeace Association: SOGPA is one of the few youth-led organizations in Somalia that addresses climate change and environmental issues. It is an active member of PACJA and other networks including the **UN Environmental Programme for Major Group of Children and Youth (UNEPMGCY)**.

Climate movements are almost non-existent in Somalia. The AACJ consortium in Somalia aims to partner with local CSOs already working on climate justice activism, in particular youth and women's organizations (formal and informal).

The consortium is yet to finalize decisions on more local partners to be involved in the AACJ programme. It will seek collaboration with humanitarian actors, youth movements, women's groups and local communities.

Oxfam Somalia has a long-standing relationship with 25 partner organizations (including organizations of women, youth and pastoralists) in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central region of Somalia. An additional 260 potential partners have also expressed interest in working with Oxfam in Somalia. AYC is currently selecting local partners that can help implement the AACJ programme in Somalia.

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

OXFAM

- Oxfam Somalia has worked with communities on climate adaptation as part of the multi-donor funded **Somali Resilience Program (SomRep)**.
- Oxfam Somalia has a long history in **humanitarian work**, particularly emergency food security and livelihoods, WASH and protection.
- Oxfam has worked on increasing youth's economic prospects and supporting innovative and green businesses as part of its **youth economic justice programme**.
- On **influencing and advocacy**, Oxfam Somalia has worked with journalists and published research on the climate crisis and its impact on gender equality and gender-based violence.

PACJA / SOMALI GREENPEACE ASSOCIATION

- Has carried out activities including planting trees combined with youth education, and organizing public events to mark World Peace Day and World Environment Day 2020.
- Has engaged the police in environmental protection.

ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

- **Ministry of Environment, Federal/Somaliland:** aware of the effects of the climate crisis and have initial plans.

- **Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs, Federal/Somaliland (NADFOR):** responsible for the coordination of humanitarian responses.
- **Ministry of Planning, Federal/Somaliland:** leads the National Development Plan process, which should reflect climate justice more strongly, and coordinates with other ministries.
- **Ministry of Finance:** plays a key role in Somalia's debt relief process and will have an interest in accessing global climate finance.
- **Somali media:** can shift the narrative from weather patterns to climate crisis, and introduce the issue into larger national policy conversations.
- **Private sector:** Somalia's emissions of CO2 are minimal, though the effects of deforestation, waste management and charcoal production should be addressed.
- **Civil society actors and alliances:** SONSA, SNC and Nexus are among civil society networks and emerging movements that will be key to advocating for climate justice in Somalia.

ALIGNMENT WITH THE DUTCH STAKEHOLDERS

The proposal aligns with the Embassy's priority themes of food security, water and climate. The Embassy is researching linkages between climate change and social consequences, in particular on the social contract, and welcomes the programme's narrative building and CSO strengthening on climate change. The Embassy has offered support to the consortium with linking to government actors and local partners. They expressed the importance of demand-driven and flexible programming. The consortium agreed to inform, involve and coordinate with the Embassy whenever possible.

7.9 SOUTH AFRICA: UNITING STRUGGLES FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

STRATEGIC COUNTRY OBJECTIVE:

Strengthening CSOs platforms and engaging with key climate actors working with women, youth, Indigenous People and Local Communities to promote an inclusive and human rights-based approach to climate action.

CONTEXT

South Africa is a leading African economy and home to 75% of the largest African companies. However, it ranks among the world's highest for poverty, inequality and unemployment: in 2019, youth unemployment was a staggering 57.5%.¹⁶³

South Africa is one of the most unequal societies globally.¹⁶⁴ At least 50% of the population live in poverty.¹⁶⁵ Despite the notable gains in poverty reduction post-apartheid, poverty levels have remained consistently highest among women, black South Africans, people with disabilities, and those living in rural areas.¹⁶⁶ Poverty is high for an upper middle-income country because high levels of inequality and low intergenerational mobility act as a brake on poverty reduction.¹⁶⁷

South Africa is the 14th largest carbon dioxide emitter in the world,¹⁶⁸ with a domestic economy reliant on coal resources to generate power and liquid fuels.

In the last two decades South Africa has established policies that advance human rights and gender, but most people are not benefitting.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

CLIMATE IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIES

Climate variability is impacting water quality and availability.¹⁶⁹ South Africa has faced a serious drought since 2015, with associated crop losses, water restrictions, and impacts on food and water security. The government of South Africa aims to increase resilience through the implementation of more efficient and climate-smart conservation practices in agriculture. However, these programmes hardly benefit poor communities, particularly women, youth and indigenous people.

¹⁶³ World Bank. (2019). *Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate)* | Data. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS>

¹⁶⁴ Statistics South Africa. (2020, February 4). *How Unequal Is South Africa?* | Statistics South Africa. Statistics South Africa. <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12930>

¹⁶⁵ South Africa Statistics. (2017). *Poverty trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 2006 and 2011, 2015*. Statistics South Africa. http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=Report-03-10-06

¹⁶⁶ Plagerson, S. (2021, January 14). *South African policies go some way to tackling poverty and inequality. But more is needed*. The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/south-african-policies-go-some-way-to-tackling-poverty-and-inequality-but-more-is-needed-151696>

¹⁶⁷ South Africa Statistics. (2017). *Poverty trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 2006 and 2011, 2015*. Statistics South Africa. http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=Report-03-10-06

¹⁶⁸ The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. (2020, January 13). *South Africa has huge 'green fuels' potential but it needs to act now*. University of the Witwaterstrand. <https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/opinion/2020/2020-01/south-africa-has-huge-green-fuels-potential-but-it-needs-to-act-now.html>

¹⁶⁹ Kusangaya, Samuel & Warburton Toucher, Michele & Archer, Emma & Jewitt, Graham. (2013). *Impacts of Climate Change on Water Resources in Southern Africa: A Review*. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth Parts A/B/C. 67-69. 10.1016/j.pce.2013.09.014.

Violence against human rights defenders including women, has increased. Further exacerbated by climate change, it remains an enormous problem in South Africa that has not been addressed by existing policies. Youth are suffering from mental health impacts caused by a feeling of intergenerational environmental injustice.

Women, indigenous people and youth do not participate in decisions over land and natural resources – leading to alienation and expropriation.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE INADEQUATE

The policies on climate change are often designed top down. They do not recognize traditional knowledge of indigenous people and women who play a crucial role in the conservation of biodiversity

South Africa is one of the world's biggest coal producers, and a leading producer of a wide range of metals. Local communities play an important role in protecting ecosystems and biodiversity, but are confronted with serious environmental, health, and social impacts of mining projects while receiving limited to no benefits from the use of their resources. Dispossession of lands and natural resources is a major human rights problem for communities, especially indigenous communities.

In line with the Paris Agreement, South Africa needs to adopt more ambitious climate action. Yet, initial proposals by the South African government for post- COVID-19 economic recovery indicate an intention to focus on carbon-intensive investments, contradicting its own global commitments. Accountability and transparency are lacking in South Africa's management of societal resources.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

- Existence of local and national CSOs and networks involved in climate activism and advocacy.¹⁷⁰ Civil society is highly organized, with strong representation of women, providing opportunities to mobilize women, youth, indigenous peoples and local communities in climate advocacy.
- The NDC and legislative frameworks such as the Climate Change Coordinating Commission (P4C) create space for policy engagement for most-impacted people.
- Growing public opposition to the negative impact of fossil fuels and lack of transparency and accountability is inspiring CSOs, movements and networks to come together.
- Collaboration is growing between public interest law centres and CSOs, movements and networks fighting land grabs, pollution and destruction of nature. Legal agendas against climate change are complementing other strategies. These include litigation to challenge laws, policies and practices that exclude youth, women and indigenous people; litigation to ensure communities have space to articulate their claims freely and effectively; and assistance to individuals and communities. Some cities, such as Cape Town and eThekweni, are working with non-governmental partners on climate goals.¹⁷¹
- South Africa's youth have widespread access to ICT, enabling digital activism.

¹⁷⁰ E.g. South Africa Climate Action Network (SACAN), Climate Africa, South Durban Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA, Durban KZN), Eastern Cape Environmental Network (ECEN, Eastern Cape), Earthlife Africa (national), Greenpeace Africa (national); Oceans Not Oil (Durban KZN), Sisonke Environmental Justice Network (SEJN Newcastle KZN).

¹⁷¹ Such as the National Environmental Management Air Quality Act 39 of 2004; the Carbon Tax Act; the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP2019), committing to shift energy policy away from coal to renewables and decommission over 35 GW (of 42 GW currently operating) of coal-fired power capacity by 2050; the draft Mining and Energy Recovery Plan; and the newly established Presidential Climate Change Coordinating Commission (P4C), with effect from 17 December 2020.

PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

IMPACT OUTCOME 1:

Strong, inclusive, and effective civil society promotes climate justice. Climate movements are driven by women, youth and Indigenous People and connected to global movements

The AACJ consortium in South Africa will **develop broad alliances** on climate justice by uniting movements that represent **impacted communities** with organizations and campaigns that **advance climate justice** and **challenge extractive industries'** impact on the environment. The consortium will develop the capacity of local organizations to increase their autonomy and ability to self-organize as a transversal grass-roots movement, including by facilitating the development of **common agendas and a unified voice** between CSOs and climate justice activists, particularly women, youth, indigenous people and local communities (Pathway 1 and 2).

IMPACT OUTCOME 2:

Indigenous people and local communities have increased capacity to understand and use laws and policies to pursue climate justice.

The AACJ consortium will work with local/ impacted communities to i) **challenge unjust policies and practices** that are currently in place, such as government support for fossil fuel energy and land grabs; and ii) **support and promote policy reform** for climate justice, including mainstreaming of environmental issues throughout government and public policy (Pathway 5). Activities include training indigenous people, women, youth and local communities to **increase climate-related knowledge and participation in policy procedures**.

The programme will also support local communities and environmental defenders to articulate and defend their **environmental and land rights**, through legal empowerment and support (Pathway 3). Finally, the programme will document best **practices on climate-related traditional knowledge and customary practices**, for example through participatory action research and provide spaces for sharing, co-creation and promotion/ advocacy (Pathway 4).

For more details on how the programme will be implemented in South Africa, see Annex 2 or click [here](#).

ADDRESSING LOCAL CAPACITY NEEDS

- CSOs are strong but disparate in the various issues they seek to tackle. Capacitated CSOs working collaboratively in pursuit of climate justice will require:
- Increased knowledge to influence climate justice while connecting with and ensuring the meaningful participation of women, young and indigenous people.
- Increased capacity to address shrinking civic space, including threats and murders of community, environment, land and human rights defenders.
- Increased capacity to articulate climate justice issues, particularly those affecting women, youth, indigenous people and local communities.
- Greater alignment with everyday issues that communities face.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL KNOCK-ON EFFECTS

South Africa has committed to a transition to clean and renewable energy that would have immediate effects on SADC member states. The SADC Secretariat has developed

a Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, but CSOs need to ensure its effective implementation. Given its economic leadership, climate action by South Africa will influence other countries in the region. CSOs in South Africa can influence the Pan African Parliament in Midrand on operationalizing the climate ambitions of Africa's Agenda 2063.

LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

The consortium partners, together with Oxfam South Africa, will strengthen relationships with and continue to support a number of CSOs and CBOs and involve local movements to achieve sustainable long-term implementation of the programme. These CSOs include:

- **South African Climate Action Network (SACAN)**, which promotes a common message on a just transition to an equitable and sustainable South Africa.
- **South Durban Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA)**, which promotes clean air, water and soil and opposes environmental racism and poverty in South Durban.
- **Eastern Cape Environmental Network (ECEN)**, a coalition of interest groups working to protect biodiversity for a sustainable future in the Eastern Cape.
- **Earthlife Africa**, which seeks a better life for all without degrading the environment.
- **National KhoiSan Council**, which aims to unite indigenous communities and fight for statutory recognition and inclusion of Khoi and San people in government structures.
- **PHA Food and Farming Campaign**, which aims to protect farmlands and an aquifer in the Philippi Horticultural Area in Cape Town.
- **Greenpeace Africa**, an environmental campaigning organization using non-violent, creative confrontation to expose environmental injustices and promote solutions.
- **Oceans Not Oil**, which challenges the impacts of offshore oil and gas developments.
- **Sisonke Environmental Justice Network (SEJN)** which pushes back against coal mining and protects watercourse around Newcastle, KwaZulu-Natal.
- **LandNNES**, which aims to influence land-related policies and legal frameworks to respond to the needs and protect the rights of those who live on and from the land.
- **Southern African Faith Communities' Environment Institute (SAFCEI)**, a multi-faith organization that supports faith communities in Southern Africa to increase awareness, understanding and action on eco-justice, sustainable living and climate change.
- **Green ELCSA**, a church organization focused on environmental issues in provinces including KwaZulu Natal, Mpumalanga and Limpopo.
- **South African Community Environmental Federation (SACEF)**, a community organization based in the north of Durban and focused on SDGs.

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

- **Natural Justice** has a track record on legal empowerment, community advocacy and strategic litigation in South Africa, Kenya, Senegal and Madagascar. Natural Justice works with communities to participate in policy development and national, regional and global processes.
- **Oxfam South Africa** Oxfam South Africa (OZA) has more than 60 years' experience in development programming, humanitarian response and campaigning. It has established itself as a trailblazer in promoting free, prior and informed consent, transparency and accountability in natural resource governance. The organisation has extensive experience mobilising mining host communities, and engaging climate champions on social, environmental and economic justice issues impacting livelihoods, resettlements and compensation for harms suffered.
- **AYC** has extensive experience in promoting involvement of young people in implementation of the Africa 2063 Agenda and UN Agenda 2030.
- **PACJA** has been amplifying the African voice in South Africa on climate justice and expertise in movement building, resilience building and policy advocacy, since COP17 of the UNFCCC was hosted in Durban in 2011.

ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

- **South African government and ministries** with responsibilities in climate and social inclusion include the Presidential Climate Change Coordinating Commission (P4C), Department of Natural Resources and Energy (DMRE), Department of Environmental Affairs, Forestry and Fisheries (DEFF), and Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). P4C has been put in place to coordinate a just transition towards a low-carbon, inclusive, climate change-resilient economy and society.
- **Private sector champions:** companies such as Vale, Rio Tinto Group, BHP Group, and Anglo American Plc have already committed to action on cutting emissions.
- **SADC Secretariat and Pan African Parliament:** to socialize and operationalize the Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (CCSAP) and Agenda 2063 of the AU.
- **Academics:** The programme will engage the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, in its work with the Pan African Parliament to host the Civil Society Forum, which aims to foster close collaboration among CSOs and with the Parliament. The South African Food Sovereignty Campaign, located at Wits University, is putting in place a Climate Justice Charter Movement and will play a key role in academic outreach.

ALIGNMENT WITH THE DUTCH EMBASSY

The Embassy of the Netherlands can provide access to its network and political and diplomatic spaces. It is willing to support the consortium by facilitating communications, supporting events and initiatives and sharing information. The Embassy has a five-year strategy addressing climate change, human rights, culture, economy, norms and values, and smart and resilient cities.

The AACJ consortium in South Africa sees that Dutch stakeholders can add value through:

- Diplomatic support through its missions, both bilateral and multilateral (expressing Dutch political and/or policy priorities), ministerial travels, access to foreign governments and/or multilateral institutions and fora, facilitating meetings, advising (for example on local legislation) and troubleshooting;
- Access to national and international networks;
- Access to knowledge, expertise and (government)information, including Multi Annual Country Strategies;
- Facilitating monitoring (including field visits), learning and evaluation (internal and external); and
- Facilitating annual strategic policy dialogues.

7.10 REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PROGRAMME: TOWARDS A STRONG AND INCLUSIVE PAN-AFRICAN MOVEMENT

STRATEGIC REGIONAL/ GLOBAL OBJECTIVE:

National AACJ movements have been connected across countries and rally together and with other (national, regional and global) climate movements, advancing the rights and interests of groups that have been affected disproportionately by climate change.

CONTEXT

The climate crisis requires **cooperation and coordination** at regional and global level and solidarity from the largest emitter countries: they should take responsibility for the impacts of their emissions on countries that are less responsible, but their climate finance commitments are not being met. The climate crisis is heavily impacting communities across Africa but adaptation and mitigation efforts by African governments are hampered by lack of finance, a situation compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Even before the pandemic, the IMF warned that 33 of the 73 countries it classifies as low-income were either in, or at high risk of, debt distress. By February 2021, this had risen to 36 – almost half.¹⁷² Many of the poorest countries are spending more on servicing debt payments than on life-saving public services. Even after the G20's debt suspension initiative in May 2020, the 73 countries repaid up to USD 33.7 billion of debt in 2020.¹⁷³

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

AFRICA LAGGING BEHIND ON CLIMATE ACTION

As long ago as 2009, the **African Union** adopted a common African position on climate change and requested the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive strategy. It has been in the making since then – a slow process.¹⁷⁴ Even if the AU had a strong strategy, its decisions have no direct force of law in member countries.

Most African countries have included adaptation commitments in their NDCs, but only five (including Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Kenya) have submitted NAPs.¹⁷⁵ Implementation is slow and there is limited evidence of climate risk reduction.¹⁷⁶

AFRICA AT A CROSSROADS

African countries depend on burning fossil fuels or local biomass for the vast majority of their energy needs, and many people still lack adequate access to energy, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁷⁷ The combined vision of the SDGs and Paris Agreement is

¹⁷² IMF. (2021, February 28). *List of LIC DSAs for PRGT-Eligible Countries*. <https://www.imf.org/external/Pubs/ft/dsa/DSAlist.pdf>

¹⁷³ Oxfam International. (2020b, July 16). *Passing the buck on debt relief*. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/passing-buck-debt-relief>

¹⁷⁴ Africa Union. (2014, May). *Draft African Union Strategy on Climate Change*. https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/cap_draft_aucclimatestrategy_2015.pdf

¹⁷⁵ Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Togo. *National Adaptation Plans*. (n.d.-a). United Nations Climate Change. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from <https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/national-adaptation-plans>

¹⁷⁶ UNEP. (2021, January 14). *Adaptation Gap Report 2020*. UNEP - UN Environment Programme. <https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2020>

¹⁷⁷ *Africa Energy Outlook 2019 – Analysis*. (2019, November). IEA. <https://www.iea.org/reports/africa-energy-outlook-2019>. Less than 50 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans have access to electricity, while only 17% have access to clean

ambitious: achieving the Paris temperature goals requires rapid decarbonization, keeping fossil fuel reserves in the ground;¹⁷⁸ and SDG7 – ‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’ – also means development paths must change.

This is possible. The unit price of renewable energy sources, particularly wind and solar, has been coming down and is now often not higher than fossil fuels, depending on the application. However, most investment in Africa is still in fossil fuels,¹⁷⁹ not renewables.¹⁸⁰ Governments need to reorient energy policies, investment decisions and tax incentives towards renewables at continental and national level. This will require concrete plans and examples, as well as international financial support.

DEVELOPED COUNTRIES FALLING SHORT OF COMMITMENTS

Developed countries are falling short on their commitments to financially support developing countries to adapt to climate change and avoid GHG emissions¹⁸¹ and there is little to no progress on finance for loss and damage. Developed countries are also falling short on their commitment to keep global temperature rise well below 2°C, and ideally limit it to 1.5°C.¹⁸² Being the largest emitters, and having the largest historical responsibility, developed countries need to move first and fastest. However, the world is still on track for at least 3°C temperature increase by the end of the century.¹⁸³ Higher temperatures will mean more devastation and higher adaptation costs for countries and communities in Africa.

AFRICAN COUNTRIES DO NOT SPEAK WITH ONE CLEAR VOICE

In international negotiations such as UNFCCC, African countries often come with small delegations that cannot cover the many topics on the agenda, let alone understand all the technicalities and make proposals. African countries do work together as the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), with some AGN members also members of other UNFCCC country groups¹⁸⁴ and involved in bilateral talks with e.g. donor countries. However, national delegations may receive conflicting instructions from their heads of state or be overruled at later stages in the negotiations, e.g. when specific economic interests are at stake. As a consequence, the AGN voice is not as strong and clear as it could be.

MOVEMENTS LACKING CAPACITIES TO COOPERATE AND COORDINATE

Regional and global NGOs are fragmented; there is a lack of capacity to coordinate advocacy efforts around common causes, opportunities to rally together are being missed. Stronger regional civil society coordination could make engagement and

cooking facilities. *SDG7: Data and Projections – Analysis*. (2020, October). IEA. <https://www.iea.org/reports/sdg7-data-and-projections>

¹⁷⁸ Ambassador Tosi Mpanu Mpanu speaking at COP25 on behalf of the African Group of Negotiators (December 2019). Retrieved March 19, 2021 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qn_3bo4NiX0

¹⁷⁹ Vetter, D. (2021, January 11). *Africa Could Be Locked Into Fossil Fuel Future, Warns New Report*. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidrvetter/2021/01/11/africa-could-be-locked-into-fossil-fuel-future-warns-new-report/?sh=2b2c9089b973>

¹⁸⁰ *Key findings – World Energy Investment 2020 – Analysis*. (2020, May). IEA. <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2020/key-findings>

¹⁸¹ Roberts, T. J., Weikmans, R., Robinson, S., Ciple, D., Khan, M., & Falzon, D. (2021, February 18). *Rebooting a failed promise of climate finance*. Nature Climate Change. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-021-00990-2?error=cookies_not_supported&code=1c643e06-fbad-4227-9621-7afe3485baba

¹⁸² United Nations Climate Change. (2021, February 26). *Greater Climate Ambition Urged as Initial NDC Synthesis Report Is Published*. <https://unfccc.int/news/greater-climate-ambition-urged-as-initial-ndc-synthesis-report-is-published>

¹⁸³ *Adaptation Gap Report 2020*. (2021, January 14). UNEP - UN Environment Programme. <https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2020>

¹⁸⁴ Group of Least Developed Countries, Group of Small Island Developing States, Group of Arab States, BASIC Group (South Africa with Brazil, India, China), and G77/China, which brings together all developing countries.

advocacy on African and global policy processes more successful. It could also raise regional and global attention for harassment and violence against human rights defenders – an alarming trend across countries. It could facilitate learning across countries from successes and failures in lobbying, advocacy and legal approaches.

Regional and global level NGOs tend to be led by men from traditionally dominant groups. As traditionally sidelined groups are often not represented in leadership positions, many movements lack legitimacy. International NGOs taking the space of local movements (whether on purpose or not) is another structural factor that often makes it harder for African movements to effectively organize and coordinate.¹⁸⁵

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE

Interest in climate change is growing across Africa. Climate and environmental movements are gaining momentum. We see multiple opportunities to strengthen them.

INFLUENCING NARRATIVES, REGIONALISING MOVEMENTS:

- Increased penetration of internet, mobile technologies and social media, and growing digital literacy among Africa's large youth population offer opportunities for social movements to connect quickly (potentially across boundaries) as 'hashtag campaigns' (such as #EndSARS, #FeesMustFall) have shown.
- Media (from AllAfrica.com¹⁸⁶ to the East African newspaper¹⁸⁷) and the entertainment industry (Nollywood) increasingly reach (sub)regional audiences, creating cross-border conversations that offer platforms for new ideas and narratives.
- CSOs are increasingly breaking silos between them, uniting struggles. Natural linkages can be found between promoting alternative energy pathways and defending the rights and interests of local communities impacted by fossil fuel extraction and deforestation for fuel. The DeCOALonize movement in Kenya, a prime example, can inspire movements in other countries.¹⁸⁸

INFLUENCING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL POLICIES

- African Union decisions have no direct force of law in member countries. An alternative strategy to promoting domestication of regional and global agreements is adoption of model laws by the African Union Summit. This has already been partly successful on access to genetic resources.¹⁸⁹ PACJA is working with the Pan African Parliament in the African Climate Legislative Initiative to develop an AU model law on climate.¹⁹⁰
- At global level, UNFCCC COP26 (November 2021 in Glasgow, UK) is an opportunity to increase ambition on limiting temperature rise. COP26 will take decisions on rules for developed countries' reporting of climate finance which may lead to more transparency and scrutiny, and negotiations on post-2025 financial commitments will begin. Progress may lead to more availability of finance for climate-frontline communities.
- Recent UNFCCC meetings have increased momentum to operationalize the Warsaw International Mechanism on loss and damage. The work of the Global Commission on

¹⁸⁵ Coordinator, G. (2019, December 6). *Solution – or part of the problem?* Gender and Development Network. <https://gadnetwork.org/gadn-resources/solution-or-part-of-the-problem>

¹⁸⁶ See for more info: <https://allafrica.com/>

¹⁸⁷ See for more info: <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/>

¹⁸⁸ See for more info: <https://www.decoalize.org/>

¹⁸⁹ African Model Legislation For the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources. See for more info: <https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/oau/oau001en.pdf>

¹⁹⁰ Onganga, J. (2019, August 6). *Development of Model Laws for ACLI implementation towards finalisation*. Pan African Parliament. <http://www.panafricanparliament.org/index.php/news-and-events/76-development-of-model-laws-for-acli-implementation-towards-finalisation>

Adaptation,¹⁹¹ including the Climate Adaptation Summit hosted by the Netherlands, also spotlighted the need for urgent adaptation action and making finance available.¹⁹² However, the approach to adaptation has remained technical rather than political, and world leaders announced few new financial commitments. African countries could engage more with allies in the Climate Vulnerable Forum,¹⁹³ which has successfully drawn international attention to the need for climate action and financial support but has so far focused more on Pacific and Asian countries.

INTERPRETING HUMAN RIGHTS

- Resolutions of the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR), or rulings of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, are an alternative way to enforce human rights commitments in relation to climate justice.¹⁹⁴ For example, the Court's ruling on a complaint from the Endorois community in Kenya is seen as seminal on indigenous communities' rights in Africa.¹⁹⁵
- The UN special rapporteurs on environment and human rights,¹⁹⁶ the rights of indigenous peoples,¹⁹⁷ and extreme poverty and human rights¹⁹⁸ play constructive roles based on mandates from the UN Commission on Human Rights.¹⁹⁹ These rapporteurs can evaluate how countries are translating human rights commitments into legislation, promote best practices, identify challenges and respond to rights violations. PACJA and NJ have been promoting the appointment of a UN special rapporteur on climate change and human rights. Such a rapporteur could be an important ally.

INFLUENCING TRADE AND FINANCIAL FLOWS

- International development banks often finance fossil fuel extraction and infrastructure. Having been an advocacy target, they may increasingly become an ally in convincing governments and societies to leave fossil fuels behind and transition to renewable energy. The African Development Bank has announced it will stop investing in coal.²⁰⁰

¹⁹¹ See for more info: <https://gca.org/about-us/the-global-commission-on-adaptation/>

¹⁹² Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat. (2021, January 26). *World leaders embrace climate adaptation action at Climate Adaptation Summit 2021*. Government.NL. <https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2021/01/25/world-leaders-embrace-climate-adaptation-action-at-climate-adaptation-summit-2021>

¹⁹³ See for more info: <https://thecvf.org/>

¹⁹⁴ *Welcome to the African Court*. (n.d.). African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Retrieved March 21, 2021, from <https://www.african-court.org/wpafc/welcome-to-the-african-court/>

¹⁹⁵ African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. (2009, November 25). *276/03 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) / Kenya*. <https://www.achpr.org/sessions/descions?id=193>

¹⁹⁶ *A UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights & Climate Change? Regional Perspectives (January 2021)*. (2021, February 9). Center for International Environmental Law. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from <https://www.ciel.org/reports/special-rapporteur-on-human-rights-climate-change/>

¹⁹⁷ See for more info: <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/SRIndigenousPeoples/Pages/Mandate.aspx>

¹⁹⁸ See for more info: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/poverty/pages/srextremepovertyindex.aspx>

¹⁹⁹ See for more info: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/chr/pages/commissiononhumanrights.aspx>

²⁰⁰ African Development Bank Group. (2019, September 26). *UNGA 2019: No room for coal in Africa's renewable future: Akinwumi*. African Development Bank - Building Today, a Better Africa Tomorrow. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/unga-2019-no-room-coal-africas-renewable-future-akinwumi-adesina-30377>

Other development banks have made similar announcements (e.g. EIB,²⁰¹ IFC,²⁰² FMO²⁰³). Even commercial banks and investors are increasingly following suit.²⁰⁴

- There is increasing interest in promoting circular economies, to address the high climate footprint of international transport and the high footprint in terms of land use and biodiversity loss of advanced economies' use of primary materials. Addressing this as a global sustainability and justice issue can reduce pressure on primary resource markets and support efforts on sustainable management (see also activities in the Netherlands).

PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

IMPACT OUTCOME 1:

Regionally coordinated globally connected, inclusive and effective movements promote climate justice, while linking local issues and experiences to regional and global discussions, and keeping global and regional bodies accountable.

The AACJ consortium's regional and global activities will aim to **bring together regional movements**, including those that have not traditionally engaged on climate justice, and **connect national climate justice movements to regional and global levels to form broad alliances**. The consortium will focus on mutual capacity development of local, national and regional organizations to self-organize, connect their struggles to regional and global challenges, and engage with regional and global debates and processes. We will reach out to (networks of) local communities and other traditionally sidelined groups to ensure they get leadership positions in regional and global movements (Pathway 1).

AACJ will create a broad platform to allow movements to find each other, connect and rally around influencing opportunities, and **build common agendas and a unified voice** to influence narratives, attitudes, beliefs, policies and practices. AACJ will initiate and coordinate regional and global campaigns, and work with journalists, academics and artists to develop and promote new narratives expressing African perspectives on climate justice-related issues (Pathway 2).

IMPACT OUTCOME 2:

Regional and global level policies, practices and frameworks which advance climate justice are adopted, funded, and implemented.

Through its influencing strategies (Pathway 5), AACJ will aim to:

- Strengthen the African voice in international agreements by proposing and promoting new alternative narratives on justice and sustainable development, and directly engaging with and technically supporting negotiators and policy makers.

²⁰¹ European Investment Bank. (2020, December 9). *EU Bank launches ambitious new climate strategy and Energy Lending Policy*. <https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2019-313-eu-bank-launches-ambitious-new-climate-strategy-and-energy-lending-policy>

²⁰² Green, M. (2020, September 24). *World Bank's IFC adopts new climate rules to deter lenders from backing coal*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/climate-change-coal-idUSKCN26F06Y>

²⁰³ FMO. (2016). *Position Statement on Coal Power Generation and Coal Mining*. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from <https://www.fmo.nl/library/download/urn:uuid:bc67f804-1588-4542-8ac8-5f168b5f417f/position+statement+on+coal.pdf>

²⁰⁴ Institute for Energy Economics & Financial Analysis. (2021, March 5). *Over 100 and Counting*. <https://ieefa.org/finance-exiting-coal/>. Institute for Energy Economics & Financial Analysis. (2021a, February 25). *Finance is leaving oil and gas*. <https://ieefa.org/finance-exiting-oil-and-gas/>.

- Engage with regional and global policy processes to secure ambitious global climate mitigation commitments and financial commitments to allow African countries and communities to take adequate adaptation action and address climate change-related loss and damage.
- Promote peer-to-peer learning and peer pressure (a 'race to the top') among African governments, to strengthen their translating of regional and global climate justice commitments into national legislation and implementation. PACJA has started comparing African countries' progress in implementing NDCs through an NDC Index, aiming to organize competition among peers.²⁰⁵ AACJ can build on this.
- Engage with AfDB and other development banks (and potentially also private banks and investors) to leverage their influence over financial flows to promote investment in renewable energy rather than fossil energy sources.
- Strengthen the role of human rights frameworks through strategic litigation (aiming to create precedents and jurisprudence) and engagement with (AU and UN) Human Rights Commissions and Special Rapporteurs to influence their reports and resolutions (Pathway 3).

The consortium will also support and train representatives of women, youth, indigenous peoples and local communities, to **increase their climate-related knowledge and understanding of and participation in regional and global level policy procedures** (Pathway 1, 4, 5).

For more details on how the programme will be implemented at regional and global level, see Annex 2 or click [here](#).

REGIONAL CAPACITY NEEDS

- CSOs in the continent lack capacities to play a strong mobilising and influencing role, or sustain strong connections with global movements and fora.

REGIONAL STAKEHOLDERS – CIVIL SOCIETY

Regionally and globally consortium partners already work with:

- PACJA, the University of Nairobi and other university partners from around the world are preparing an international Summer School on Climate Justice for activists and academics from around Africa.
- PACJA works closely with Pan African Media Alliance for Climate Change (PAMACC), and initiated African Coalition for Sustainable Energy and Access (ACSEA).
- FEMNET works closely with Sex Workers Alliance, This Ability, Coalition of African Lesbians, Teen Feminists, and Young Women Leaders.
- Oxfam plays an active role in Climate Action Network (CAN) at international and European levels, particularly on issues of equity, finance, adaptation, loss and damage, and agriculture, including as a member of CAN's Political Coordination Group.
- Oxfam Novib and CAN-Europe lead an EC DEAR-funded awareness raising campaign on climate change across Europe, including in the Netherlands, with a focus on youth.
- Oxfam regularly works with Powershift Africa, Consumer Unity Trust Africa and Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa, and is deputy chair of CAADP Non-State Actors Coalition.
- Natural Justice and Oxfam work closely with the International Land Coalition, Forest Peoples Program, and the Land Rights Now campaign, hosted by Oxfam Novib.
- Natural Justice participates in the ICCA Consortium, which brings together indigenous peoples and local communities involved in local governance and nature conservation.

²⁰⁵ *African Politicians Asked to Develop Legal Instruments to Fight Climate Change.* (2020, January 19). Inter Press Service. <http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/12/african-politicians-asked-develop-legal-instruments-fight-climate-change/>

In the first year, we will map and consult with other civil society networks and movements to better understand how our efforts can add value to theirs, and avoid duplication.

REGIONAL STAKEHOLDERS - POLICY PROCESSES

- Traditionally excluded groups increasingly have avenues to participate in international processes, e.g. Women and Gender Constituency²⁰⁶, YOUNGO²⁰⁷, and UNFCCC organs such as Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform.²⁰⁸ AACJ will support representatives from those groups in national and regional level movements to engage with these platforms as a way to influence UNFCCC proceedings.
- Engagement with African Group of Negotiators (AGN) preparatory process and spokespersons can be effective in strengthening negotiators' capacities. PACJA, FEMNET and Oxfam have good working relations with the AGN and other relevant negotiating groups in the UNFCCC and other UN processes, and will continue to align with them to support a strong and clear African voice in negotiations.
- PACJA strengthens capacities of African governments on climate policy development at regional and national level. PACJA convenes civil society to engage with the ClimDev-Africa, an initiative of AUC, UNECA and AfDB mandated by African heads of state. PACJA also partners UNECA in organizing Climate Change and Development in Africa (CCDA) conferences for dialogue, collaboration and knowledge sharing among civil society, governments and private sector. PACJA, FEMNET and Oxfam have strong working relations with the Pan African Parliament and sub-regional parliaments.
- Oxfam has an AU liaison office in Addis Ababa, which has a Memorandum of Understanding with a broad mandate with the African Union, including observer status in AU summits. Oxfam has strong relationships with the governments involved and the relevant regional economic communities: ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, and IGAD.
- AACJ will engage with the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Adaptation Fund (AF) and their contributing countries, aiming to increase contributions to these funds, improve direct access for African countries and frontline communities, and increase the funds' allocations to locally led adaptation, including ecosystem-based adaptation.
- FEMNET plays a key role in convening and coordinating women's rights organizations' engagement in UN processes. It has strong relationships with UN Women, Commission on Women, and the African Union Gender, Women and Development Directorate

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

PACJA

- Movement building, capacity building: PACJA can rely on **designated national platforms in 48 African countries**, bringing together over 1000 local CSOs, and convening their engagement with African regional bodies. They have been mobilized in continental and national campaigns on climate justice, e.g. on the road to Paris. PACJA has organized regular trainings to build the capacities of platforms and member groups.
- PACJA has helped **build and influence climate narratives** through the Africa Climate Change & Environmental Reporting (ACCER) Awards, which every two years recognize African journalists who excel in constructive climate change reporting; and the ACCER Awards Finalists Academy, to strengthen capacity of reporters and media

²⁰⁶ See for more info: <https://womensgenderclimate.org/>

²⁰⁷ See for more info: <https://www.youthpolicy.org/blog/structures/conference-of-youth/>

²⁰⁸ See for more info: <https://unfccc.int/LCIPP>

trainers across Africa on climate and environmental reporting, increasing high-quality news coverage.²⁰⁹

FEMNET

- FEMNET has organized four African Feminist Macroeconomic Academies (AFMA), in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020, which **build new/ counter narratives and strengthened the voice**, role and meaningful contribution of women's rights organizations and activists across Africa to push for women's participation in macroeconomic processes and discussions, using feminist narratives.
- FEMNET has regularly **convened women's rights organizations and activists** from across Africa to agree common positions, narratives and policy recommendations, e.g. on Agenda 2030, Africa Agenda 2063, and CSW sessions, and has started engaging the UNFCCC process on the Gender Action Plan.

AFRICAN YOUTH COMMISSION:

- Annual Pan-African Youth Conference on African Unity and Development is a multi-stakeholder, **youth-driven platform** to influence national, sub-regional and continental youth policies and programmes of governments, African Union Commission, regional economic communities and other inter-governmental agencies.

NATURAL JUSTICE:

- In 2019, NJ with the support of International Land Coalition set up the African Defenders Emergency Fund to **support environmental and land defenders** who find themselves in emergency situations due to the nature of their work.²¹⁰
- NJ is active in the ICCA consortium, promoting recognition, strengthening and mutual support for **indigenous and community conserved areas** (ICCAs).²¹¹
- NJ has engaged with the Convention on Biological Diversity on adoption and implementation of the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework, focusing on securing **community rights, traditional knowledge and benefit sharing**.

OXFAM:

- Oxfam has supported hundreds of CSOs to **strengthen their capacities**, including to engage with regional and global policy processes. Oxfam has initiated and coordinated (often with others) **global and regional public campaigns** mobilising organizations around Africa, e.g. on the Road to Paris and previously on the Road to Durban.²¹²
- Oxfam has **influencing experience** and working relationships with relevant institutions at Pan-Africa (African Union Commission, UNECA, Pan-Africa Parliament, AfDB) and global level (UNFCCC, GCF, World Bank, European Union, etc). Oxfam has published research and policy reports, including e.g. on carbon inequality²¹³, climate-related displacement,²¹⁴ loss and damage²¹⁵ and climate finance.²¹⁶

²⁰⁹ OFA. (2018, July 10). *African Climate Change and Environmental Reporting (ACCER) Awards 2018 for journalist in Africa (US\$1000 & Fully Funded to UN Climate Change Conference - COP24 in Katowice, Poland)*. Opportunities for Africans. <https://www.opportunitiesforafricans.com/african-climate-change-and-environmental-reporting-accer-awards-2018/>

²¹⁰ See for more info: <https://envirodefenders.africa/emergency-fund/>

²¹¹ See for more info: <https://www.iccaconsortium.org/>

²¹² See for more info: <https://www.facebook.com/993857220658217>

²¹³ See for more info: <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/confronting-carbon-inequality>

²¹⁴ See for more info: <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/uprooted-climate-change>

²¹⁵ See for more info: <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/who-takes-heat-untold-stories-climate-crisis-horn-africa-and-mozambique>

²¹⁶ See for more info: https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/climate-finance-shadow-report-2016_
https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/climate-finance-shadow-report-2018_<https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/climate-finance-shadow-report-2020>.

- Oxfam initiated and leads Fair Finance International,²¹⁷ an international civil society network of 70 CSOs that seeks to **strengthen the commitment of banks and other financial institutions** to social, environmental and human rights standards. By benchmarking these institutions' investment policies and practices in areas such as human rights and climate impact, Fair Finance enables consumers to demand more socially responsible, fair and sustainable investments. In 2020, Fair Finance applied the same benchmarking methodology to development banks, including AfDB.²¹⁸

ALIGNMENT WITH THE DUTCH MINISTRY/ STAKEHOLDERS

- AACJ very much appreciates the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs' interest in supporting efforts to protect human rights and environmental defenders, and we will happily refer relevant cases to the Ministry or Dutch embassies.
- AACJ also appreciates the MoFA's efforts to promote community land rights, including ongoing collaboration with Oxfam Novib.
- AACJ appreciates the Netherlands' leadership role on the UNFCCC Gender Action Plan, and its role in convening the Global Commission on Adaptation and the Climate Adaptation Summit. Recent Dutch leadership on adaptation could translate into a bridging role with African and other developing country governments in UNFCCC negotiations: on raising ambition on adaptation action and adaptation finance.
- AACJ has explored opportunities and made initial agreements on coordination with several other Power of Voices partnerships, as referred to in section 6.3.
- For alignment with other Dutch stakeholders, see the section on activities in the Netherlands (Section 7.11).

²¹⁷ See for more info: <https://fairfinanceguide.org/ff-international/about-us/>

²¹⁸ See for more info: <https://fairfinanceguide.org/ff-international/news/2020/development-finance-institutions-failing-on-sustainable-investment-policies/>

7.11 THE NETHERLANDS: ADDRESSING THE DUTCH CLIMATE FOOTPRINT

STRATEGIC COUNTRY OBJECTIVE:

To widen the perspective on the climate crisis among Dutch audiences, particularly youth, by introducing African narratives and promoting an inclusive and human rights-based approach to climate action, and to influence government policy to take more responsibility for the Dutch footprint in the world and the impacts of the climate crisis in Africa.

CONTEXT

In terms of per capita carbon footprint, the Dutch are among the highest emitters in Europe and the world.²¹⁹ The Netherlands is also one of the richest countries in Europe, with an economy that is proving to be relatively resilient to the COVID-19 pandemic. The government has a healthy debt position, which allows it to borrow cheaply to support businesses and households to cope with economic losses due to the pandemic.

Whether the next Dutch government will use this position to put the economy on a new course will depend on coalition negotiations following the elections on 17 March 2021. The outgoing coalition government facilitated a multi-stakeholder process leading to a national climate accord aiming for a 49% reduction of GHG emissions in 2030 compared to 1990. However, it is yet to be fully translated into policies, regulations and investments.

The climate movement in the Netherlands is alive and kicking: unprecedented numbers of (young) people took to the streets and called for climate action online in 2019 and 2020.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

NETHERLANDS: A LARGE CLIMATE AND LAND USE FOOTPRINT

Many emissions for Dutch consumption happen in other countries, including through deforestation and land degradation, which also impact biodiversity and local ecosystem integrity. Dutch trade and investments also impact on the climate and biodiversity. The Netherlands aims to develop into a circular low-carbon economy, but progress is slow.²²⁰

Many, including Oxfam, have argued that COVID recovery programmes are an opportunity for fundamental economic change:²²¹ Pandemic-related support to businesses should be conditional on moving towards zero emissions. As it is borrowing to respond to COVID-19, the government could also borrow to respond to the climate crisis, investing in a just transition to a low-carbon economy and creating scale for technological breakthroughs.

European leaders have agreed to aim for 55% emissions reduction by 2030, so the next government will have to be more ambitious than the previous one. Climate Action Network Europe, of which Oxfam is a member, calls for a reduction of at least 65% to be

²¹⁹ Oxfam International. (2020c, December 8). *Confronting carbon inequality in the European Union*. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/confronting-carbon-inequality-european-union>

²²⁰ Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving. (2021, January 19). *Integrale Circulaire Economie Rapportage 2021*. <https://www.pbl.nl/publicaties/integrale-circulaire-economie-rapportage-2021>

²²¹ Oxfam Novib. (n.d.). *Zo kan Nederland groeiende ongelijkheid door de coronacrisis aanpakken*. Retrieved March 21, 2021, from <https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/zo-kan-nederland-groeiende-ongelijkheid-door-de-coronacrisis-aanpakken>

consistent with the Paris Agreement aim of limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C, but even that would not be sufficient to account for the global and historical inequity of emissions.

LIMITED PERSPECTIVE ON CLIMATE CRISIS

Politicians, activists and other stakeholders in Dutch climate discussions are focused on what the Netherlands should do at the national level. Few address the global level, or climate change impacts in Africa. They have limited understanding of how policy, production and consumption choices in the Netherlands impact on other countries.

The narrative of the climate movement focuses mostly on the future of younger generations being stolen. There is increasing attention for global impacts, but the realities and voices of people – especially African women, youth and indigenous peoples – who are already facing the consequences of climate change are not sufficiently included in the Dutch climate narrative or in addressing the climate crisis.

INSUFFICIENT GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CRISIS

The Netherlands government supports multilateralism, including international cooperation for climate action, and can be an ally in supporting human rights and in fighting exclusion. Nevertheless, in recent years, the country's Official Development Assistance has fallen from over 0.7% of GDP to 0.55%, and its contribution of public climate finance is part of that amount rather than being 'new and additional finance' as committed previously.²²²

The Netherlands has been a leader in drawing attention to the need for adaptation action, by initiating the Global Commission on Adaptation and hosting the Climate Adaptation Summit. However, the focus has been on the technical aspects of adaptation and the role of private investment, rather than showing more ambition on public adaptation finance.

The country's contribution to international climate finance has the highest share (50%) of private climate investments in developing countries. However, recent OECD research indicates that 95% of private climate finance is invested in mitigation measures, especially in energy, with very little actually helping adaptation in developing countries.²²³

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE

- COVID-19 recovery packages and low interest rates for government borrowing offer an opportunity for government support and investments to influence the country in the direction of a low-carbon, resilient, circular economy.
- The European Commission's proposal for a European Green Deal, embraced by the European Parliament and European Council, including the emission reduction target of 55% by 2030 (compared to 1990), offers an opportunity for more ambitious climate policies, including the Netherlands – and positive momentum in the global negotiations towards a more ambitious agreement in Glasgow at COP26 in November 2021.
- Negotiations on a new coalition after national elections on 17 March 2021 offer opportunities for influencing future government climate and climate finance policies.
- Recent Dutch leadership on adaptation could translate into a bridging role with African and other developing country governments in UNFCCC negotiations, on raising ambition on adaptation action and finance.

²²² Oxfam Novib. (2019). *Naar een Deltaplan Klimaatsteun voor Ontwikkelingslanden*. Retrieved 2021, March 21: <https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/Files/rapporten/2019/Naar%20een%20Deltaplan%20Klimaatsteun%20voor%20Ontwikkelingslanden%20-%20Oxfam%20Novib%20-%202019.pdf>

²²³ OECD. (2020, November 6). *Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-18* | en | OECD. <http://www.oecd.org/environment/climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries-in-2013-18-f0773d55-en.htm>

- The AACJ programme offers opportunities to inform Dutch debates and public campaigns with lived realities in African countries, and connect the Dutch climate justice movement with Pan-African movements and campaigns.
- The Netherlands' agencies on statistics and economic, social and environmental planning (CBS, CPB, SCP and PBL, respectively) have started publishing yearly 'Broad Prosperity Monitors'²²⁴ and separately monitoring the government goal to reach a 'circular economy' by 2050.²²⁵ These offer data for analysing and monitoring the Dutch climate and land use footprint on the planet, as well as opportunities for advocacy.

PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

IMPACT OUTCOME 1:

Work with Dutch audiences, movements and media expands their perspectives on the climate crisis, including by sharing African narratives and connecting movements in the Netherlands and Africa.

The AACJ consortium's activities in the Netherlands will leverage its work in Africa to **introduce African narratives into the climate debate in the Netherlands**. Oxfam Novib will build on its existing networks with Dutch climate justice movements to **raise awareness** of the impacts of the climate crisis in Africa and the Dutch climate and land use footprint and **mobilize support for specific climate justice policies** (Pathway 2).

IMPACT OUTCOME 2:

Influencing and advocacy towards decision makers in government contribute to policies and practices that advance climate justice for women, youth, local and indigenous communities in Africa.

The AACJ consortium will **link advocacy** at regional and global level with networking and advocacy opportunities in the Netherlands. We will research the Dutch climate footprint and implementation of international agreements, and use evidence from the AACJ programme to inform advocacy with Dutch actors (Pathway 5).

For more details on how the programme will be implemented in the Netherlands, see Annex 2 or click [here](#).

LOCAL CAPACITY NEEDS

- Limited understanding among Dutch (young) activists of climate impacts in African countries, and the impact of Dutch consumption on the climate, global land use, and indirectly on local land rights issues, biodiversity and ecosystems in commodity-exporting countries.

LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

- The activities in the Netherlands will be implemented by Oxfam Novib, usually in cooperation with others. Public campaigning will be in coalition with the Klimaatcrisis Coalitie, a broad alliance of civil society and social movements on climate justice.

²²⁴ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. (2020, May 20). *Monitor Brede Welvaart & Sustainable Development Goals 2020*. Rijksoverheid.NL. <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2020/05/20/monitor-brede-welvaart--sustainable-development-goals-2020>

²²⁵ *Werkprogramma monitoring en sturing circulaire economie*. (2020, January 21). Planbureau Voor de Leefomgeving. <https://www.pbl.nl/monitoring-circulaire-economie>

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS WORK

- Oxfam Novib actively engages youth on climate justice and impacts in the South, on events such as Lowlands²²⁶ and IDFA²²⁷, supported by wider engagement through online and offline campaigning. Oxfam Novib supports youth climate movements in the Netherlands such as Fridays for Future²²⁸ and Jonge Klimaatbeweging²²⁹.
- Oxfam Novib was one of the initiators of the country's largest climate march, in March 2019,²³⁰ and supported the equally large youth climate strike in September 2019.²³¹ In March 2021, Oxfam Novib was one of the organizers of the 'Klimaatalarm' (Climate Alarm) march – decentralized and partly online due to the pandemic – which aimed to make climate action an important topic in upcoming national elections.²³²
- Oxfam Novib has a track record of asking attention for the impacts of climate change in developing countries, and of monitoring, critiquing and mobilizing public support for an increase in the Netherlands' government's climate finance.²³³

ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

- The Netherlands government plays an active role in international climate negotiations, as an influential member of the European Union and as a (co)lead in initiatives such as the Climate Adaptation Summit, Gender Action Plan and NDC Partnership. Oxfam Novib and other Dutch NGOs regularly meet with MoFA to exchange and coordinate on the international climate agenda, particularly on climate finance.
- Oxfam Novib and other Dutch NGOs regularly meet with members of parliament and the European Parliament to exchange and coordinate on international climate policies.
- Oxfam Novib will continue to be part of the Klimaatcrisis Coalitie,²³⁴ mobilizing the Dutch public for ambitious climate policies, and to support youth climate movements in the Netherlands such as Fridays for Future²³⁵ and Jonge Klimaatbeweging.²³⁶
- Oxfam Novib is active in the Climate Action Network (CAN) internationally and in Europe, particularly on issues of equity, finance, adaptation, and loss and damage.
- Oxfam Novib and CAN-Europe lead an EC DEAR-funded awareness-raising campaign on climate change across Europe with a focus on youth, including in the Netherlands.
- Oxfam Novib engages in multi-stakeholder dialogues on topics including international corporate social responsibility, e.g. with the Dutch financial sector on climate impact.
- Oxfam Novib has led the Eerlijke Bankwijzer²³⁷ (*Fair Finance Guide Netherlands*) joint NGO campaign since 2009, engaging banks to improve policies including on climate, and with other NGOs filed a successful complaint against ING for its outdated climate

²²⁶ See for more info: <https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/doe-mee/lowlands-2019>, <https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/nieuws/lowlands-loves-the-climate>

²²⁷ See for more info: <https://www.idfa.nl/en/shows/dad627e4-4b6d-4a6c-9cff-b0efada7bc1e/morning-star-talk-oxfam-novib-selection>

²²⁸ See for more info: <https://fridaysforfuture.nl/>

²²⁹ See for more info: <https://www.jongeklimaatbeweging.nl/>

²³⁰ See for more info: <https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/oxfam-novib/beheer/backups-bewaren/klimaatmars>

²³¹ See for more info: <https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/nieuws/staak-mee-voor-een-eerlijk-klimaatbeleid>

²³² See for more info: <https://klimaatmars2021.nl/>, <https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/kies-voor-klimaat-doe-mee-met-het-klimaat-alarm>

²³³ See for more info: <https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/nieuws/petitie-overhandiging-klimaat-2019>,

²³⁴ See for more info: <https://klimaatmars.nl/>

²³⁵ See for more info: <https://fridaysforfuture.nl/>

²³⁶ See for more info: <https://www.jongeklimaatbeweging.nl/>

²³⁷ See for more info: <https://eerlijkegeldwijzer.nl/bankwijzer/themas/klimaatverandering/>

policies.²³⁸ Dutch financial institutions have become frontrunners on commitments to decarbonize their portfolios in alignment with the Paris Agreement, and we will continue to engage with them – including through Fair Finance – to monitor implementation.

- Oxfam Novib leads the Behind the Barcodes campaign (engaging supermarkets) and Behind the Brands (engaging food and beverage companies) to improve their policies and practices. Behind the Brands led to General Mills and Kellogg's committing to address climate change in their supply chains and operations.²³⁹

²³⁸ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. (2019, May 16). *Final Statement Dutch NCP specific instance, 4 NGOs versus ING bank*. OECD Guidelines. <https://www.oecdguidelines.nl/latest/news/2019/04/19/final-statement-dutch-ncp-specific-instance-4-ngos-versus-ing-bank>

²³⁹ Oxfam International. (2016, April 19). *The Journey to Sustainable Food*. Retrieved March 19, 2021 from https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp-journey-to-sustainable-food-btb-190416-en.pdf



After Cyclone Kenneth, the strongest tropical cyclone in Mozambique since modern records began, people use an improvised bridge to cross a section of washed out road between Pemba and Metuje, Mozambique. Photo credit: Tommy Trenchard/Oxfam

PART 3: MEL, RISK MANAGEMENT AND CONSORTIUM AGREEMENT

8 MEL

8.1 INTRODUCTION

A robust monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) system will enable the consortium to track the progress of our work, measure its effects (intended and unintended), ensure accountability to stakeholders and enable adaptive management and learning within the programme. MEL in the AACJ will be inclusive, participatory, gender-responsive and conflict-sensitive, as well as knowledge- and impact-driven. This approach is rooted in consortium members' commitment to gender equality, social inclusion and principles of feminist MEL, which remind us that power relations are inherent in monitoring and research work and that choices about how data are collected, analysed, presented and owned can either help empower people or reinforce existing inequities.

The AACJ MEL system will inform day-to-day and strategic decision making to feed continuous improvements in the quality and effectiveness of programme implementation. It will foster accountability and transparency – to donors, partners and supporters – and social accountability to the people, communities and organizations that consortium members and partners will work with, and the wider public in programme countries.

AACJ is about building movements to fight for climate justice across Africa. Knowledge generated and shared through the MEL system will empower movements with data, stories, narratives and knowledge to use as evidence to advocate for change, while also demonstrating the programme's added value, successes, lessons learned and challenges faced. In keeping with the focus on climate justice, MEL activities will take account of the environmental and social costs of technology, transportation, energy and resource use, to strike a balance between sustainability, effectiveness and equity in everything we do.

8.2 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

8.2.1 OUTPUT & OUTCOME INDICATORS

We propose the following programme-wide results framework, developed with input from colleagues across the consortium and in each programme country. Output (process) indicators are linked to activities and intervention strategies for all five pathways of the TOC; outcome indicators capture changes these activities contributed to. Outcome indicators align to four of the indicators in the MoFA's Strengthening Civil Society (SCS) results framework ('basket indicators').

8.2.2 PROGRAMME IMPACT

The programme-wide results framework will focus primarily on outputs and intermediary outcomes, defined by the ToC as within its 'sphere of influence'. We propose indicators also for two medium-term impacts identified by the ToC that are outside the programme's sphere of influence and direct accountability, but very much within its 'sphere of interest'.

8.2.3 PROGRAMME-WIDE RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The tables below provide an overview of the AACJ programme-wide results framework. Each outcome corresponds to one pathway of the ToC. **Targets** for all medium-term outcome indicators are presented in **Annex 2** (Outcomes and activities per country). Activity plans in **Part 4** of this programme proposal include targets for output indicators in Year 1 of implementation.

Table 8.1 contains the outcome indicators for the programme-wide results framework, linked to MoFA SCS basket indicators, and the primary and complementary data collection methodologies proposed to measure each indicator.

Table 8.1: AACJ midterm impact indicators

Result	Outcome indicator	Link to SCS basket indicators	Primary data collection method	Complementary data collection method
IMPACT OUTCOME 1 (I1) STRONG, INCLUSIVE AND EFFECTIVE MOVEMENTS PROMOTING CLIMATE JUSTICE	# of cases where CSOs contribute to creating space for climate justice demands and positions	MoFA SC S3	Outcome harvesting	Stories of change
IMPACT OUTCOME 2 (I2) POLICIES, PRACTICES AND FRAMEWORKS THAT ADVANCE CLIMATE JUSTICE ARE ADOPTED, FUNDED AND IMPLEMENTED	# of changes in law, policy and practice that advance climate justice	MoFA SC S1 + MoFA SCS2	Outcome harvesting	Stories of change

Table 8.2: AACJ outcome indicators

Result	Outcome indicator	SCS basket indicators	Primary data collection method	Complementary data collection method
OUTCOME 1 (O1)	# of supported organizations applying their increased	MoFA SCS5 ²⁴¹	CATool	Stories of change

²⁴¹ Specific to L&A, part of 'capacity to act'.

<p>STRONG, INCLUSIVE CLIMATE MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA</p>	<p>capacities to act, operate and connect (O1.1)</p> <p>% of leadership positions in supported organizations filled by women, youth or people from indigenous communities²⁴⁰ (O1.2)</p>	<p>MoFA SCS8</p>		
<p>OUTCOME 2 (O2)</p> <p>AFRICAN CLIMATE JUSTICE NARRATIVES DEVELOPED AND SPREAD</p>	<p># of supported organizations applying their increased capacities to develop and spread narratives (O2.1)</p> <p># of cases of climate justice narratives developed and spread (O2.2)</p>	<p>MoFA SC S1 + MoFA SCS2</p>	<p>CATool</p> <p>Outcome harvesting</p>	<p>Stories of change</p> <p>Digital media analysis</p>
<p>OUTCOME 3 (O3)</p> <p>STRENGTHENED HUMAN RIGHTS FRAME-WORKS</p>	<p># of cases of supported communities defending environmental and social rights (O3.1)</p> <p># of cases of successful strategic litigation (O3.2)</p>		<p>Outcome harvesting</p>	<p>Legal case tracking</p>
<p>OUTCOME 4 (O4)</p> <p>COMMUNITIES' ADAPTIVE CAPACITIES STRENGTHENED</p>	<p># of community-level innovations and best-practices spread (O4.1)</p> <p># of cases of communities improving their capacities for</p>		<p>Outcome harvesting</p>	<p>Stories of change</p>

²⁴⁰ Indigenous communities to be defined in context of each country.

	adaptation planning (O4.2)			
OUTCOME 5 (O5) POLITICAL WILL TO SUPPORT CLIMATE JUST POLICIES (O5)	# of supporting statements and commitments on policies advancing climate justice by decision-makers at local, national and international level (O5.1)		Outcome harvesting	Stories of change

These indicators link the AACJ MEL system to five of the basket indicators:

I1 contextualizes SCS3 to align with the AACJ programme’s focus on supporting strong, inclusive African movements to mobilize for climate justice.

I2 is our preferred measure of policy and practice changes among local and national government institutions and private sector actors, contextualized to the programme’s goals. It will capture both new laws and policies that advance climate justice, and the blocking or repealing of those that are climate unjust. By summarizing these as ‘changes in law, policy and practice’ we can report towards SCS1 and SCS2. We have removed changes in norms and attitudes, referenced in SCS1 and SCS2, from the indicator as this aim does not figure prominently in the programme ToC.

I2 will also contribute quantitative and qualitative data for the MoFA IGG-KL internal indicator ‘climate-smart policies prepared, adopted or implemented’, as will our first programme-wide learning question, referenced later in this chapter. However, in keeping with the AACJ programme focus, we will track ‘climate-just’ policies.

O1.1 will be disaggregated by type of capacities, allowing us to report on SCS5: ‘# of CSOs with increased L&A capacities’.

O1.2 is our proposal for SCS8, on inclusion of women and youth.

Table 8.3 below presents the output indicators for each intervention strategy. The final column indicates the ToC pathway to which each indicator most closely corresponds.

Table 8.3: Output Indicators

INTERVENTIONS	Output Indicators	Pathway
CAPACITY STRENGTHENING	# of efforts to strengthen the capacity of partner organizations to act, operate and connect	1
	# of small grants disbursed	1
	# of trainings and events held to engage and strengthen capacities of communities	3,4
		3,4

	# of trainings and events held to engage and strengthen capacities of local partners and consortium partners	
AWARENESS RAISING	# of events organized to make people aware of climate justice issues	1
	# of public influencing campaigns implemented	1
	# community based innovation have been scoped and documented and shared	4
MEDIA ENGAGEMENT	# of media efforts undertaken	2
NARRATIVE DEVELOPMENT	# of efforts to strengthen the capacity of partner organizations to develop and spread narratives	2
LITIGATION AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT	# strategic litigation cases undertaken	3
	# of initiatives launched to protect environmental and human rights defenders	3
ALLIANCE AND MOVEMENT BUILDING	# of cases in which AACJ consortium members support joint agendas of movements and alliances	5
RESEARCH AND LEARNING	# of pieces of evidence from research or lessons learned (reports, mappings, documents, studies, videos, testimonies etc.)	4,5
LOBBY AND ADVOCACY	# of lobby and advocacy initiatives to influence climate justice policies and practices	5

8.2.4 DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGIES

The AACJ MEL system will employ a standard set of primary methodologies to measure these indicators. Country teams may also use optional, complementary methodologies to provide further insights and feed into the country-specific learning agendas.

The selection of methodologies is based on the expertise of the consortium partners and the contexts, skills and needs of colleagues in programme countries. Methodologies will capture data that can be meaningfully disaggregated, mainly type of organization (those that represent women, youth and indigenous/local communities) and by individual characteristics like by gender, age group, geography and other demographic factors – such as poverty status, education level or urban/rural – as possible and appropriate in each country context.

Indicators relating to data on CSOs and other organizations will be disaggregated by factors such as whether it is female-led, youth-led or represents indigenous communities. We will take care to employ methodologies in ways that are gender-aware and sensitive to power imbalances and barriers to the participation of people from marginalized groups.

Consortium members and partners will continuously implement mutual capacity strengthening through trainings, learning events and reflection sessions on evaluation outcomes to improve the programme team's capacity for gender-responsive and do-no-harm measurement approaches. Oversight from a team of external academic expert volunteers (coordinated by the PMU MEL officer) will help ensure an adequate level of academic rigor in our work.

8.2.5 PRIMARY MEL DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGIES

Outcome harvesting: the consortium will use outcome harvesting (OH) bi-annually. OH is ideal for monitoring progress in influencing programmes that use policy processes and practices as an entry point to achieve systemic change. OH also lends itself to a feminist approach to MEL as it is participatory, does not work from pre-determined outcomes and stresses the identification of changes that are both positive and negative, intended and unintended. Through twice-yearly 'write-shops' in each programme country, consortium and partner MEL staff will collect outcomes and work through a participatory process to analyse how programme interventions contributed to them. We will validate OH results by triangulating findings against other available information. OH is currently used by three consortium partners: PACJA, FEMNET and Oxfam Novib, which has worked extensively with OH over the past six years, especially in the Strategic Partnership 'Towards a Worldwide Influencing Network' between 2015 and 2020.

Capacity strengthening assessment tool (CATool): a self-assessment survey designed by Oxfam Novib, CATool measures changes in capacities among partners and other organizations; the effectiveness and sustainability of capacity strengthening; and its contribution to alliance building, protecting and expanding civic space, and policy results. CATool is most suitable for measuring changes in capacities retrospectively, i.e. asking participants to indicate their level of capacity at the beginning of the programme and at the moment of the measurement. The survey will be used in the mid-term and final evaluations to capture data about the demographics of those in leadership positions within organizations (O1.2) and capacities to develop and spread narratives (O2.1).

8.2.6 COMPLEMENTARY MEL DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGIES

Stories of change (aka impact stories): a qualitative methodology used to document the effects of interventions on people and organizations and understand how change came about. Oxfam Novib uses this methodology, and PACJA and FEMNET use similar approaches. Stories of change provide an in-depth look at how stakeholders interpret the changes they have experienced through the programme. Subjects are determined by monitoring of intermediary outcome indicators and results of the mid-term evaluation. Sampling criteria could include stories with learning potential, including innovative approaches, best practices and unexpected results.

Digital media monitoring and analysis: careful tracking and analysis of social media activity in programme countries will help measure the spread of African climate justice narratives (Pathway 2). Using publicly available data, it is possible to track the spread of messages across Twitter or the relative volume of Google searches for a particular

phrase over time in a country or major city. Oxfam Novib already monitors trends and sentiments expressed in social media about its brand and campaigns. PACJA works with young digital activists who design and run online awareness campaigns and could also be engaged to work together on social media analysis.

Legal case tracking forms: NJ developed and use digital legal case tracking forms which facilitate the rapid assessment of human rights violations and their consequences, and track the steps taken towards a remedy. The form can be filled in by a paralegal or trained MEL staff on a tablet or other device during a visit to or communication with a community reporting a human rights violation. Legal case tracking is an effective tool for monitoring ToC Pathway 3 outcome indicator O3.1.

8.2.7 BASELINE, MID-TERM REVIEW AND FINAL EVALUATION

Baseline: Context analyses completed by consortium staff in programme countries will form the core of the baseline study, complemented by an initial assessment of capacity strengthening needs for implementing partners and organizations the programme will support. A participatory 'narrative scan' exercise will identify the dominant narratives in each programme country about climate justice and activism, the 'messengers' that propagate these narratives and the channels they use to do so.

Mid-term review and final evaluation: In the third and fifth year of the programme period respectively, an externally conducted mid-term review and final evaluation will check on the programme's progress and ensure an academic level of rigour and quality in the evaluation and the MEL system overall. The mid-term review will build on internally conducted OH and CATool results to evaluate the programme's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and coherence, and make recommendations for how the programme can adapt in its final years for maximum impact. It will also validate the programme's monitoring and learning activities, especially OH, so the MEL system can also adapt and improve. The final evaluation will rigorously evaluate and measure the programme's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, coherence and sustainability. Evaluations and reflection sessions will be inclusive, participatory and responsive to the expectations of the programme's target groups: women, youth and indigenous communities.

8.3 LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

8.3.1 LEARNING AGENDA AND APPROACH

Learning between partners and from everything we do in the AACJ programme will generate the knowledge needed for adaptive programming. We will also incorporate learning and knowledge from outside the consortium, notably from African academia and knowledge partners and the people, communities and organizations the consortium will work with. We will make our learning activities as inclusive as possible and ensure that knowledge developed by AACJ is accessible online and useful for social movements, youth and women's groups and other stakeholders.

Joint reflection and analysis of monitoring indicators, evaluation results and consortium partners' and implementing partners' learning from other programmes will all contribute to the knowledge the programme generates and compiles, which in turn will become an input into the programme's decision-making. Mutual capacity strengthening of people and organizations is based on analyses of knowledge and capacity gaps, and linking and learning through on- and offline learning platforms is key to the programme.

A joint consortium learning agenda will provide the framework to design and roll out learning activities, knowledge products and evaluations. This will help ensure that lessons learned are systematically captured, documented in accessible learning products, and shared among the consortium members, partner organizations and key stakeholders, including participants in programme activities and communities the consortium members and partners work with. The learning agenda will be a living document, continuously revisited and updated through reflections and exchanges, integrating new findings and knowledge, and iterative adaptation of strategies, programme design and/or implementation.

8.3.2 KEY LEARNING QUESTIONS

The learning agenda will be structured through the preliminary questions below, based on consultation with colleagues in programme countries about their learning priorities and input from consortium partners. They focus on assumptions underlying the programme ToC, changes in the context in programme countries, and how to structure equitable and effective partnerships among consortium members and between consortium members and local partner organizations. This will allow continuous learning and reflection on how we work together as partners, organize ourselves and structure our work.

- What are our wins on climate-just policies that are being prepared, adopted or implemented in programme countries? What approaches have worked to achieve climate-just policy changes with governments and private sector actors? Through exploring these questions, we will learn about how we can contribute to achieving the programme's medium-term impacts, especially Impact 2 on policy change.
- How can consortium members partner most effectively, legitimately and equitably with groups that have high stakes in climate justice activism? What works best across the consortium in engaging groups comprising or representing women, young people, indigenous communities and other excluded groups? These questions test assumption 1 of the ToC about the willingness of such groups to engage with the consortium.
- How can we work with existing digital tools to meaningfully and equitably engage people, communities and organizations in virtual exchanges of knowledge and learning? Exploring this question in a small-scale innovation trajectory in Year 1 will provide us with new approaches for digital communication and collaboration tools. This questions is specifically relevant for pathway 4 (documenting local knowledge and community-based innovations)
- How can communities' adaptive capacities be harnessed to advocate for policy shifts? How can we ensure sustainability in the communities' adaptive capacities? How can best practices be used to create ripple effect in communities not directly benefiting from the project? What systems and structures can CSOs adapt to support monitoring and follow-ups after the project has ended? These questions will test assumptions underlying Pathway 4 of the program ToC, and guide the consortium's learning on how to most effectively work with communities to strengthen their adaptive capacities.
- What are emerging best practices for developing and spreading narratives that have an impact on policymakers and policy outcomes? Who are the most effective messengers and what are the most effective channels in programme countries? By exploring these questions with partners, external experts and practitioners, we will test assumption 2: that African narratives are best placed to influence African decision makers.
- What is the role of international public opinion in influencing public and private sector action on the climate crisis in programme countries? How can public and non-public pressure best complement each other to achieve results? These questions are key to

understanding how our work at global and regional levels and in the Netherlands can support our work in the eight programme countries.

- Under what conditions can strategic litigation support communities and help to open up civic space? When might litigation risk closing civic space or reprisals from authorities, private sector or other actors, and how can this risk be mitigated? These questions test assumption 3 of the ToC, on strategic litigation strengthening communities' rights.

8.3.3 LEARNING EXCHANGES

The learning agenda will be brought to life through day-to-day collaboration and annual programme-wide learning exchanges, at which consortium staff, partners and other stakeholders (specifically representatives of local communities) will reflect on progress, the evolution of indicators in the results framework, emerging lessons and what they mean for programme implementation.

These events will also take stock of the joint consortium learning agenda and country-specific learning agendas, share and discuss new knowledge and learning that helps answer the key learning questions, and revisit and revise the questions themselves, if necessary. They will not be limited to staff involved in MEL and research: we will encourage participation from a wide range of consortium member and partner staff who involved in the programme from different angles, as well as other stakeholders including external knowledge partners and colleagues working on similar programmes or from other consortia supported by the MoFA PVP framework. By gathering different stakeholders, learning exchanges will provide opportunities to swap lessons and learning, exchange best practices and reflect on what does and does not work.

The exchanges will be scheduled shortly before the annual review meetings, which will involve members of the Programme Governance Group, Programme Advisory Committee and Designated National Platforms. This will allow for emerging knowledge and learning to be taken into account in strategic decisions about programme implementation. While the exchanges will initially be at least partly online, we aim for in-person sessions when the pandemic situation allows, in part to make them more accessible to members of targeted populations and excluded groups.

We will document what we are learning in innovative and accessible knowledge products, for diffusion within the consortium and with other organizations engaged in similar change processes and stakeholders including the communities, people and organizations that AACJ works with. Knowledge products may include infographics, factsheets, blog posts, radio spots, articles and podcasts, among others.

8.3.4 LEARNING FROM EXPERIMENTATION AND INNOVATION

The AACJ programme will put new interventions into practice to learn what works and what does not. One area where innovative approaches are needed from the start of the programme is how we connect and collaborate effectively on digital platforms, especially with implementing partners and stakeholders including women, youth and people living in communities where the programme is active (learning question 3).

Many digital tools are used regularly within the consortium and by many of the people we seek to engage with. However, they all require a level of internet connectivity, technology access and digital literacy that not all key stakeholders may have, which could limit their opportunities to participate. As part of the learning agenda, we will run a short innovation

trajectory modelled on the ‘design sprint’²⁴² methodology in one programme country in Year 1 to prototype and test ways to use existing digital tools across the ‘digital divide’ in programme events and learning exchanges. The solution will likely be a combination of digital technology and tools alongside skilled facilitation techniques and translation, to facilitate a direct link of communication, learning and knowledge exchange between consortium members and people, communities and organizations the programme will work with. If successful, we will actively scale this innovation throughout the programme.

8.3.5 ADAPTIVE PROGRAMMING

The AACJ consortium proposes targeted outcomes for the five years of the programme, based on the ToC’s pathways and assumptions. We propose an adaptive management approach based on annual review of progress, changes in context and budget. Results of these reviews, and the changes they lead to, will be referenced in the adjusted plans. We will give careful attention to the influence of conflict, instability and events such as elections on planning, as well as the development of the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the uncertain nature of adaptive programming, the AACJ programme will maintain close collaboration and communication with MoFA, Dutch Embassies in programme countries and other partnerships supported under the PVP framework during implementation.

8.3.6 DATA AND TECHNOLOGY

Working in partnership with networks of women, youth and climate justice organizations, each with a highly diverse membership, will allow the programme to disseminate learning and exchange knowledge and innovative approaches with these networks’ members and members’ members. A mix of new technologies such as social media and time-tested platforms such as community radio will allow us to share learning and knowledge at scale with different audiences. Digital platforms for communication and exchange will also be used extensively for meetings and events – especially in Year 1, as the pandemic continues to limit opportunities for travel, but also to reduce our carbon footprint.

Data and technology are at the core of our MEL methodologies. CATool surveys can be administered and responded to online, through a system that also enables immediate tabulation of results. OH write-shops can be conducted online, with digital communication and collaboration tools used for participatory analysis. Interviews for stories of change can be conducted by video or voice call. NJ’s case tracking form is fully digitized.

The consortium will take steps to mitigate the risks of misuse of data and technology through data protection and online safety and safeguarding. Our MEL system will fully comply with the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulations, and respect the rights of those whose data we collect, through rules on informed consent, managing and sharing data, and responsible disposal of data once its purpose has been served.

8.3.7 WAYS OF WORKING, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The programme’s MEL will benefit from the rich and diverse experiences and skills of consortium members, who in turn will benefit – along with implementing partners – from opportunities for exchange and mutual capacity strengthening. MEL and research staff,

²⁴² Knapp, J. (2016). *Sprint (How to Solve Big Problems and Test New Ideas in Just Five Days)* (1st ed.). Simon & Schuster.

coordinated by a Senior MEL Officer in the PMU, will organize and participate in regular activities with colleagues from implementing partners and other programme stakeholders. They will contribute to developing and implementing the programme's learning agenda and knowledge products, analysing data for quarterly reporting in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and compiling data for the annual report. Although the PMU will lead on MEL and knowledge management, thematic lead roles within MEL have been discussed with consortium partners. These will entail monitoring the big picture on the theme, acting as a go-to resource for sharing experiences and tools, mapping partners' expertise and resources, and setting up opportunities for exchange and mutual capacity strengthening. The roles and responsibilities are as follows:

- **PACJA** will have overall responsibility for MEL and knowledge management, as lead applicant in the consortium. It has extensive experience with MEL methods and tools in advocacy projects including OH and monitoring social and print media and activities.
- **FEMNET** will have lead responsibility in the consortium for knowledge management and learning. FEMNET has experience applying feminist MEL in Anglophone and Francophone countries, and disseminating findings through monthly e-bulletins, fact sheets, policy briefs, digital media and the *African Women's Journal*, which it publishes.
- **NJ** brings a unique perspective from its work on human rights and environmental law. Its MEL approaches are community-centric, legally grounded, participatory, inclusive and gender responsive, including its digital case tracking form for monitoring human rights violations and how it rallies communities to defend environmental and social rights.
- **Oxfam Novib** will lead on capacity strengthening for MEL and knowledge management, drawing on its broad expertise on MEL, impact measurement, knowledge and innovation from a wide variety of programmes and extensive experience working to strengthen the capacities of partners to use MEL systems and methodologies.

We consider the people, communities and organizations we work with as key stakeholders of the AACJ programme. We will ensure that learning exchanges, reflections on evaluations and results of our MEL work - including learning products - are available to them and encourage their participation in learning and evaluations. This may require translations in local languages, audio (instead of written) content and feedback sessions during field visits. We will also ensure safe feedback mechanisms for participants in MEL activities as part of our approach to social accountability.

8.4 MEL WORK DURING COVID-19

The AACJ MEL system will apply best practices on the use of digital tools for data collection, communication and collaboration, to cope with the limitations on international travel and in-person gatherings during the pandemic and to limit the negative impacts of travel on the environment. While some travel for face-to-face meetings and events will be needed once feasible, we will limit ourselves to truly essential travel for MEL and knowledge activities and make the best use possible of socially distanced and digital data collection methods, including virtual interviews and web-based surveys. Learning exchange events can be virtual or blended, mixing online and in-person to comply with social distancing rules while addressing gaps in access to and knowledge about technology and connectivity and finding ways to include those who might otherwise be excluded. In all cases, we will ensure that MEL and learning activities are fully compliant with national and local COVID-19 protocols for as long as remains necessary.

9 RISK MANAGEMENT

In line with the requirements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the AACJ consortium's risk management strategy consists of a **description of the risk monitoring system** (section 9.1) and an **analysis of the most important risks** (section 9.2).

9.1 OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR RISK MONITORING IN THE AACJ CONSORTIUM

The **risk monitoring system consists** of an overall **framework for risk monitoring at consortium level**. Within this framework, individual consortium members are responsible for using their own risk **management frameworks and tools**.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

- Each consortium member will be responsible for monitoring and managing the risks it incurs in implementing the activities it is responsible for, including those incurred by implementing partners with which it has a contractual relationship. Each member will regularly update the others through the Country Lead at national level and Programme Management Unit (PMU) at supra-national level, as per agreed reporting schedules.
- National-level risk registers will be maintained by the Country Lead. The PMU will maintain a global consolidated risk register, containing all national and supra-national level risks, housed by PACJA as the lead applicant.
- The Country Leads and PMU will regularly update the risk registers based on the reports they receive from the consortium members (for the Country Leads) and from the consortium members and the Country Leads (for the PMU).²⁴³ They will do this at least once per year, ahead of drafting the plan for the following year.
- National Steering Committees²⁴⁴ are responsible for overseeing risk management at national level and advising the Country Leads on solutions and mitigation measures when risk materialize. The Programme Governance Group (PGG)²⁴⁵ is responsible for overseeing risk management at the global level and advising the PMU on solutions and mitigation measures when risks materialize.

WAYS OF WORKING

- Each consortium member will submit updates on national-level risks to the Country Lead, on a schedule to be proposed by the Country Lead and agreed by the members, but at least once per year. The Country Lead will consolidate the risks and submit the consolidated risk register to the National Steering Committee and the PMU at least once a year. At the global level, each member will submit updates on supra-national risks to the PMU, on a schedule to be proposed by the PMU and agreed by the members, but at least once per year. The PMU will consolidate national and supra-national risks and submit the consolidated risk register to the PGG at least once a year.
- The individual reports of consortium members and the consolidated reports will contain, for each risk, an update on its potential impact and likelihood, and on envisaged and implemented mitigation measures. The reports will also mention new risks that have emerged. The National Steering Committees and PGG will approve the yearly

²⁴³ See Chapter 10 for composition, roles and responsibilities.

²⁴⁴ See Chapter 10 for composition, roles and responsibilities.

²⁴⁵ See Chapter 10 for composition, roles and responsibilities.

consolidated reports at national and global level respectively, and give a steer on additional mitigation measures at national and overall programme level if necessary.

- At national level, consortium members can discuss risks and mitigation measures with each other, implementing partners and other stakeholders through the National Steering Committees. At global level, this discussion can take place in the PGG. This does not relieve the consortium members from their individual reporting responsibility.
- If a risk materializes that affects a consortium member's implementation in country, they will take the necessary measures and report on them in their regular reporting to the Country Lead for national-level risks and to the PMU for supra-national level risks.
- When national-level risks materialize that affect the national-level consortium, the consortium member instantly informs the Country Lead, who immediately convenes the National Steering Committee to assess the risk and discuss necessary measures. When supra-national risks materialize that affect the global consortium, the consortium member instantly informs the PMU, which immediately convenes the PGG to assess the risk and discuss necessary measures.

ADAPTING

- Based on the reports and updated risk register, the Country Leads and PMU may propose adjustments to the national or global programmes as a whole; specific strategies, approaches and interventions; and/or the management and governance structure, or any other necessary adjustments considering the mitigation measures defined in the register. They will consider the consequences for the consortium in meeting obligations to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others. Proposals will be submitted to the National Steering Committee or PGG for approval. For significant adaptations, the Ministry will be duly consulted, as per standing agreements.

ACCOUNTING TO THE DUTCH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

- In line with the guidance provided by the Ministry, the PMU hosted by PACJA will report to the Ministry on risk management through its annual reports. These reports will reflect on contextual, programmatic and organizational risks (including those related to SEAH) identified in the global risk register: did risks materialize; have mitigation measures proven effective; have risks affected implementation; were new risks identified.
- In case a risk manifests that is so critical and urgent it cannot wait until the annual report, the PMU will inform and consult the Ministry immediately.

IMPORTANT RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS OF CONSORTIUM MEMBERS

The individual consortium members will use their own **risk management frameworks and tools**, which are described in detail in Annex 3. The most relevant common tools include:

- Keeping a risk register and regularly reviewing the risks and mitigation measures in it.
- Developing and maintaining policies and practices on e.g. procurement, financial management, anti-fraud, anti-corruption, integrity and SEAH.
- Vetting of partners through pre-assessments, and monitoring risks progressively at agreed intervals through meetings, reporting and spot checks.

9.2 RISK ANALYSIS

This risk analysis presents the most important risks at regional and global (consortium) level, and per country. These were identified by the in-country consortium teams and the regional and global consortium team, mostly in the concept note stage. The global team suggested additional risks based on recently tested risk analyses submitted to the Ministry. The teams adapted risks to their contexts and added context-specific risks and mitigation measures. Regional and country-level risks can be found in Annex 4.

10 GOVERNANCE

The four consortium members PACJA, FEMNET, Oxfam Novib, Natural Justice and the key implementing partner African Youth Commission have come together to design and implement the AACJ programme, sharing a joint climate justice vision that it is hugely unjust that people that have least contributed to the changing climate are most impacted.

The AACJ consortium signed the **AACJ Partnership Agreement** which explains the objective of collaboration, the guiding principles and mutual rights and responsibilities, which was annexed to the concept note submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Annex 5). This agreement has been adjusted (see Annex 6; Addendum AACJ partnership Agreement). With AYC a separate partnership contract will be signed at the start of the implementation of the programme. Rules for how to change the partnership are included. To meet the requirements of the Grant Decision, the consortium members agreed on the division of a lead applicant (PACJA) in submitting the proposal and being the grant recipient, and as such accountable to the Ministry regarding programme implementation; and co-applicants (FEMNET, Oxfam Novib and Natural Justice) as part of the proposal submission and implementation; and key implementing partner AYC to be fully involved in the latter, including governance structures.

In this section we provide the required information on how members of the AACJ programme keep each other informed about its progress, the role of each consortium members and key implementing partner in monitoring, evaluation and steering of the activities within the programme framework. We provide a general description of the vision, principles, roles, and main responsibilities of respective organs of governance & management at the global, regional, and national level, followed by an indicative organogram (governance structure) of the programme.

The AACJ Programme will be managed by PACJA Continental Secretariat, based in Nairobi, Kenya, who will host the Programme Management Unit (PMU) and will be overseen by an overall Programme Governance Group (PGG) consisting of the Consortium members PACJA, Natural Justice (NJ), FEMNET and Oxfam Novib, and the key implementing partner AYC.

Our partnership vision is expressed by our programme proposal, which has taken the key values of our notion of climate justice into our ways of working as a consortium and into our relationship with partners and local communities. They need to be the expression of our 'walking the talk', and thus should be (a) fair & equitable, carving our roles & responsibilities, transparent and mutually accountable; (b) ecologically justice following ecological principles to minimize the impact of our operations; (c) socially inclusive and gender responsive, ensuring meaningful participation at all levels, facilitating the voices of those most affected by climate change.

The consortium and implementing partners in this program have also agreed on 7 key program principles: complementarity of actors; co creation local-regional/continental-global; co responsibility (clarity); effective coordination & simplification of rules; flexibility; conflict resolution mechanisms, and integrity. Between Consortium members it is agreed that all activities in this programme will be guided by a clear set of partnership principles, applicable to all organizations in the programme. These principles have been taken to set-up the following structures for governance.


PROGRAMME GOVERNANCE GROUP

A Programme Governance Group (PGG) will be set-up to provide management guidance and oversight of the entire programme progress, and to hold the Programme Management Unit (PMU) and all Programme stakeholders to account (Consortium members and their sub-contracts, country-level coordination, partners). It consists of the directors of the consortium, key implementing partners AYC and a chosen representative (vice-chair) of the Program Advisory Committee (PAC, see below). The PGG assesses and approves annual plans, reports, and budgets, to ensure the Programme delivers according to plan and meets the quality standards set by the Consortium and the back donor, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). It will ensure synergy & collective action, risk management and compliance with the contract signed with MoFA.

The PGG is not involved in programme and contract management, which is hosted in the Programme Management Unit (PMU). It is acknowledged that PACJA, as Lead Applicant, will chair the PGG and has specific obligations, responsibilities, and tasks to meet the requirements of the grant obligation for the entire consortium.

PROGRAMME ADVISORY COMMITTEE (PAC)

A Program Advisory Committee (PAC) will be established, to be representing and giving a voice to the key stakeholders, vital to the success of this program. The PAC is to provide strategic advice to the PGG and the PMU and will consist of programme partners, representatives of national designated platforms/national steering committees, strategic allies, rightsholders, and knowledge centres.



We aim to have gender parity in its membership and at least 3 members are younger than 35 years. The PAC will act as platform for programme stakeholders to share information on global climate justice trends, new approaches to activism, (digital) campaigning, give advice on the strategic direction of the programme and promote collective learning from research, experiences, the different pathways of the programme.

The PAC will be prepared and chaired by the AACJ Programme Manager and meets at least every 6 months. A vice-chair will be elected from its members. We will set up a final design in consultation with our stakeholders.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT UNIT (PMU)

Hosted and Managed by PACJA Continental Secretariat in Nairobi, the role of the Programme Management Unit (PMU) is day-to-day management of the Programme, ensuring successful delivery of the targets, and to keep information flowing between PMU, Programme Governance Group, Country Leads, PAC, country-level structures, consortium members and implementing partners as far as is needed to ensure they can take up their roles and responsibilities. The PMU will be accountable to the PGG and will be headed by the Programme Manager. It consists of a program & contract manager, senior finance officer, administration officer, communications, MEL officer and senior lobbyist.

The PMU will ensure the timely delivery of the overall narrative and financial reports, and will organise annual review meetings following on a full year of implementation to further discuss progress, lessons learned and any need for adjusting the programme activities to ensure the program targets are being met. Both the PGG and the PAC as well as representatives of the Designated National Platforms (see below); communities, local movements, and partners (3 per country of implementation) are part of the annual review meetings.

As Lead Applicant, PACJA is to provide leadership and overall program management to ensure optimal consistency and coherence between the global, continental and in country-level implementation of activities. For efficient and effective delivery of activities at global level, capacity building and technical assistance at country level, a pool of technical advisors from the consortium members, both sitting at global level and roving across regions, will be made available.

Programme Leads have been identified on capacity-building, regional & global advocacy, and the Climate Justice Facility for Africa, to coordinate these lines of work across the consortium, convene expert groups from the Consortium members, ensure common approaches, tools, quality standards. They report to the PMU.

COLLABORATION, LEARNING & INNOVATION

The partnership agreement lays down the possibility to adapt the consortium. However for an effective collaboration in the partnership, the following aspects of learning and innovation are key in deciding how to adapt the consortium.

- Each stage of the Programme Cycle will include **principles of co-operation, collective decision making, inclusive accountability and (community) consultation**. We will undertake partner and local stakeholder consultations before formulating (annual) plans and strategies.
- **Effective and adaptive programming** through continuously updating our analyses, re-examine our assumptions, monitor and analyse the progress we make in the partnership.
- **Problem Driven** Iterative Adaptation facilitates the generation of local solutions for local problems, for instance through social labs. (Local) Partners, communities and organizations/networks/movements will learn together and from each other through different kinds of exchanges and online platforms.
- **Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL)** practice will support more transformational partnerships. The MEL practice will include regular partnership monitoring through reviewing processes of engagement, assessing the quality of partnership relationships, reflecting on the mutual added value of partnerships, identifying (un)expected benefits arising from collaboration and, partnership challenges. Feedback will be addressed in a transparent way through regular formal meetings.
- **Partnership Reviews**. Our learning agenda, aligned with the planned outcomes and Theory of Change assumptions, will be developed to check whether we do the right thing and the things right. We will coordinate learning activities for the programme, systematically share and capture the emerging learning among the consortium, local partners, communities, and organizations/networks/movements and (internal and external) stakeholders. Different monitoring tools, like outcome harvesting, will regularly inform us about progress, process, changes in the contexts of the programme and ensure timely adaptation when needed.
- **Brokering the capacity of consortium partner staff**; transformational partnering processes/approaches use dedicated financial resources, staff time and, (new) technical partnership brokering competencies. Investing in this transformation will also

include colleagues from finance, business development, programme staff and administration.


- **Investments and innovation in new forms of partnership and learning.** This includes experimenting with new accountability, control and reporting mechanisms and new kinds of partnerships. New forms of partnership, e.g. with Indigenous Peoples will use flexible funding and support for social movements and other forms of informal community representation, especially in contexts with fragile civic space or dynamic social mobilizations. Learning will go bottom-up and from higher levels down.

COUNTRY LEVEL COORDINATION

Coordinating the country-level implementation of the programme is the responsibility of the consortium member that assumes the lead role in the respective country. To effectively assume this responsibility, the respective Consortium members will appoint/elect/recruit a Programme Country Lead (CL) in countries in which they will be leading. A detailed Terms of Reference for the CL position will be further elaborated per country during the start-up of the AACJ-program. Overall, the CL will act as coordinator for the Consortium members at the country-level. The Country Lead is accountable to the in-country lead consortium member. The Country Lead will also report to the NSC and to the Programme Manager of the PMU, on behalf of the in-country lead consortium member. This lead consortium member will be accountable to the National Steering Committee, which will provide guidance to the lead consortium member. The Country Lead will oversee coordination of the National Designated Platforms (NDPs) and will chair and work with the National Steering Committee (NSC). Her/his main deliverables are the joint national action plans, budget and related progress, and financial reporting.

NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE (NSC)

The NSC will provide management guidance, advise, and oversight of all programme activities in a specific country implemented by the consortium members and their implementing partners.



The NSC will hold the Program Country lead, country focal points of Consortium members, AYC and national programme implementers to account. The NSC will work with the Program Country Lead to prepare country annual plans, budgets, and reports to ensure they align to the pathways, seek synergy and meet quality standards set by AACJ Consortium Partners, the PMU, and MoFA as back donor.

The NSC consists of the CL as chair, representatives of the consortium members (can be national member/ implementing partner), AYC and a representative of the DNP. The NSC's constitution will respect the diversity of the DNP and its members, in terms of regions and sectors/ themes defined by the individual countries' socio-economic, political, and regional landscape. It will be respecting bottom-up, people-centred, and inclusive policy advocacy-making processes, building on the principles of climate justice.

DESIGNATED NATIONAL PLATFORMS (DNPS)

The National Programme Steering Committee (NSC) will be bringing together their national partners to establish a Designated National Platform with representatives to be elected/appointed from critical groups. The DNP can cover actions related to the pathways of the AACJ-program, reflect on the key thematic pillars of UNFCCC such as adaptation, mitigation, climate finance and capacity building. The DNP will ensure representation from the most marginalised groups, have youth representatives, and aims for gender parity and female leadership. The role of the DNPs includes to promote and support the AACJ programme objectives and activities in their country; share information, seek collaboration between actors, seek alliances to foster climate justice at national level. It will promote engagement of civil society actors, grassroots movements in national conversations on climate justice, SDG processes, and facilitate linkages to key national (NDC) and international processes, engage policy makers and other stakeholders to be key champions for the AACJ objectives, particularly the important subject of intergenerational equity and elevate sectoral concerns in the DNPs, and into national/regional debates.

The ACCJ-consortium holds specific importance in the ideas and voice of young people and local grassroots communities in countries, so there will be deliberate efforts to integrate their concerns, and representation within the structure of the DNPs. These representatives can be shaped to be Young Climate Justice Activists (YCJAs) and Community Climate Justice Activists/Volunteers (CCJAs) being the key pillars of the PACJA programme in all 8 programme countries. They will also include Youth Movements supported by the other AACJ Consortium members and specifically the AYC partners. Next to strong youth agency, we will ensure gender parity amongst DNP members, have solid representation of women's and feminist movements (a.o. via FEMNET), and ensure female leadership.

REDUCING CLIMATE IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM

By addressing internal processes, policies and ways of working, the consortium members will collectively move towards sustainable practices that reduce their contribution to carbon emissions, waste and other environmental impacts that occur through fulfilling their organizational and programme objectives. The consortium agrees to conduct this resolution through the following means.

- **Undertake broad environmental assessments.** Each consortium member undertakes a broad assessment of their current activities, processes and practices and calculates a baseline environmental impact of these activities, processes and practices. Each member to also consider the suppliers, contractors, consultants, technology, vehicles, buildings etc. that are used in the process of implementing their organizational activities.
- **Develop strategies and action plans for implementing measures to reduce environmental impacts.** Each organization considers internal strategies and action plans for reducing their impact by considering how they can: Contribute to water conservation; Reduce energy consumption; Reduce waste or pollution; Reduce carbon emissions.
Impacts refer to direct impacts of organizations buildings, transport emissions, resources used for events, impacts caused by use of technology etc. Indirect impacts can refer to the impacts that the suppliers and contractors might have, or the impact of the types of products used. We will: i) Consider a percentage in reduction in impacts; ii) Consider organizational policies on carbon offsetting
- **Assess policies and ways they contribute to environmental impacts.** Each consortium member considers their internal policies and ways that these will need to be

adjusted to meet their environmental and climate action strategy objectives. Key areas of concern: i) Air travel; Procurement and events management; water use; use of plastics; management of waste; office supplies and use of paper; catering, cleaning, maintenance and transportation providers; energy use and ii) The policies of suppliers, contractors and products used.

- **Assess investment and banking portfolios.** Consider divestment (and positive reinvestment) in banks and investment portfolios in line with environmental and social ethics. Organizations may consider banking with more ethical banks and using retirement investments such as Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Funds.
- **Develop a programme to communicate initiatives with staff and educate them on assessing impacts and choosing better.** Ensuring that the staff of the organizations have an understanding of the initiatives that will be undertaken, why they matter and how much of a difference they will make. It will help staff to make better decisions, especially if they are required to assess and calculate impacts. Consortium members may even consider incentivizing or supporting staff to reduce their personal carbon “footprints”, while also understanding that the reduction of personal footprints is not as effective as system-wide changes.



Climate strike in Amsterdam in 2019
Photo credit: Arie Kievit/Oxfam Novib

PART 4: ACTIVITY PLAN YEAR 1 & BUDGET

11 ACTIVITY PLANS YEAR 1

This chapter summarizes the activity planning for 2021, to complement the budget provided with this proposal. It lays out the **targets for outputs** tied to activities in each of the five pathways of the programme ToC, to be achieved in the first calendar year of implementation (consisting of eight months, from May to December). This is also the foundation of the monitoring and evaluation framework for tracking outputs.

Planning for 2021 was conducted in a participatory way with consortium partners at global, regional and country level. As described in chapter eight (Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning), we developed output and outcome indicators working from the ToC and draft activity plans submitted by consortium partners in all programme countries and at the regional/global levels. After mapping activities to intervention strategies and output indicators, we set targets for Year 1 with all consortium partners. Table 11.2 (on the coming pages) presents these targets aggregated at country and regional/global levels, and links output indicators and targets to the most closely related ToC pathway. Outputs presented under one pathway may also support realization of other pathways.

Country teams and colleagues working at the regional/global level were asked to set targets only for output indicators their programmes would target. These are for the first calendar year of implementation only, and in some cases a low number may reflect plans for a phased approach: for example, relatively fewer strategic litigations are foreseen in Year 1, as the consortium is initially prioritizing other activities that could make strategic litigations launched later in the programme more likely to succeed.

Year 1 activities planned at the country and regional/global levels tied to targets for outputs, are presented in Table 11.1 below:

Table 11.1: Year 1 activities

CATEGORY	ACTIVITY
CAPACITY STRENGTHENING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall mapping of capacity strengthening needs and development of specific trajectories • Further training on conflict sensitivity and updating analyses • Developing capacity trajectory on SEAH and integrity • IATI reporting training
MEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MEL inception workshop • MEL methods trainings • Baseline • Annual learning exchange
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inception workshop • Setting up the PMU • Annual programme and financial reporting • Audit preparations • Update risk management

Table 11.2: Output plan Year 1

OUTPUT PLAN (YEAR 1)		Burkina Faso	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mozambique	Nigeria	Senegal	Somalia	South Africa	Netherlands	Global/Regional
RESULT	OUTPUT INDICATORS										
IMPACT OUTCOME 1 Strong, inclusive climate movements in Africa	# of efforts to strengthen the capacity of partner organizations to act, operate and connect	5	17	15	7	13	26	7	8	NA	12
	# of small grants disbursed	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	12
	# of events organized to make people aware of climate justice issues	3	19	12	10	11	13	5	9	NA	6
	# of public influencing campaigns implemented	1	2	7	3	3	6	0	4	NA	7
IMPACT OUTCOME 2 African climate justice narratives developed and spread	# of efforts to strengthen the capacity of partner organizations to develop and spread narratives	7	19	10	9	2	2	1	5	NA	4
	# of media efforts undertaken	2	10	8	8	7	12	1	3	2	10
IMPACT OUTCOME 3	# of strategic litigation cases undertaken	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	NA	2
	# of initiatives launched to protect environmental and human rights defenders	1	3	2	0	5	1	1	1	NA	1

Strengthened human rights frameworks	# of trainings and events held to engage and strengthen capacities of communities	0	7	8	8	4	10	4	3	NA	NA
	# of trainings and events held to engage and strengthen capacities of local partners and consortium partners	2	3	6	6	6	2	5	5	NA	3
IMPACT OUTCOME 4 Communities' adaptive capacities strengthened	# of community-based innovations that have been scoped, documented and shared.	1	4	5	5	3	5	NA	4	NA	3
	# of trainings and events held to engage and strengthen capacities of communities	1	5	9	4	2	7	NA	6	NA	NA
	# of trainings and events held to engage and strengthen capacities of local partners and consortium partners	1	3	7	5	13	1	NA	4	NA	1
	# of pieces of evidence from research or lessons learned (reports, mappings, documents, studies, videos, testimonies etc.)	1	2	5	5	2	3	NA	4	NA	7

IMPACT OUTCOME 5 POLITICAL WILL TO SUPPORT CLIMATE JUST POLICIES	# of cases in which AACJ consortium members support joint agendas of movements and alliances	4	4	9	3	13	8	1	6	1	7
	# of lobby and advocacy initiatives to influence climate justice policies and practices	3	7	9	4	4	5	3	6	1	9
	# of pieces of evidence from research or lessons learned (reports, mappings, documents, studies, videos, testimonies etc.)	7	4	6	4	6	1	2	5	1	8

12 BUDGET

12.1 BUDGETING BASED ON THEORY OF CHANGE AND ACTIVITIES

The AACJ programme built this budget based on the ToC as elaborated in the narrative part of the proposal, using multiple years' outcomes as part of the pathways, the annual activity plan for 2021, MEL and knowledge management, and activities linked to quality assurance on SEAH.

Budget information was gathered in a 'bottom up' process: local partners developed plans with consortium members, alongside the development of the international and overall management budget, ensuring the budget is based on activities.

The budget presented here follows MoFA's budget guidelines by presenting a budget per year, a budget per result area, a budget per country (divided per cost category and per result area) and a budget per consortium member.

More detailed budgets are presented in Annex 7.

12.2 BUDGET OVERVIEW

In the letter of 19 October 2020 on the decision regarding the budget for AACJ, MoFA communicated a maximum grant amount of EUR 43,373,934.15. In line with the 'budget guideline for subsidy frameworks' provided by MoFA, EUR 40,125,424 is budgeted for direct project costs as further detailed in sections 12.2.1 and 12.2.2 below, and EUR 3,248,508 for indirect cost recovery, as further detailed in section 12.2.3 below.

12.2.1 DIRECT STAFF COSTS

When consolidating the individual budgets, direct staff costs have been assigned to separate budget categories as follows:

- The line 'Staff costs' contains all costs for staff working on coordination at the multi-country level (e.g. staff responsible for delivery of multi-country work on capacity strengthening or influencing);
- The line 'Local staff costs' contains the costs of staff of consortium members at the national level to implement the national plans in each country. Please note that staff from local partners are budgeted under the line 'Activity costs' (see 12.2.2 below);
- The line 'Consultants and advisors' shows all costs for external consultants and advisors hired to bring in external expertise and skills needed to deliver activities at the multi-country level.

12.2.2 OTHER DIRECT PROGRAMME COSTS

- The line 'Activity costs' contains all activity costs made by consortium members at national, regional and international level and all costs made by local partners that are taken up in the national plans.
- The line 'Costs of consortium partners and local NGOs' contains the costs for programme management (the PMU housed by PACJA) for the entire consortium, in line with the budgeting guidelines. Budgeting for programme management is based on past experience in terms of the

capacity and activities needed to manage a programme of similar size (e.g. the Strategic Partnership). See the consortium agreement supplements for more details;

- Lines C to E contain all costs by each of the consortium members budgeted under these categories (travel, project office costs and equipment and investment) following the budget guidelines of MoFA;
- The line 'Monitoring, evaluation and auditing' contains all costs related to MEL and auditing.

12.2.3 OVERHEAD/INDIRECT COSTS

The indirect costs are budgeted in section III of the consolidated budget and reflect the calculations made by each consortium member. Oxfam Novib has a coordinated account management agreement with MoFA on the amount of ICR that can be written into the budget (12.45%). PACJA, FEMNET and Natural Justice arrived at a percentage higher than 7%, so they followed the MoFA budget guidelines and used 7% ICR for their budgeting.

12.3 PRESENTATION OF THE CONSOLIDATED BUDGET PER YEAR, RESULT AREA AND COUNTRY

12.3.1 BUDGET PER YEAR

Table 1 below presents the budget per year. The peak of expenditure will be in years 2 to 4 of implementation, with the highest amount in year 2, as fewer activities are planned in the start-up phase in year 1 and the closure phase in year 5. The budget accounts for inflation over the course of five years.

Table 1: Overview per year

	Year 1*	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Total 5 Years
I. Direct staff costs						
A. Staff costs	1.220.874	2.082.720	2.043.499	2.078.696	2.052.106	9.477.894
B. Local staff costs	728.702	1.060.985	1.083.217	1.087.219	978.219	4.938.342
C. Consultants and advisors	320.388	265.597	228.959	198.157	184.348	1.197.449
Subtotal I.	2.269.965	3.409.302	3.355.675	3.364.072	3.214.672	15.613.686
II. Other direct programme costs						
A. Activity costs	3.374.487	3.565.945	3.126.746	2.878.854	2.184.507	15.130.539
B. Costs of consortium partners and local NGOs	703.530	813.076	770.873	778.960	787.348	3.853.786
C. Activity-related travel costs	559.665	350.953	345.578	364.962	318.500	1.939.659
D. Project office costs	227.791	350.007	353.377	349.919	356.205	1.637.299
E. Equipment and investment costs	121.730	70.759	54.791	31.607	13.162	292.049
F. Monitoring, evaluation, and auditing	269.598	345.893	306.537	309.814	426.564	1.658.406
Subtotal II.	5.256.800	5.496.633	4.957.902	4.714.116	4.086.286	24.511.738
Total I+II	7.526.765	8.905.935	8.313.577	8.078.189	7.300.958	40.125.424
III. Overheads/indirect costs (Partners)						
A. Costs of support staff	-	-	-	-	-	-
B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	-	-	-	-	-	-
C. Other not directly allocable costs	603.168	719.559	668.260	651.723	605.799	3.248.508
Subtotal III.	603.168	719.559	668.260	651.723	605.799	3.248.508
Total I-III	8.129.933	9.625.494	8.981.837	8.729.912	7.906.757	43.373.934

*Year 1 consists of 8 months and runs from the 1st of May 2021 until the 31st of December 2021

12.3.2 BUDGET PER RESULT AREA

Table 2 below presents the consolidated budget per result area, which correspond with the ToC pathways.

As explained above, the budgets have been built bottom-up and costs have been allocated per pathway based on the outputs delivered per pathway.

Table 2: Overview per result area

	Result area 1	Result area 2	Result area 3	Result area 4	Result area 5	TOTAL
I. Direct staff costs						
A. Staff costs	2.298.430	2.010.501	1.980.929	1.144.959	2.043.075	9.477.894
B. Local staff costs	896.857	470.171	2.861.458	231.277	478.579	4.938.342
C. Consultants and advisors	348.129	187.204	329.852	202.794	129.470	1.197.450
Subtotal I.	3.543.417	2.667.876	5.172.240	1.579.030	2.651.123	15.613.686
II. Other direct programme costs						
A. Activity costs	5.100.643	2.626.911	3.035.043	2.171.295	2.196.646	15.130.539
B. Costs of consortium partners and local NGOs	1.006.475	659.008	501.790	886.369	800.144	3.853.786
C. Activity-related travel costs	608.191	325.843	218.550	558.071	229.005	1.939.659
D. Project office costs	371.196	334.995	300.317	297.399	333.393	1.637.299
E. Equipment and investment costs	111.537	75.385	55.734	31.883	17.511	292.049
F. Monitoring, evaluation, and auditing	459.363	286.900	189.769	370.710	351.663	1.658.406
Subtotal II.	7.657.405	4.309.041	4.301.203	4.315.727	3.928.362	24.511.738
Total I+II	11.200.822	6.976.917	9.473.442	5.894.757	6.579.485	40.125.424
III. Overheads/indirect costs (Partners)						
A. Costs of support staff	-	-	-	-	-	-
B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	-	-	-	-	-	-
C. Other not directly allocable costs	924.821	637.148	465.736	614.480	606.324	3.248.508
Subtotal III.	924.821	637.148	465.736	614.480	606.324	3.248.508
Total I-III	12.125.643	7.614.066	9.939.178	6.509.237	7.185.809	43.373.934

12.3.3 BUDGET PER COUNTRY

Table 3 below presents the consolidated budget per country split per cost category, and Table 4 below per result area, for costs budgeted for all consortium members.

The column 'Regional/Global' contains the costs budgeted for the regional programmes in Africa. The column 'Climate Justice and Resilience Facility for Africa' contains the costs for the 'Climate Justice and Resilience Facility for Africa' that is designed to support innovative, rapid-response alternatives and 'start-up' initiatives.

The costs for cross cutting components in the programme i.e. capacity strengthening, mutual learning, the flexible funding mechanisms, SEAH, the PMU and the ICR are placed under 'Crosscutting'. The column 'NL' contains the budget for the activities of the Netherlands programme.

Table 3: Overview per country - per cost category

	Burkina Faso	Senegal	Nigeria	Kenya	Ethiopia	Somalia	Mozambique	South Africa	Regional/Global programmes	Climate Justice and Resilience Facility for Africa	Crosscutting	NL	TOTAL
I. Direct staff costs													
A. Staff costs	426.058	155.898	180.458	236.390	426.058	155.898	155.898	1.099.730	1.621.505	318.156	4.399.644	302.203	9.477.894
B. Local staff costs	248.005	924.027	660.598	1.020.744	246.008	654.325	756.928	427.706	-	-	-	-	4.938.342
C. Consultants and advisors	127.630	83.300	131.864	39.470	67.754	51.071	187.429	205.884	93.795	28.573	180.680	-	1.197.449
Subtotal I.	801.692	1.163.225	972.921	1.296.605	739.820	861.294	1.100.255	1.733.319	1.715.300	346.728	4.580.324	302.203	15.613.686
II. Other direct programme costs													
A. Activity costs	1.321.964	1.301.183	1.367.250	1.178.314	1.110.939	1.027.136	1.116.742	805.930	2.332.131	1.847.845	1.546.104	175.000	15.130.539
B. Costs of consortium partners and local NGOs	123.518	45.196	435.626	68.531	123.518	45.196	45.196	40.575	130.579	64.158	2.731.694	-	3.853.786
C. Activity-related travel costs	157.684	107.247	413.886	197.076	132.764	135.443	81.990	194.147	73.974	26.472	418.976	-	1.939.659
D. Project office costs	106.090	136.180	28.612	110.517	71.364	176.860	635.717	45.494	58.104	28.548	239.812	-	1.637.299
E. Equipment and investment costs	20.917	15.178	23.441	20.196	23.595	19.022	22.625	27.445	16.117	7.919	95.595	-	292.049
F. Monitoring, evaluation, and auditing	61.436	124.809	194.738	128.242	29.273	63.211	20.711	85.674	40.385	15.205	894.722	-	1.658.406
Subtotal II.	1.791.610	1.729.794	2.463.554	1.702.876	1.491.453	1.466.868	1.922.981	1.199.264	2.651.289	1.990.147	5.926.903	175.000	24.511.738
Total I-II	2.593.302	2.893.019	3.436.474	2.999.481	2.231.273	2.328.162	3.023.236	2.932.584	4.366.589	2.336.875	10.507.227	477.203	40.125.424
III. Overheads/indirect costs (Partners)													
A. Costs of support staff	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
C. Other not directly allocable costs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.248.508	-	3.248.508
Subtotal III.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.248.508	-	3.248.508
Total I-III	2.593.302	2.893.019	3.436.474	2.999.481	2.231.273	2.328.162	3.023.236	2.932.584	4.366.589	2.336.875	13.755.736	477.203	43.373.934

Table 4: Overview per country - per result area

	Burkina Faso	Senegal	Nigeria	Kenya	Ethiopia	Somalia	Mozambique	South Africa	Regional/Global programmes	Climate Justice and Resilience Facility for Africa	Crosscutting	NL	TOTAL
Result area 1	499.811	754.832	574.626	360.694	565.042	974.664	903.343	591.624	1.295.193	887.707	5.312.403	75.924	12.795.862
Result area 2	497.311	210.226	139.836	360.591	382.197	175.606	352.655	528.643	599.099	434.408	2.614.930	97.921	6.393.422
Result area 3	312.817	951.285	716.136	1.152.649	186.307	468.543	589.320	956.148	630.298	240.865	1.502.260	99.494	7.806.122
Result area 4	436.524	416.100	1.763.848	480.907	685.088	303.536	661.398	327.826	473.841	266.469	1.423.291	101.106	7.339.934
Result area 5	846.839	560.576	242.028	644.640	412.639	405.811	516.521	528.342	1.368.159	507.428	2.902.851	102.759	9.038.593
Total result areas 1-5	2.593.302	2.893.019	3.436.474	2.999.481	2.231.273	2.328.161	3.023.236	2.932.584	4.366.589	2.336.875	13.755.736	477.203	43.373.934

12.3.4 BUDGET PER CONSORTIUM MEMBER

In Table 5 the budget per consortium member is provided.

Table 5: Overview per consortium member*

	PACJA	Oxfam Novib	Natural Justice	FEMNET	African Youth Commission (via PACJA)	TOTAL
I. Direct staff costs						
A. Staff costs	3.002.761	2.573.902	1.573.677	2.077.335	250.220	9.477.894
B. Local staff costs	-	1.175.140	2.836.283	666.119	260.800	4.938.342
C. Consultants and advisors	387.689	177.738	333.277	134.657	164.089	1.197.449
Subtotal I.	3.390.449	3.926.780	4.743.237	2.878.111	675.109	15.613.686
II. Other direct programme costs						
A. Activity costs	6.105.094	3.758.003	2.229.618	2.150.171	887.653	15.130.539
B. Costs of consortium partners and local NGOs	870.525	1.403.835	789.686	607.504	182.236	3.853.786
C. Activity-related travel costs	359.181	699.236	649.149	85.659	146.433	1.939.659
D. Project office costs	387.357	320.297	136.844	656.000	136.800	1.637.299
E. Equipment and investment costs	107.446	14.029	56.527	50.000	64.047	292.049
F. Monitoring, evaluation, and auditing	206.311	750.395	236.765	373.962	90.973	1.658.406
Subtotal II.	8.035.915	6.945.796	4.098.589	3.923.296	1.508.143	24.511.738
Total I+II	11.426.364	10.872.575	8.841.826	6.801.406	2.183.252	40.125.424
III. Overheads/indirect costs (Partners)						
A. Costs of support staff	-	-	-	-	-	-
B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	-	-	-	-	-	-
C. Other not directly allocable costs	799.846	1.353.636	618.928	476.099	-	3.248.508
Subtotal III.	799.846	1.353.636	618.928	476.099	-	3.248.508
Total I-III	12.226.210	12.226.210	9.460.754	7.277.506	2.183.252	43.373.934

*African Youth Commission is not a consortium member, but a Key Implementing Partner and will be engaged through PACJA

12.3.5 LIQUIDITY OVERVIEW

Below the liquidity overview shows the required liquidity for the first year and the first three months of the second year of the programme.

Liquidity overview AACJ

01-05-2021 t/m 30-06-2022

Received	0
Gained interest	0
Planned expenditures/transfers Year 1	8.129.933
Planned expenditures/transfers Q1 of Year 2	2.406.374
Required Cash balance 01-05-2021	10.536.307

HOW MOFA'S FEEDBACK ON THE CONCEPT NOTE HAS BEEN ADDRESSED

TOC CRITERIA	ASSESSMENT CONCEPT NOTE	HOW ADDRESSED IN FULL PROPOSAL
The extent to which there is a clear problem analysis concerning one of the themes, resulting in a single strategic objective	Activist (pamphletistic) problem description and analysis, with a broad scope. The problem is not so much 'analysed', but rather described in the form of statements that illustrate the central problem statement.	Problem statement has been further elaborated in Chapter 2 . The scope has been narrowed: AACJ primarily aims to address deep injustices that are created, maintained and exacerbated by the nexus of climate change, exclusion and inequalities.
	Pathways plus assumptions is in itself a logical analysis/strategy, but with a high degree of tautological reasoning.	The five pathways have been described in more detail. Attention has been paid to how the pathways interact and how they contribute to the objective of the programme (Chapter 4).
	Strategic project objective is relatively generic 'answering current and long-term needs sustainably' and would benefit from more precision.	The strategic objective has been made more specific in Section 4.1 .
	The African context could have come out even more strongly: what is the position of African countries and people in global climate negotiations? What is the influence of Northern countries? Thereby also including the influence on this problem of countries like the NL and Northern companies.	Chapter 3 and Section 7.10 (global/regional plan) reference African governments' shared opinion that developed nations must take responsibility for their historic emissions and contribute the funds and transfer of technologies to developing countries needed to address climate change and transition to more sustainable economies. Section 7.10 (global/ regional plan) presents positions and challenges of African countries in global climate negotiations. Chapter 3 and sections 7.10 and 7.11 also describe increasing pressure on natural resources and the role of Northern companies and consumers therein.
The extent to which the relationship between assumptions, planned interventions and results is logical	Climate justice is put at the centre of the approach, but this is a broad and complex concept, and hence demands further operationalization.	The concept of climate justice has been explained and operationalized in Chapter 3 .
	Change pathways are positively people centred, but thereby seem to provide less attention to working with/targeting companies and other power-holders.	The AACJ consortium primarily aims to influence companies through strong public policies and implementation thereof. However, some interventions are planned (in pathway 3) with the aim to increase corporate accountability (in particular of large scaling companies involved fossil fuels,

and well-reasoned, and the way in which these results contribute to the objective	The alliance aims to influence companies through government L&A.	agriculture), as described in Section 4.3.4 . The consortium also aims to encourage private investment in renewables, mostly through standard setting for development banks (described in Section 7.11).
	How the collective demands of this movement will be formulated, promoted and, eventually, lead to responses by citizens, companies and governments (ref. strategic objective) remains unproblematized/unanalysed and therefore the potential contribution to the ultimate goal (climate justice for Africa) is unclear.	Section 4.2 explains how a strong movement can achieve policy and practice changes (e.g. through empowered communities, better articulation of their needs, challenging status quo/power asymmetries, increasing political will, etc.). Text boxes in Chapter 4 provide examples of how this has worked in the past.
	The part on promoting resilience action (pathway 4) is poorly substantiated. Implementing adaptation practices at community level requires a completely different analysis and expertise. It is not clear why this consortium would include this as a pathway instead of using the large number of initiatives out there that can be drawn from in L&A for climate justice.	The AACJ consortium has decided to adapt pathway 4 to ensure stronger linkages with overall ToC. Pathway 4 now focuses on the scoping and documenting of community-driven strategies, to improve adaptive capacities and resilience of local communities. These strategies/practices/innovations are used to both inform evidence-based advocacy and give power and legitimacy to the climate justice movement. See also Section 4.3.5 .
	Scaling up is presented as an obvious consequence ('successes and failures will be shared for upscaling and fuelling national/regional/global advocacy agendas'), but upscaling is often very hard to achieve. This issue requires further elaboration.	Opportunities for scaling are presented throughout the AACJ programme proposal , and will happen through interventions that (among others): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unite struggles to rally together around climate justice topics; • Connect movements locally, nationally, regionally and globally; • Enforce/encourage implementation of global agreements; • Support evidence-based advocacy, informed by (e.g.) community-driven innovation, progressive climate laws (Kenya). • Encourage mutual learning between the consortium and local partners.
The extent to which there is a clear	The proposal elaborates on building and strengthening a social movement, however the L&A strategy remains	Essential and feasible lobby agendas are presented in Section 4.3.6 .

elaboration on the strategy of lobbying and advocacy.	very broad and more precision would have helped to focus on a number of essential and/or feasible lobby agendas.	
The extent to which these results can be realistically achieved	More precision would have helped to understand the scope of the awareness raising (climate literacy? or governments' willingness? Etc.)	Awareness raising needs and proposed interventions (e.g. to address climate illiteracy and governments' lack of comprehension) have been presented in the problem analysis (Chapter 2), pathways 2 and 5 (Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.6) and the country sections (Chapter 7).
The extent to which the Theory of Change contributes to raising awareness of the rights of the project target groups and to amplifying the voice of these groups so that they can demand their rights	Intermediary outcomes are realistically achievable at least in the way they are formulated, but scope and depth of the interventions are difficult to assess.	Chapter 4 and Annex 2 present interventions/activities, indicating scope and depth.
	Achievement of results is plausible up until the level of intermediate outcomes. There is an unrealistic jump between these and the strategic objective.	A more detailed strategic objective (Chapter 3) has closed the gap between strategic objective and intermediate outcomes.
	No clear thematic results have been provided (what needs to be achieved in terms of climate objectives).	A more detailed and specific strategic objective (Section 4.1), operationalization of the climate justice concept (Section 3.1) and more clarity on lobby agendas and relevant policy areas (Section 4.3.6) has given the proposal more thematic focus and clarity.
	It is as yet unclear what such an exit strategy would look like.	The proposal elaborates in Section 6.4 (sustainability) how we envision continuation of the climate justice movement beyond the lifetime of our programme.
The extent to which the choice of regions, countries or specific areas within these countries follows logically from the problem analysis	Country specifics are detailed, but some more attention regarding international or regional influence could have enhanced the analysis in line with the selection criteria and the ToC's objectives.	Section 1.4 explains why the AACJ consortium selected the proposed eight countries. Attention is paid to international and regional influence of some selected countries. Opportunities to leverage international/regional influence are explored in the country sections (7.2 to 7.9) and the global/regional and Dutch sections (7.10 and 7.11).
The extent to which gender equality and	The alliance could have made it clearer how, apart from directly including marginalized groups, underlying	Underlying mechanisms of exclusion are addressed throughout the full proposal, in particular in Chapter 2 , such as social norms, use of technical

inclusion are an integral part of the Theory of Change, and the extent to which the Theory of Change specifically focuses on interventions to eliminate obstacles for excluded groups, women and girls, and young people in general	exclusion mechanisms will be tackled and lead to social transformation in the long term. Specific groups/barriers are not identified, and the indicators can still be made more gender specific.	language, barriers to political participation, underestimation of community-based climate strategies, and lack of spaces to articulate needs and concerns. How underlying exclusion mechanisms will be tackled is presented in the description of the pathways (Chapter 4).
	Gender seems a bit 'away-streamed' and it would help to formulate more specific objectives in this regard, or drive a specific focus (e.g. on youth inclusion). It would be interesting to understand what mechanism/tools/safeguards will be used to make sure gender does not get lost along the way in the implementation.	FEMNET and AYC will leverage their expertise and skills to ensure a feminist/intersectional lens to the implementation of the programme, further unpacking barriers and underlying conditions of exclusion, and ensuring leadership positions of women and youth in movements (Section 5.2). Section 4.3.6 presents more details on how the AACJ consortium will pursue a gender transformative lobby agenda, among others through ensuring the implementation of the Gender Action Plan in all eight countries. The indicator that measures progress on leadership positions in supported organizations is disaggregated for women, youth and indigenous communities.
	Geographical balance does not extend into Northern Africa in order to cover a genuine pan-African voice, which in itself is an acceptable limitation of geographical scope, but could be made more explicit.	Selection criteria for countries are presented in Section 1.4 . The ambition is to connect with climate movements across the African continent.
The extent to which there is a clear analysis of the available civic space for the proposed programme and the (innovative) way in which this space will be safeguarded and/or expanded	Opportunities for this programme could have been made explicit, thereby linking the context description to specific interventions or strategies.	Sections 3.3 and 7.2 to 7.11 present opportunities for change at national and global level, and regional knock-on effects.
	The alliance does explain how advocacy will be used to open civic space, specifically for women and youth, but this is very general and provides insufficient insight into how civic space will be used or increased.	Section 5.6 presents strategies for how the AACJ consortium plans to protect and open civic space. Sections 7.2 to 7.10 provide additional details on planned interventions to open and protect civic space.
	Some risks should deserve more attention in the ToC itself (e.g. 'Frames used by powerful adversaries	Vested interests, in particular related to exploitative projects which damage the environment and violate fundamental rights, are problematized in

	underline shifts in attitudes and beliefs’, or ‘Vested interests slow down transition policies’).	Chapter 2 (problem analysis) and addressed in Section 4.3.4 (pathway 3, legal empowerment of communities).
The extent the consortium has insight into the organizations and groups that are most important for the programme, and can illustrate this using an actor analysis	Explicit actor overview, their roles are not analysed.	The roles of actors are further elaborated in Sections 3.4 (actor analysis) and 7.2 to 7.11 (country and regional/global sections).
	Private sector is included as a target group, but does not feature in the analysis and overall programme approach. This needs further deepening. More insight into the ‘powerful adversaries’ would have helped to understand the scope of the approach.	Exploitative (extractive) industries and large-scale (agricultural, infrastructural) projects damaging the environment and causing rights violations are problematized in Chapter 2 .
	More insight into access to climate network needed.	Sections 7.2 to 7.11 provide details on existing climate networks that the consortium has reached out to or will reach out to.
The extent to which the consortium can clearly explain its reasons for working together	Information to assess complementarity and added value between consortium partners remains insufficient.	Section 4.3.1 provides expertise and skills of consortium partners vis-a-vis the pathways. Sections 4.3.2 to 4.3.6 present how interaction between pathways (hence shared expertise and experience of consortium partners) contribute to the strategic objective.
The extent to which the Oxfam Novib is capable of drawing attention in Dutch society to climate Justice	Lack of clear L&A objectives regarding the NL agenda to support climate justice internationally (e.g. the direct targeting of Dutch companies and policy makers or politicians comes forward to a lesser extent).	Section 7.11 presents the Dutch lobby and advocacy agenda.

ORGANISATIONS

